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Summary
The research presented in this thesis rests on the premise that the
administrative and legal systems of France have a critical bearing on the way that
decisions on applications for permissions to build are taken, and the nature of the
decisions themselves. In the knowledge that the French system of law offered a
legalistic, regulatory franiework for planning policy and policy implementation, four
specific questions are posed: firstly about the relationship of plans to development
control decisions; secondly about the effects of the system on applicants; thirdly about
the possibilities for third parties to be involved in, and seek redress from,
development control decisions and fourthly about the effects of the decentralisation
of development control powers that has taken place since 1983. These questions are
then located within a broader discussion of discretion, accountability and the
management of uncertainty.
The theoretical discussion of the first chapter paves the way for a more
detailed presentation of the nature and origins of French local administration and
French planning law and procedure which in turn lead to a case study of the 55
communes of the Urban Community of Lyon and eight studies of development
control applications which are explored through an examination of the case file
documents and interviews with participants.
Two sets of conclusions are drawn from the study. The first set concerns the
effects of a legalised system on the making and implementation of planning policy.
The first conclusion is that the legalistic approach of the French planning system
appears to create serious difficulties for finding an appropriate expression for policy.
In part the problem is shown to be as much a question of ethos as of what is really
possible under the law, amid some examples of practice in Lyon show how flexibility
is still possible even within a legalised system. The second conclusion is that once the
rules are departed from, the system offers no alternative means of testing policy in
its specific application, although the use of non-statutory consultation meetings in
Lyon has gone some way to meeting the problem. The third is that the pattern of
zoning and regulations does not appear to help the maintenance of a planning strategy.
The fourth is that a legalised system does not promote certainty for either
administrators or applicants. The fifth is that a legalised system does not permit third
parties to participate in the decision-making and ensures that objections are seen
mainly as being about property values.
The second set of conclusions has to do with the question of the power to
decide and the accountability of decision-makers. The first is that the legalised
system, while offering potential for agency discretion, nevertheless appears to favour
officer discretion which on the evidence of the case studies is rife. While offering
mayors the possibility of tactical power, it appears to reduce the accountability for
decisions taken. Moreover, the control of the legality of decisions is dependent
equally upon the discretion of the prefect. The second is that the pattern of cross-
regulation within the French system of local government has ensured the continuity
of dependencies between the principal actors in the planning system. The final
conclusion is that decentralisation has had relatively little effect on the balance of
power. In the Lyon conurbation, COURLY would appear to be the principal
beneficiary of the new powers, which would suggest that more power will be
concentrated in future at the local level, but that the power will not be any more
susceptible to control by the electorate.
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1.	 INTRODUCTION
Li	 The Genesis of the Project
Because Britain developed a planning system somewhat in advance of other
industrial countries, and because aspects of the planning have been much admired and
emulated overseas, there has been a tendency to self-sufficiency in Britain's attitudes
towards planning which has underplayed the value of looking at other planning
systems. There are two reasons why it has become increasingly difficult to sustain
such an attitude. Firstly, an assumption about the superiority of Britishplanning can
certainly no longer be taken for granted, if it ever could, now that all industrialised
countries have sophisticated planning machinery; secondly, membership of the
European community actually requires an understanding of what takes place in the
member states, as a prerequisite for greater harmonization between them.
Apart from adding to the store of knowledge and to planners' cultural
awareness, there nevertheless remains a doubt about what value such examination of
other systems actually has. One approach is to see whether other countries might
actually offer a way of doing things that could be usefully applied at home. But there
is an inherent danger in that approach. You may study solutions to a particular
planning problem, or the use of a particular policy tool, or even a kind of procedure,
only to discover that each is dependent upon circumstances that do not obtain at
home. The conclusion is then to say that countries differ because they differ, and
that the findings are interesting but irrelevant. Any tendency to insularity is thereby
reinforced, and nothing very useful has been gained.
The thrust of this thesis is that a mechanistic study of planning instruments
or policy in other countries tells one too little to be of real value. With decisions on
changes in land use, the important focus, it will be argued, must be upon the process
by which decisions are taken. The process not only concerns the way in which
2decisions are taken, but who takes them, and what kind of decisions they are. And
the process is determined by the nature of the transactions between certain actors and
the understanding that the actors have of themselves and of each other. In this light,
the plans and the policy tools, the procedures and the methods of control, must be
seen as products of deep-seated cultural forces and not determinants of the process:
they formalise and maybe come to constrain, relationships and transactions, but they
do not at the origin alter the way in which the actors behave. The real lessons come
from the awareness of this relationship between the visible aspects of the planning
system and the context in which it operations.
The purpose of this research project is not to make a detailed comparison of
two planning systems, but to examine in depth one system from without. It has thus
avoided some of the methodological difficulties of cross-national comparison. On the
other hand, the chosen field, of French development control, was a direct extension
of work on the British development control process (Booth, 1979, 1981, 1983; Beer
and Booth, 1982) which to some extent had explored the way in which participants
in the planning process in this country had actually behaved. Most of this research
had used case studies to investigate the processes and confirmed the value of case
studies as a method of investigation. The same approach was adopted here, and
development control in France has been studied through examples of developments
for which approval was given in the Lyon conurbation. As it turned out, there are
in effect case studies at two levels: at the larger scale the urban community of Lyon
itself forms a case study - in many respects a special case in France - and the
individual developments amplify the process at the smaller scale.
If the concentration on one planning system avoided the methodological
problems inherent in making comparisons, it ran the risk of making imperfect
judgments upon the processes observed through a failure to understand the cultural
forces that determine the transactions that took place between people and
organisations. In the end there is no substitute for long association with the culture
3whose planning system is under study, though observation of how people treat each
other, through an understanding of the formative points in the country's history,
through friendships, through literature and the use of language. In the present study
that process was aided by the work of informed outsiders like Ardagh or insiders like
Peyrefitte or de Beauvoir. But it is never complete: there are always new discoveries
to be made, that may cast the understanding of the development control process itself
intO a new and unexpected light.
1.11	 An Ai p roach to French Planning
It has to be said also that the point of departure for this study of French
development control was not some well-conceived conviction about the value of the
study of planning in other cultures. There was not in the first instance any well-
developed theoretical formulation which it was hoped that empirical research could
test; nor did the study arise at the outset from a desire to explore the effects of policy
in action. Rather it was the result of a somewhat indiscriminate inquisitiveness about
how things were done 'over there', a land of summer holidays spent by the sea or
strolling along tree-lined boulevards, where the wine and the food were by definition
good, but where presumably there was also some concern for the distribution of
activities and the need to control physical development. The inquisitiveness was
fuelled by a more immediate and practical need: that of having to explain to students
what happened in France and why as a necessary preparation for field trips to
northern France in 1980 and 1981. The difficulty in making sense of the planning
system represented an important spur to becoming more deeply involved.
English language texts on what was happening in France appeared to be few
and far between. Those by English writers have tended to concentrate on special
areas, be they the new towns or regional planning in the Ile-de-France. Those by
French writers have tended to be based on assumptions that English readers would not
4share and describe what the law allows for but not what happens in practice. There
seemed to be an equal dearth of empirical study among the standard French texts,
which appeared in the main to be legal textbooks written by lawyers, and for an
outsider rendered opaque by the attention to the fine detail of planning law. If
anything did emerge from this initial reading it was that France has had successes in
sectoral planning and in regional development of a kind that find little comparison
in Britain. For the rest, France evidently had a land-use planning system with a
hierarchy of plans and a system of control, which one might be tempted to think was
similar to our own. But such comparisons are nugatory and say nothing about how
decisions are taken and on what basis, and what the results have tended to be.
At this point the temptation would be to embark on a comparative study of
comparable developments in Britain and France, say housing estates or hyper-
markets, and see what had happened in each country. The approach was rejected at
the outset, however. 'Comparable' developments may be superficially similar, but
would in practice be sure to reveal a host of dissimilarities, be they in terms of
housing finance, land acquisition, retail markets and catchment areas, household
expenditure (to name but few), not to mention topography, climate or building
materials and techniques. Thus there would be no guarantee of holding the
development as a constant to analyse the respective, differing, systems of control:
both, one may argue, are the products of socio-economic forces which are specific
to the countries. Any investigation of the French system of development control was
going to have to be internal to the system, examining the process from within the
constraints and the definitions that the system itself imposes.
Yet an outsider does not come to a foreign system of development control
necessarily capable of penetrating that system and dealing with it as an insider could,
because he will come equipped with a pattern of expectations about how things should
work and assumptions about the purpose of development control which will almost
certainly not be shared. The opaqueness at first sight of so much of the literature is
5precisely because it is based upon expectations and assumptions which are neither
shared nor explicit and the excitement conies from trying to detect what those
assumptions might be.
Little by little, light began to emerge from what had been rather unpromising
beginnings. One clue was the fact that the only books on French development control
appeared to be by lawyers and to deal with legal basis for decision-making in a way
that suggested that the role of law in our two countries is of a very different order.
This was taken an important stage further by the discovery of the book by Prats, et
al (1976) on dërogalions d'urbanisrne (departures from planning regulations in force)
which suggested that within the French planning system, departures were a far more
agonising problem than was the case in Britain, and clearly threatened the legitimacy
of the system. Prats' book was not important because it described current practise -
by the time the book was published the law had been changed - but because it shed
light on what other texts had taken for granted, that the control of development was
essentially an act of law, and that accountability before the courts was a potential
factor in every decision taken. It had the added advantage of being based on case
studies which made it amenable for someone whose experience had been as a
practising planner in a way that the theoretical texts was not.
A second text that proved formative was the collection of essays on French
and British local government, edited by Lagroye and Wright (1979). Although only
one of the chapters is related to town planning, it describes a pattern of local
government based upon principles which are seemingly far removed from those which
underpin our own. It provided the answer to such baffling questions as why the
French remain wedded to an institution as apparently anachronistic as the commune.
It also revealed a pattern of relationships between elected representatives and civil
servants, and a pattern of assumptions about the nature of local decision-making that
looked as though it might be central to understanding how the French development
control system might work. As it turned out, the of role of law and the specific
6nature of local government in France were to be understood as facets of the concern
for the country's proper administration that is deeply rooted in the history of the past
two centuries, but which had a direct bearing on the way in which town planning,
and specifically the control of development, is carried out.
Here at last, then, seemed to be something worth exploring. For it became
increasingly clear that the pattern of local government and the role of the law were
not simply a 'context' with which to flesh out the opening chapters of a thesis, they
were part and parcel of the problem to be investigated. They gave rise to two
intriguing sets of questions.
The first concerned who actually had the power to take development control
decisions, and to whom the decision-makers were responsible. Armed with Anglo-
Saxon prejudices, one wanted to be able to say, 'this is the real seat of power; this,
or this, is the body to which authority has been given to act with discretion in the
best interests of the inhabitants of this place", and then to build up a pattern of power
relationships on that basis. No such convenient pattern emerged, however, because
the premise on which French local administration is founded is not that there are
some things which it is better to let local authorities to do unimpeded within broad
limits set by Parliament. Apparent responsibilities, such as the power of mayors to
sign permissions to build in the name of the commune, came to look like an illusory
freedom, given the external constraints imposed by the regulations and the availability
of technical expertise. It was by no means necessarily 'real power'. Instead, one had
to look at an often very complex pattern of relationships between organisations and
between individuals, at all levels in the hierarchy of government, that could and did
shift according to time and place. All this raised the question of the effect of such
complexities on the practice of development control.
The question of the role of the law raised the second set of questions. A
regulatory, codified system of administrative law such as obtains in France is
7evidently geared to providing the maximum degree of certainty both for those who
administer and those subject to administration (the adrninisirés, as the French often
refer to the population at large). Here, for example, were regulations which spelled
out precisely the nature and content of development control decisions; here too, was
a system of plans which had to become legally binding documents, themselves
providing the regulations for given areas which were all-embracing in their content
and their coverage. I-low, one wondered, could such a system respond to the inherent
uncertainties of forward planning? What happened when for all the care with which
the regulations may have been prepared, reality had moved on by the time a decision
had to be taken? The experience of Prats' work suggests that the system responded
badly, because the legitimacy of the system (accountability before the courts)
vanished if for what ever reason the rule of the regulation was departed from. But
this clearly was not the whole story. Starting from the premise that in practice no
system of controlling development can work without a measure of discretionary
freedom, it seemed reasonable to investigate how that discretion was in practice
incorporated and to whom it was given to exercise. There was not questions of "other
material considerations" or "conditions such as the local authority may think fit", so
much was certain from the outset; but discretion there proved to be, though with a
far less clear indication as to whom the power to use the discretion was given.
To these general questions about the way in which the French development
control system operates, must be added the interesting complication of the change
brought about by the decentralisation of powers to local government. For the 1980s
have witnessed major legislative change introduced by Mitterrand's socialist
government of 1980-1986 which purport to give local government real power to act
in their own best interests and to try to lay to rest the bogey of the stifling
stranglehold of centralised power. Since the decentralisation of planning powers was
a major part of the legislation, most importantly in the Act of 7 January 1983, the
effects of decentralisation on development control could under no circumstances be
ignored. Indeed, they offered an excellent opportunity to explore the nature of
8relationships in local government rather more thoroughly, by posing the question of
what had actually changed between 1980 and 1986. Inevitably, the answer proved
more difficult to find than might at first have been supposed, but all the more
intriguing for that. Part of the problem was that a major restructuring of
relationships and powers that the Defferre Act and the subsequent legislation set in
place could not be expected to emerge fully fledged on the first appointed day; only
when the new system has settled down, will a full evaluation be possible.
Nevertheless there is already a good deal of evidence about the intentions and the
practice of decentralisation and such as it is, it is often very confusing.
Some things manifestly, were not intended to change, like the structure and
sub-division of local authority units: communes, dëpartenienis and regions all
remained as they had been. Others, like the a priori control of the prefect or the
introduction of directly elected regional councils, are clear departures from previous
practice. But a great deal more remains ambiguous. What does the new found
freedom of mayors to sign permissions to build in the name of the commune if there
is a plan in force really amount to if the decisions must be taken in the confines of
narrowly defined regulations? What does the power to institute plan-making,
available since 1983, really mean for the mayor of a small commune, if it is the same
ministerial technical service that is likely to be called upon to prepare the plan?
These were clearly questions of some importance to the investigation in hand.
1.12	 The Research Questions
The role of the law, the nature of the relationships within local administration,
and the effects of decentralisation are therefore three themes which run throughout
this thesis. They offer, moreover, the foundation for a rather narrower focus on
specific questions to do with the development control system which empirical research
could then be designed to explore in detail.
9The relationship between development control decision-making and the policy
base in the local plan. The French system of planning supposes that the
relationship between the plan d'occupation des sols (POS; local land use plan)
will be direct and obvious, because the parameters of the decision are mostly
contained in the POS itself. But how flexible in practice are the POS when
a development proposal does not, or does not quite, accord with the
regulations in force? Is it possible for the necessary adjustments to be made,
in an accountable fashion, or is development in practice held up by
mismatches between proposal and regulation? The hypothesis .was that the
system could not work without a measure of flexibility and therefore the
only problem was to discover how the flexibility was introduced and to whom
the power was given to exercise it.
2. The effect of a regulatory system on the applicant. A system which lays down
clearly defined rules is in principle one that ought to commend itself to
developers, of whatever kind, because provided they can meet the
requirements of the POS they should be able to receive permission to proceed
with the development swiftly, assuming that the paperwork is efficiently
handled. That, however, assumes that the regulations relate accurately to the
particularities of every site and that developers in practice are always prepared
to conform to the regulations. The hypothesis was that the certainty was
probably illusory, that there would be doubt about how the regulations were
to be applied and that it would be difficult for developers to achieve a
flexibility on the part of the authorities that would respond to their needs.
3. The ability of third parties to enter into the debate and to find redress against
the decisions of their local authority. Writers on French administrative law
suggest that it confers on third parties guarantees without equal against the
arbitrary exercise of power by those in authority. In particular, the power
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to appeal against a local authority's decision to grant consent, only rarely
present in the British system, appears an enormous advantage for third parties.
There is a difference, however, between being able to seek redress when the
decision is unfavourable and being able to enter into the process by which
decisions are taken. The hypothesis was that if redress of grievance was well
catered for by French administrative law, the right to be consulted, far less
to participate in the process, was scarcely available in the system and that
therefore, the public at large was poorly served.
4.	 The effect of 1/ic decentralisation of powers on the preceding.factors. In
theory, the decentralisation of planning powers should have set in train a
massive transforniation of relationships and distribution of power whose
reverberations would have been felt in the flexibility and the certainty offered
by POS and in the capacity of third parties to enter into the process. Initial
reading and some preliminary fieldwork suggested that this was far from the
case. First of all, the territorial subdivisions of the country had not been
altered. Secondly, there were no major changes in the participants and the
process, even if, as with the prefect now renamed Commissaire de la
Republique, they might exercise their authority in a rather different way.
Thirdly, the relationship between regulation and decision has not changed at
all, even if law had been modified. The springs of the system remained, one
could argue, as they had ever been. Moreover, decentralisation which one
might have assumed would imply a system more accountable to the population
affected by it, in practice appeared to offer nothing to the public. The
hypothesis, then, was that research would reveal that little had changed since
1983.
These four questions gave a specific focus for the research and permitted the
development of a programme to work to test the hypothesis. But behind the specifics
of the question of the development control system, behind the more general questions
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of the impact of a regulatory system or the characteristics of the local government
system, lurk some important theoretical issues which need to be considered in some
detail. These are; discretion in decision-making, the accountability for decisions
taken, and the management of future uncertainty. It is to these three that we must
now turn.
1.2	 Discretioii: Government and the Rule of Law
By making the assumption that flexibility is essential to the operation of any
planning system and, by extension, that the users of a planning system must have
discretion to act according to circumstance, we take the discussion into a minefield
at the heart of the debate in modern administration. The administrator's view,
implicitly adopted in the previous section, that discretion is simply some kind of
conveient lubrication that allows things to get done, does not adequately correspond
to the complexity of ideas that the debate has produced from lawyers, political
scientists and those concerned for social welfare. Coming to terms with discretion is
clearly fundamental to understanding how the modern state does, or should, conduct
its affairs.
An obvious next step is to ask whether there are adequate definitions of
discretion that will help us understand why the debate is so critical. Commentators
(e.g. Adler and Asquith, 1981; Ham and Hill, 1984):
"A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits of his
power leave him free to make a choice among public courses of action
or machail. "(p.4)
or Jowell (1973):
"Discretion will here i'efer to the ioom for decisional manoeuvre
possessed by the decision maker."
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To these one might add the distinction made by both Bull and Donnisson (cited by
Ham and Hill, 1984) that there is a distinction between judgement which is the
"simple interpretation of rules" and discretion in which rules "give specific
functionaries in particular situations the responsibility to make such decisions as they
think fit" (p. 149). All these commentators, concur that discretion in Jowell's words
"is rarely absolute and rarely absent'. But to conclude that discretion is about choice
in decision making and that there is a lot of it around hardly advances the argument
very far. There must be considerable sympathy for a view such as Smith's (1981) that
"the apparent supposition that we can settle upon a definition, before research begins
in social work, [is] unhelpful" (p. 60)
More helpful is the discussion that tries to define discretion by antithesis.
For Davis (1971) discretion is the antithesis of law and the issue was how laws could
successfully control unbridled discretion in the administration. This relates to the
considerable literature that opposes discretion to rules, and Ham and Hill argue that
discussion of the former must sooner or later entail consideration of the latter. Thus
Noble (1981) shows how the Housing Corporation formulated rules for registering
housing associations which were in practice widely departed from while Bradshaw
(1981), in charting the development of the Family Fund shows how it increasingly
moved towards formulating instructions to predetermine its decision-making. Within
such a view there is then a tendency to take sides: if town planners regard discretion
as indispensible to their work (e.g. Davies, 1980; Thomas et al., 1983), for those
concerned with the personal social services discretion has been seen as arbitrary and
unfair, depriving those subject to it of their rights and leaving them without proper
means of redress (Winkler, 1981; Bankowski and Nelken,198l). Discretion may be
necessary to free decision-makers from the inflexibility of rules; rules willl be
necessary to ensure that discretion is not merely a matter of personal whim. Put in
this way we can see that the phenomena are not simply opposite, but are
interdependent, as the quotation from Jowell (1973) given above suggests.
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Yet even this conceptualisation is limiting. To suppose that rules and
discretion are opposite ends of a sliding scale is more helpful than to present them as
mutually exclusive antitheses. It nevertheless supposes that they are in a similar order
of phenomenon. Dworkin's (1979) image of discretion suggests something rather
different:
"Discretion like the hole in the doughnut does not exist except as an
area left open by a surrounding bell of restriction. It is therefore a
relative concept. It always makes sense to ask 'Discretion under which
standards?' or 'Discretion as to which authority?"
(cited by Harlow and Rawlings, 1984, p. 132)
There are two points to make about such a view. The first is that it re-emphasises
Jowell's assertion that discretion is rarely absolute but must operate within limits.
The second is that it suggests that discretion is not so much a thing in itself as a
shorthand term for dealing with how the power to take decisions is allocated, the
criteria by which decisions are taken, and the mechanisms by which decision makers
account for their actions. Thus, as Adler and Asquith observe, discretionary power
is a reflection of power relationships within society as a whole.
This begins to explain why discretion causes so much concern and why it
encompasses so many fields of study. I-lam and Hill (1984) identify five areas in
which discretion becomes an issue: in organisation theory, in social policy, in
administrative law, in criminal law and in central-local relationships. Discretion in
two of these areas, administrative law and central-local relationships, is clearly of
central relevance to this study of French development control and it will be important
to explore the theory further in these contexts. Before doing so, however, there are
two further general issues that need to be addressed.
The first of these concerns the split that Adler and Asquith (1981) identify
between the discussion of discretion at niicro and macro levels. In social policy, for
example, the discussion appears to be rooted in the minutiae of practice. Thus Bull's
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(1980) concern for discretion stems from how the supplementary benefits system
affects individuals, and many of the studies in Adler and Asquith's book are
concerned with precisely the same level of detail. Yet the concerns of those who
write about administrative law and discretion, or about central-local relationships are
with global, constitutional issues rather than with the welfare and the rights of
individuals. The present study therefore faces an important conceptual gap. At one
level it is to be about the day-to-day decision-making of individual officers and
elected representatives, and therefore is comparable in general terms to studies like
Bull's or Noble's and Bradshaw's cited earlier. At another we have already suggested
that a discussion of French development control draws us willy-nilly into a discussion
of institutional relationships and how the French understand the nature of
government. As we shall observe later the sense of a structural continuum in
government, law and decision-making will require us to bridge that gap.
The second has to do with types of discretion available. The literature makes
it clear that the hole in the doughnut varies considerably in size and shape. Bull, for
example, makes the important distinction between agency and officer discretion. In
the former, the agency has powers conferred on it by parliament, which in the case
of supplementary benefits meant the central Commission (and local offices were
obliged to follow where the Commission led). Officer discretion on the other hand
originates from the actions of individual officers and is subject to control, if at all,
only to the local level. With officer discretion, he further distinguishes between the
discretion implied by interpretation of rules, taking decisions in cases where rules are
deemed inappropriate and departing from rules. Though Bull is dealing with
supplementary benefits it is quite possible to see an analogous pattern in the British
planning system: the Town and Country Planning Acts confer explicit discretion on
local authorities as agencies; in their dealings with the public planning officers can
and do exercise discretion in interpreting the acts. The model would, however, need
further elaboration to incorporate the various kinds of formal delegation from
members to officers that the local authority planning function often incorporates.
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Bull makes it clear that to confuse these types of discretion, by whatever name they
may be called, is to blur two quite separate problems:
"My concern is that the failure to distinguish between these different
levels and types of activities can contribute to a confusion of issues:
the extent to which parliament should leave scope for agencies and/or
officials to exercise discretion in exceptional circumstances; and
whether and how checks can be imposed on the inevitable power of
officers at the point of delivery of a service to make a judgement about
claims by their fellow human beings for that service."
( p . 68)
If there is a limitation to this model, it lies in the view of discretion being at
one pole whose opposite is rules. We have already argued that the two are not
phenomena that are comparable in that way; but it also fails to recognise the other
means by which discretion is contained or constrained. But because it lays stress on
rules it is particularly relevant to the essentially regulatory character of French
development control.
There are, however, other ways of characterising discretion. Adler and
Asquith (1981), for example, distinguish between professional and administrative
discretion. Professionals, they argue, are prime examples of discretionary actors
which are "subject to particularly weak forms of public accountability and control".
They can justify their use of discretion by laying claim to "esoteric professional
knowledge" and have retained the power to act "through the development of powerful
forms of occupational control" (p. 13). Professionals are also more likely than
administrators to have a strong commitment to certain kinds of welfare ideology built
up by protracted professional education. The power these professionals wield is thus
great and the exercise of what is often referred to as their professional judgement is
accorded a high status. Administrative discretion on the other hand is low-status,
characteristically constrained by rules or guidelines but because administrators do not
share in a professional sub-culture is more likely to be distorted by personal ideology.
It is also more readily criticised and controlled.
16
So high-order and low-order discretion may not simply be a question of
institutional as against individual discretion, but also of distinctions between types of
actor. Any analysis of discretionary power therefore must note who wields the power
and by what right, and what the power base of the actor may be.
1.21	 Discretion and Local Government
If to discuss discretion generally takes us into the vexed debate on social
welfare and individual rights, to discuss local authority discretion is to broach the
equally convoluted field of central-local relations. Much of this debate would appeal
to be about whether and to what extent local government can be autonomous
(Rhodes, 1980). But in whatever terms it is couched the debate is essentially about
Bull's agency discretion and has little to do with individual discretion.
A convenient starting point might be the model of British local government
that Lagroye and Wright (1979) offer as a contrast to the model they perceive for
French local government. In referring to it as a 'residual domain' they imply that
there are areas of service and welfare provision that the central state has regarded as
being better handled by local government. This Lagroye and Wright contrast with the
'conceded domain' of French local government, where the central state has grudgingly
given partial control to local authorities over activities in which the state nevertheless
retains a strong contact. We shall return to the question of French local government
in chapter 3; the model of British local government does, however, suggest some
important theoretical perspectives.
First of all, the idea that local government has an equal role accorded to it
by parliament with central government suggests in Rhodes' words a view of central
and local government being in partnership which in turn leads to a view that local
government is or should be essentially autonomous within the constraints imposed by
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acts of parliament. Such a view has led to what Rhodes can describe as the
'conventional wisdom' that local government autonomy has been eroded by successive
stages, through directive and financial control, and local authorities have been
reduced to mere agents of central government. Rhodes argues that the conventional
wisdom is not supported by the facts and that if the concept of complete autonomy
was something of a myth, so, too, was the idea that central control was removing all
local authorities' discretion to act.
The first point that Rhodes makes is that so far from being easily described
by clear concepts such as 'partnerships', 'residual domain' and ulli:a vires, the
relationship between the two levels of government is essentially ambiguous and
confused, and multi- rather than uni-dimensional. Thus a local authority does not
deal with central government as a single phenomenon, but with a multiplicity of
departments, agencies and quangos. Moreover these relationships are mediated by
policy committees which straddle institutional boundaries and what Rhodes calls the
'national community of local government' to produce a very complicated structure
indeed. It is hardly surprising that central government finds it much harder to
control local government than popular imagination would suppose. The real problem
for local government, Rhodes argued, in echoing the Layfield report was that local
authorities were forced to operate in an atniosphere of considerable uncertainty that
made long-term strategy difficult if not impossible (Rhodes, 1980, 1986).
The second point that Rhodes makes is that local authorities have never been
fully autonomous. On the other hand, the multiplicity of relationships between the
tiers of government and central government's need to rely upon local authorities to
implement policy offers local government considerable leeway to negotiate, and in
negotiating to exercise discretion. Howells (1983) exemplifies, in his study of
transport policy in South Yorkshire the essentially ambiguous character of the local
authorities' relationship with central government and the way in which that
relationship was in a state of constant evolution born of the interdependence of both
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levels of government in making policy and implementing it. And even in the 1980s
Rhodes argues that apparent directive control.by central government has been offset
by evasive action by local authorities that has resulted in unforeseen impacts on other
policy areas. This holds true even if the relationship between the actors is
asymmetric, as the state's "monopoly of legislative resources' led Rhodes to recognise
that they were often not:
"In short, there is a tension between interdependence and the exercise
of executive authority and analysis must focus on the interaction
between the two. Neither bargaining nor control is the appropriate
focus, even when the relationship is asymmetric."
(Rhodes, 1986, p. 6).
In this light it is clear that, even if we were to retain the more simplistic
'partnership' and 'agency' models of local-central relations, and to persist in arguing
that there was a shift towards local authorities as agents of the state, local authorities
would not thereby lose all their discretionary power. Indeed organisation theory
posits that the very act of delegating results in the transfer of at least some
discretionary power (Ham and Hill 1984) and that transfer must presumably occur
between organisations as between individuals. The point is reinforced by the practice
of the present British government not to make local authorities mere ciphers made
under the control of the state, but to circumvent them altogether by transferring
powers to other bodies or by giving ministries direct responsibility for what have
hitherto been local authority functions.
The messages that come across from this largely British discussion of local
government and discretion must nevertheless have a wider application. The first
must be that in a unitary state, local authorities cannot be wholly autonomous: they
will work for better or worse iii a context of national policy for which part of their
function is to be the implementing agency. The second is that if local authorities in
a unitary state are never wholly autonomous, they can to a greater or lesser extent act
with discretion because their relationship with the state is one of interdependence and
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not simple subservience: there is room for manoeuvre. The real question is how that
discretion is used and what constraints there are upon its use. The third message is
that local authorities are likely to have many different types of relationship with
central government and that these will modify over time. The specific dynamics of
a given relationship and the specific context within which the actors operate will be
of paramount importance in knowing the extent of the discretionary power available
and the likely outcome of negotiation.
1.22	 Discretion and Administrative Law
If the issue of discretion in local government is really to do with the relative
freedom of local authorities in relation to the central state, seen from a legal
perspective the issue is about whether there should be administrative discretion at all,
and if there should, how the law niight then control it. The origins of this debate lie
ultimately with the 19th century theorist Dicey who argued that there was no such
thing in England as administrative law and that "the state possessed no exceptional
powers and . . . individual public servants were responsible to the ordinary courts of
the land for their use of statutory powers" (Harlow and Rawlings, 1984, p. 15).
Drecy is therefore the progenitor of what Harlow and Rawlings call 'red light
theories' of administrative law that see the power of state as arbitrary and something
therefore to be resisted through legal control. It is from this attitude that modern
calls for a return to the rule of law derive in relation to specific acts of administration
that are perceived as arbitrary.
Adler and Asquith (1981), following Tay and Kamenka, regard this desire
for legality as presenting a crisis in the law itself lawyers raised in the tradition of
gesellschaft law based on 'atomic individualism and private interests" find it hard to
cope with administrative law in which private interest is often subordinate to the
achievement of public policies. The argument goes further that gesellschafl law is
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unable to deal with the discretion wielded by modern government, and the return to
the rule of the law produces procedural rights without necessarily tackling "basic
social and structural inequalities". (pp. 20-21)
There is, however, a rather different view encompassed by what Rawlings
calls 'green light theories' of administrative law that recognises that discretion was
inevitable, even desirable for the operation of modern administration, but there
remained a problem about how to make the exercise of discretionary power more
accountable. For such commentators as Wade, administrative law is necessary to
ensure that the executive conforms "to the principles of liberty and fair dealing"
(Ham and Hill, 1984, p. 159). Davis (1971) believed the answer lay in the legalisation
of the administrative process by developing administrative rules than relying upon
adjudication through the Courts to control and to create policy. Rules are fair
because they are explicit, but the limits of their effectiveness had to be recognised.
Davis thus goes a stage beyond what he describes as the 'extravagant rule version of
the law' which argues that only the law can provide certainty and justice for the
individual. Firstly, the rule of law does not in fact provide that certainty in that
judges themselves act with discretion according to circumstance. Secondly, Davis
recognised it would be incompatible with the needs of modern administration. But
his analysis rests on the need to distinguish between necessary and unnecessary
discretion and then that necessary administrative discretion can only be confined by
rules.
Jowell's (1973) analysis takes the discussion further. We have already noted
that he recognised the necessity for, and the ambiguity of, discretion: he proceeds to
examine how, and how far, the law can in fact control it. For Jowell there are in
effect two legal means: by 'legalisation' the formulation of explicit rules for action,
and 'judicialisation', or the subjecting of decisions to the adjudicative procedures of
courts of law. In examining these two processes Jowell argues there must be two
criteria by which they should be judged. First at a strategic level, it is important to
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know "whether legal techniques will prove effective means to achieve given ends" (p.
183). Second, it is necessary to know whether in fact the task in hand is susceptible
to legal control.
Arguments at the strategic level are familiar from other sources. Jowell notes
that rules bring the benefits of clarity and accountability to administration, will aid
efficiency and serve to protect individual administrators. On the other hand they
may prove rigid and encourage legalistic behaviour. Adjudication similarly has
strengths in allowing participation in the decision-making process, and by requiring
the decision-maker to give a justification on the basis of a declared principle, rule or
standard. It allows, too, the "incremental elaboration of laws on the basis of a case-
by-case treatment of issues" (p. 198). On the other hand, adjudication may confer
procedural rights without substantive rights, and the focus on an individual's rights
may make it difficult to generalise for the administrative task from the particular
case; to that extent adjudication is inferior to rule-making.
There are three observations to be made about this argument as it stands.
The first is that the formulation of rules does not of itself presume that decisions will
also be the subject of adjudication, although decisions subject to adjudication may
be justified in the light of a rule. The second is that adjudication always requires the
justification of decisions, but by reference in principle to more than just a legal code.
The third observation to make is that a rule once it is in place may avoid arbitrary
decision-making, but the process by which rules themselves are made may not
necessarily be free of arbitrariness. How rules are made in a legalised system of
administration will need to be scrutinised; so, too, will the other means by which
decisions are justified.
The argument cannot end there, however; we need to consider Jowell's
criterion for assessing legal control:
'What are the limits of rule-governed conduct? The essential limit
arises as a corollary of the fact that a rule is a general direction
applicable to a number of 'like' situations that may arise in future .
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The corollary therefore of the impersonal nature of rules is that
they are unsuited to the guidance of situations where the action to be
controlled is non-recurring.' (p. 202).
Jowell is thus departing from commentators like Davis (1971) who see rule-
making as the only antidote to unfettered discretion by affirming that rules will only
help in assisting with certain tasks. Standards, on the other hand, are means of
measuring flexibility in policy making because they require 'in addition to the
finding of a fact . . . a qualitative appraisal of the fact, in terms of its probably
consequences or moral justification." (p. 203) They clearly do allow for a greater
responsiveness to a particular circumstance, and can adapt to changes over time. The
application of a standard to a specific problem would thus appear to be an essentially
discretionary act on the part of the administrator, but one which becomes susceptible
to adjudication because its basis is clear. Standards nonetheless can only be used, like
rules, where the problems recur.
Legal control not only becomes difficult in dealing with unique problems, it
becomes difficult too where the problem that Jowell, following Polanyi, calls
polycentric. Jowell argues that adjudication deals invariably with "yes-no" questions
or "more or less" questions, and it is clear that rules and standards also entail this kind
of simple choice in decision-making. Where a problem consists of several interrelated
factors, the adversarial process of the law court and the right-or-wrong application
of the rule does not work satisfactorily.
The purpose of discussing Jowell's work at length is to emphasise the
importance of deciding whether in fact a particular kind of discretionary action can
be subject to either legalisation or juducialisation. In town planning, there must be
doubt whether the multi-faceted problems of land-use allocation and control can
reasonably be subject to rules, both because they are multi-faceted and because there
can be no certainty that a problem will recur, or worse, can even be foreseen. The
use of standards has also been criticised as inappropriate. Woodford et a!. (1976)
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argue that standards in residential layout fail to recognise the interaction of factors
in the housing environment and all too often employ quantified criteria that are
inappropriate to the specific end.
The potential judicialisation of planning poses rather different questions.
The success in Britain of the quasi-judicial public inquiry suggests that judicalisation
is both possible and desirable but the limitations of the .adversarial approach have
been criticised in major public inquiries and the move away from the judicial model
would appear to have accelerated since the 1970s. The emphasis on pre-inquiry
meetings and the introduction of informal hearings all tends in the.direction of
greater accessibility and participation in the process (Great Britain, 1986) and perhaps
also the representation of multiple viewpoints. There is also the question of the basis
that is used for adjudication. On the one hand there is the point already raised about
whether the possibility of recourse to judicial determination allows substantive rights
as well as merely procedural ones (Jowell, 1973; Adler and Asquith, 1981). On the
other, adjudication based on legal rules must tend, we can argue, to encourage a
legalistic approach, that will be concerned about whether the rule has been complied
with than with the justification for the rule in the first place. Legalisation of
planning thus runs the risk of failing to cope with the complexity of planning
problems, limits true participation in the decision-making process and fails to explore
fully the justification for decisions taken.
1.23	 Discretion and Accountability
One of the problems associated with discretionary power is how those who
use that power account for its use. Discretion that is accorded to local authorities by
statute implies the possibility of political discretion for which politicians are
answerable to their electorate. Politicians are served by administrators who though
they may also use discretion, are responsible to the authority that employs them and
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account in this way for their actions. In the same way, at central government level,
ministers are responsible to parliament for the activities of their ministries.
There are a number of snags to this theory of accountability. The electoral
process may be good for holding politicians to account for the accumuJation of
decisions that take, but it is not very effective for dealing with individual decisions,
which only in the cases of grossest misconduct lead to resignation. Then the link
between electorate, politician and administrator may become so attenuated that there
is no effective accountability at all. The classic case of Crichel Down in the 1950s
exposed, in Harlow and Rawlings' (1984) words, "a world of administrative policy
and decision-making apparently immune from political and parliamentary controls"
( p . 43). And, finally, professionals in local and central government will consider
themselves to have a responsibility to written and unwritten codes of conduct and to
uphold the status of their profession perhaps in the face of political pressure. In the
last case, perhaps, one kind of discretion and accountability is balanced with another
such that arbitrary decision-making is held in check, but this is clearly not enough.
There would also be the possibility of collusion which could destroy the balance.
There have to be other means to prevent the arbitrariness and unfairness of decisions
such as Crichel Down.
Requiring accountability by judicial or quasi-judicial procedure is clearly
one way forward. But as Ham and Hall (1984) observe, seeking "to counteract the
discretionary behaviour of officials with the rule of law, merely comes up against a
further set of discretionary actors, the judges" (p. 160). In legal opinion there would
appear to be an increasing view in favour of fond ing in Elliott's words "new form for
administrative disputes" with judicial review as a device used from time to time
(Harlow and Rawlings 1984, p. 94). Certainly such a view is reflected in the
proliferation of tribunals in Britain whose function and purpose varies, and not all
were or are intended to be quasi-judicial (Wraith and Lamb, 1971). The emphasis
appears to have shifted to procedural fairness as a way of making administrative
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decision-making transparent. Certainly courts of law on their own are now seen as
inadequate to ensure administrative justice and accountability and this poses
considerable problems for lawyers.
1.24	 Discretion and Certainty
The final question about discretion relates to the issue of certainty. It matters
little whether the need for certainty is primarily a psychological or practical one: the
fact that options may be left open for eventual decision reduces the certainty that
participants in a process may have about the outcome. In these terms, so far from
being a necessary strategy for dealing with future uncertainty, discretionary powers
are of themselves productive of uncertainty. There is an assumption therefore that
the more clearly guidelines for development are set out, the more expeditious is the
development process likely to be. McBride (1979) therefore criticises the British
planning system for allowing too much bureaucracy and argues in favour of zoning
regulations on the basis that delay is a factor of the fluid relationship between plans
and development control decisions. A system that lays down clear rules for
development thus eliminates uncertainty and a source of unproductive delay.
Such a view begs two questions. The first is whether in practice the rules so
devised will be easy to apply or whether the process of verifying a development
proposal in the light of the regulations in force will not itself be a time-consuming
and difficult operation. The second is that not all participants will necessarily regard
certainty as being beneficial. Healey (1983) argues that in the face of uncertainties
in economic investment opportunities and public policy, developers actually welcome
the ability to maintain a negotiative relationship with local authorities rather than one
constrained by too clearly defined policy guidelines. The point here is that
uncertainty about future development decisions is not solely related to uncertainty
about the rules governing land-use change.
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Christensen (1975) formulates the problem in a different way in analysing
how American planners behave in the face of uncertainty. She establishes a matrix
whose axes are 'technology' and 'goal'. Where goals and technology are both known,
the problems are most susceptible to regulation and the use of standards. Other
combinations are likely to involve varying kinds of discretion in order that
uncertainty can be handled. Thus where the goal is not agreed but the technology is
known, the field is open for negotiation and bargaining, while an agreed goal with
the lack of human technology encourages experimentation and research. Rules in this
analysis may be used but only under certain conditions, and this implies that systems
dedicated to rule-making might only attempt to deal with certain kinds of problem.
Thus for rules to bring certainty requires a direct and contained relationship
between the rule and its object. Where other factors have a bearing on an outcome,
then there must remain some doubt about the effect of the rule. In these terms, the
doubt about the certainty of legal rules as a medium for expressing planning policy
does not hinge simply on the particularist nature of planning and the general question
of uncertainty, but on the overlay of uncertainties, only some of which could be
directly by a system of rules.
1.3	 The Stud y of French Develo p ment Control and Discretion
These studies of British social administration and administrative law shed an
important light on the conduct of this study. Firstly, they make it clear that if the
issue is to discover what element of flexibility exists in the granting of permissions
for development, and if by flexibility we intend the use of discretion in given
circumstances, it is of paramount importance to ask what kind of discretion is at
issue. In a regulatory system the expectation must be that the prime source of
discretion is in the interpretation and the departing from rules in force and therefore
is primarily a matter of officer discretion. That in turn, however, begs the questions
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of which officers are able to act in this way and what is the context within which
they work. The answers are likely to give us a clue as to how the discretion will be
exercised. It will also be important to know if the statutes themselves confer
discretionary powers, and if so, to which agency within the hierarchy of
organisations. We might suspect there to be an interesting interaction in planning
between these forms of discretion.
Secondly, the issue of discretion in central--local relations must lead us to ask
whether clecentralised local government in France can really have the autonomy that
the decentralisatiori statutes purport to give it. The British literature suggests we
need to look very closely at the ii'pes of local authority and the parts of central
government that are involved in the planning system. We shall be moving into the
field of what Rhodes (1986) calls policy networks, or rather into one specific policy
network, where there is likely to be as much to unite as to divide the central and local
institutions. It reminds us, too, that what will hold good for the development control
system is not necessarily true for other parts of French local authorities' functions.
All of this might suggest that in studying French local authorities and their links with
central government we are not after all dealing with phenomena that are substantially
different: both are involved in what is essentially the same kind of game. What we
can argue is different 1
 however, is the understanding that the actors have of
themselves in relation to others and this is born of history and the cultural
environment. Understanding the concepts which underpin the French system will be
critical to understanding how far the actors are autonomous and how they use their
discretionary freedom. Rhodes (1986) thus underwrites in a very different context
Geertz's (1973) socio-anthropological approach referred to in chapter 2 below.
Thirdly, we shall need to examine how the legal control of discretionary
power in the French planning system works. We have referred to the system as being
'regulatory' implying that it uses legal rules extensively, and suggested that it coped
badly with the uncertainties of planning; we argued following Jowell, a priori that
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planning was inherently unsuited to control by rules. But we shall need to establish
what kind of rules are used, and who establishes them; we shall need to enquire
whether the statutes themselves confer discretionary power and on which agency.
And all of this begs the intriguing question about what happens if you try to apply
rules to a problem that is inherently unsuited to control by rule. Will we discover the
kind of 'stress' that Thomas and his colleagues (1981) discovered in Leiden? The
discussion of rules has to be accompanied by an examination of the use of
adjudication. Here the literature would seem to suggest three questions: who
adjudicates, on what basis is the adjudication carried out, and what rights does the
process confer on participants?
Fourthly, we shall be concerned with the accountability of all the decision-
makers and this implies some consideration of' the actual relationships between
politicians and their electorates, administrators and their political superiors, and the
accountability of judicial decision-making.
Fifthly, we have identified an issue in relation to rule-making and certainty,
namely that we shall need to be interested in not only the question of whether rules
really do provide certainty, but whether this is what the participants in the
development control process actually appear to want.
Such discussion apparently takes the argument well away from the classic
territory of how to formulate planning policy and maintain it through the
development of control process; indeed it is relatively unfamiliar ground for planners.
But in fact the emphasis on process has an important bearing on the work of planners,
in that the 'how' of decision-making is inextricably linked to the quality and
effectiveness of the decisions taken. In looking at rules, we are forced to consider
how planning policy is best formulated; in asking questions about discretion, we are
probing the rationale that specific actors adopt for taking decisions within their
power.
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1.4	 The Organisation of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organised in the light of the specific research
questions outlined in section 1.12 (see page 9 above) and the theoretical issues which
are addressed in the rest of this chapter. Chapter 2 looks at the methodological
questions that a study of a control system in an unfamiliar culture give rise to.
Chapter 3 expresses the nature of the French local government system in terms of the
administrative units and the powers they exercise and in terms of tke underlying
assumptions that are made about the nature of local government. The chapter also
examines attempts at reform, as a key to penetrating the assumptions, and in
particular outlines the reforms that have been implemented since 1982. Chapter 4
begins with an examination of the nature of French administrative law as a
prerequisite for understanding the statutory basis for French planning which follows.
Chapter 5 presents the local government structure of Lyon and the way in which
planning and specifically planning control is handled in the conurbation. Chapter 6
then takes specific cases of development to exemplify the application of locally and
nationally derived regulations, and the effect that these regulations and the actors
who use them have on the decisions taken. Chapter 7 analyses the findings and
presents the conclusions to be drawn from the study.
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2.	 THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
2.1	 Introduction
The research questions posed in the first chapter and the concern for process
rather than for policy and procedures as such, required an approach that would
permit the analysis of the detail of decision-making as well as of the administrative
framework in which those decisions were set. An analysis of published and
unpublished official statistics, even had they been available in a form that would have
made it possible to comment on the relationships of planning policy to eventual
control decisions, would not therefore have been an adequate basis for the research.
Nor again would an analysis of the wording and effect of the regulations, in the
legalistic fashion that is popular in France. Nearer the mark might have been an
analysis of decisions made on cases that reach the iribunaux adniinistratifs (for an
explanation of these courts see below p.5), for these would be likely to reveal some
of the preoccupations of participants on contentious cases, and shed light on how they
perceived and used the planning control mechanisms. Using cases which are the
subject of litigation has an essential weakness, however: the focus is on the
exceptional and not the typical, for only a minority of cases actually reach the courts,
in France as much as in England. There is undoubtedly important work to be done
from the source, but the method did not correspond to the purposes of this research
project.
The preferred research method was thus to use the classic development control
case study which now has a longstanding pedigree in British planning research. It
combines a reading of the relevant case files with a study of policy and informal
interviews with participants. It has mainly been used to investigate how certain kinds
of policy have been implemented in practice, and is particularly appropriate for
British development control in which local planning authorities are given a great deal
of discretionary freedom and the accretion of decisions thus becomes a major factor
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in the evolution of policy as well as in its iniplementation. Conversely, case study
research of this kind in France appears to be very rare, and perhaps precisely because
of the legalistic nature of French planning. The choice of the method for dealing
with French development control was not because of a desire to focus on the
implementation of specific policy or because it appeared little charted territory in
France. The case study of this kind is a unique opportunity to explore the unfolding
of a process over time and of the interactions of the participants with each other and
the planning machinery they have at their disposal.
The research was carried out in France in three periods. An exploratory visit
to Dijon in 1985 from mid-April to mid-May established the feasibility of doing case
study research from files. That research has already been reported on (Booth 1985)
but some of the findings are also incorporated into this thesis. In 1985 contact was
made with the planning agency at Lyon. The main research was conducted in Lyon
in a four-month period from April 1986 when the bulk of the material from primary
and secondary sources was gathered. A follow-up visit was made for three weeks in
September 1987. Legislative change up to July 1986 is incorporated in the body of
this thesis but the changes introduced since then, most importantly the Mehaignerie
Act, which was in project at the time but not made law until December 1986, has
been omitted.
This chapter looks at the way in which the case studies were chosen, the
nature of the cases, and the way in which they are treated. This is followed by a
section which deals with the limitations of the method. The final section looks at the
wider methodological problems set by undertaking research in a foreign country.
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2.2	 The Case Studies
Though the intention was to study individual cases of development that were
subject of the control process and thereby to demonstrate how the procedure laid
down in the statutes worked in practice, it soon became clear at an early stage that the
study would have to be geographically limited if the constraints of time and resources
were to be met. Thus there would be in effect two levels of case study: the first
concerning the specific application of legal provisions and administrative
arrangements to the particularities of a given area; the second nested within the first,
of particular cases of development within that area.
2.21	 Lyon
The choice of Lyon it has to be said was partly opportunistic. A preliminary
visit had established the availability of suitable case material and the willingness of
the administration to lend support to a research project of this kind. There were,
however, signal advantages in the choice of Lyon. Firstly, as a large and prosperous
conurbation it afforded the prospect of a wide choice of cases to study in detail.
Secondly, as a conimunau1 urbaine (urban community), it brought together 55
communes of widely varying types into a single administrative system for planning
purposes. The conurbation thus was a self-contained unit but at the same time
offered considerable diversity in a relatively small area. Thirdly, its specialist
planning agency offered the type of organisation and expertise that most closely
approaches a British local authority planning department and thus minimised the
problems of adjustment to unfamiliar surroundings.
The study of the planning system in the Lyon conurbation was assessed
through four types of work. First, there was a certain quantity of published and
unpublished material about the administration for planning to be found in the
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professional press and in documentation produced by the Communauté urbaine de
Lyon (COURLY). Second, interviews were conducted with representatives of three
principal organisations in the conurbation: the Direction departementale de
l'Equipment (DDE; field service of what is now the Ministry of Infrastructure); the
planning agency, and the administration of COURLY. Third, it was possible to
attend three meetings of the consultation préalable, the preliminary consultation by
applicants of the deputy Mayor of Lyon and the Consultant Architect of the
départenieni of RhOne that take place monthly for development in the commune of
Lyons. This was supplemented by attending a meeting of the groupe de travail
(working party) for a revision of the plan for the south-west of the conurbation and
a public participation meeting in the suburb of St.-Clair. Fourth, published and
unpublished development control statistics were available to give the order of the
administrative task that confronts the authorities.
2.22	 The Cases of Development
The original intention had been to select one application for permission to
build and to follow it through the period in which it was being determined in order
to chart the process with the greatest immediacy. It quickly became apparent that the
time available did not permit such a study. A suitable case was not immediately
forthcoming; it would in any case almost certainly have taken longer to process than
the period of the main study; and to have studied a case from the point at which an
application was lodged would have overlooked the critical period of informal and
semi-formal negotiations that precedes the lodging of an application. The focus thus
shifted to cases that had already been determined, which were originally intended as
back-up for the main case.
Selecting the cases was not necessarily an easy task. A prime requirement was
that they should be recent so that memories of what had happened and why were still
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fresh in the minds of participants. The selection was thus limited to decisions taken
in the period from 1 April 1985 to 1 April 1986, i.e. the year immediately before the
main study visit. A second decision had to be made as to whether the cases should
represent different types of development and different types of commune. Quite
apart from the fact that the permutations of these differences were potentially
endless, and the cases could never be fully representative, such an approach would
have rested on a fallacy, that the process varied according to the type of development.
Except insofar as the participants were different in, say, an industrial as against a
residential case, reflection suggested that this was not self-evident. The differences
between communes, however, looked more significant and it did seem appropriate to
enquire what the relative power of mayors whose communes had no more than several
hundred inhabitants, and the mayor of Lyon whose commune had a population of
several hundred thousand, might be.
Fortunately the conurbation is divided into five sectors and the method
adopted was to select, with the assistance of the sector group leaders in the planning
agency, cases for exploration. The group leaders were asked to identify cases in
which there had been problems with the regulations or disagreement between
participants. This yielded a total of ten cases which were explored in detail. Seven
were cases which had already been determined, and of them, two were found to have
insufficient interest to be worth reporting. Three more were cases that were in the
process of being determined. Two were in Lyon itself and were presented at the
consultation préalable in June 1986; the third was in Rillieux-la-Pape and was the
subject of an internal meeting with the technical officers involved and the developers'
architect. An eleventh case, which because of its sensitivity could only be studied
from the extensive coverage in the local and national press, was that of the proposed
Lyon mosque. Though worth a monograph in its own right, the nature of the
material gathered and of the issues involved made it unsuitable for inclusion in this
thesis.
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Of the cases that are reported on, the majority concern housing. Four are of
detached or semi-detached housing on green field sites; one concerns terraced housing
in part of a suburban centre redevelopment project and one inner mixed residential
and commercial development on a small inner area site. The other two concern the
extension to commercial premises, and the conversion of, and addition to, a 19th
century villa for an old people's home. The geographical distribution was such that
there was at least one case in each sector, although in the event there was no cases
chosen from Villeurbanne. The two cases rejected were both in the eastern sector.
One was an industrial layout where planning regulations proved to be a less important
factor than hesitations on the part of the developer. The other was a hostel for
handicapped children in which problems - in the event trivial - had to do with the
ownership of the site.
Each of these cases, with the exception of the eleventh, was studied from the
case file, by reference to the appropriate plan d'occupation des sols (POS; local land
use plan) and by interview with as many of the participants as possible. The
interviews were unstructured, but sought in every case to do three things. First, the
participants were asked to give their version of what had happened before and during
the processing of the cases and to comment on their attitude to the events. Second,
they were asked for their opinions on the decentralisation of planning process. Third,
they were asked for their opinions on the deregulation of the planning system.
The interviews lasted between one and two hours and were not tape-recorded,
but were written up immediately following the interview from notes. They reflect
the views of administrators, professional planners, state and municipal authorities,
elected representatives, architects, developers and local residents. The interviews thus
served a triple purpose: they promoted information on, and perceptions of, the cases
studied; they offered perceptions of the planning process in Lyon; and they gave a
cross-section of professional and lay opinions of the French planning system in
general.
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Each of the sites was visited, sometimes on more than one occasion, and most
were recorded photographically. As far as possible, plans, extracts from the POS,
copies of the decision notices and other documentation were obtained and some of
them are incorporated in chapter six.
The analysis of the cases follows a consistent pattern. The importance of the
period before the application for permission to build were lodged came to be seen as
critical, since it appeared that much decision-making occurred then rather than
during the processing of the application itself. The case studies were thus analysed
specifically with a view to determining what decisions had been taken and by whom
before the application had been lodged, as well as in the formal processing period.
They were also analysed in terms of the interests of the participants in order that
decisions could be seen in the light of participants' priorities. The timing of
decisions, their nature and the participants' interests are also related to the procedural
mechanisms provided for by the code de I'urbanisnze.
The use of case study methodology was thus geared to the objectives of the
research and the nature of the hypotheses to be tested. It is equally true to say,
however, that the desire and the ability to do case study research was an important
factor at the outset and to some extent generated the research questions. In part, the
incentive was the knowledge of what case studies would yield, as against say,
gathering statistical data; in part it was a love of the concrete detail, the desire to
visualise the system and know what it 'felt like'. To present research of this kind as
logical progression from knowledge of the research area to the formulation of
research hypotheses to the selection of appropriate methodology is a falsification of
the actual research process, a falsification which ignores the looping that takes place,
and the impact of the researcher's interests and abilities. This in turn suggests a high
degree of engagement of the researcher in the process which is both essential, and
dangerous insofar as enthusiasm may obscure the logic of the method. There is
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nevertheless a purpose in presenting the process as linear, apart from the observance
of academic proprieties, and that is to demonstrate that engagement and looping do
not necessarily lead to inconsistency.
2.23	 Limitations of the Case Stud y Method
There are invariably shortconiings as well as strengths in using case studies as
the major research method, and within the present project are of two kinds. The first
was to do with the inherent problems associated with case studies. The second has to
do with the particular problems of the choices made. In relation to the first, there is
the inevitable fear, drawn very vaguely from a conception that scientific endeavour
must generalise from the particular, that the cases may not be 'typical' and that the
result is 'merely anecdotal'. Yet this approach is a fundamental misunderstanding of
the nature and value of the case study. The truth must be that no case can ever by
typical of other than itself, be the method of choosing the case never so rigorous. As
the anthropologist Geertz (1973) puts it:
"The notion that one can find i/ic essence of national societies,
civilizations, great religions or whatever summed up and simplified in
so-called 'ivoical' small towns and villages is palpable nonsense. What
one finds in small towns and villages is (alas) small-town or village
life. If localised, microscopic studies were really dependent for their
greater relevance on such a premise - that they captured the great world
in the little - they wouldn't have any relevance.
But, of course, they are not. The locus of the study is not the object
of study. Anthropologists don't study villages (tribes, towns,
neighbourhoods...) they study in villages.
The methodological problem which the microscopic nature of
ethnography presents is both real and critical. But it is not to be
resolved by regarding a remote locality as the world in a teacup . .
It is to be resolved . . . b p realizing that social actions are comments
on more than theniselves that where an interpretation comes from does
not determine where it can be impelled to go."
( pp . 22,23).
The relevance of Geertz's observations extend well beyond the field of
ethnography which was his concern in this quotation. Apart from considering the
38
irrelevance of the search for the typical or the general from the case, Geertz shifts
the emphasis to the interpretation of the actions, the origins and the statements. The
purpose of this study, then, cannot be to say that French development control is
always thus; but nor does it have to confine itself to saying that French development
control was like this in this particular place at this particular point in time. There is
an important interaction between the behaviour of people planning in Lyon and the
culture which they share with the rest of France: they. act through that shared
culture, but by acting further develop it.
The risk of becoming anecdotal in the interpretation of cases remains,
however. There can be no ultimate proof that the interpretations are sufficiently
articulated, if indeed even correct. It was salutary, for example, that observation of
the consultation préalable on three separate occasions over a period of more than two
years yielded rather different perceptions of what was actually happening. On each
occasion the ability to interpret events had been developed by the growing
understanding of the context in which the participants operated. Indeed, there are
only two guarantees against inadequate interpretation. The first is that the choice of
the parts of the context to study in depth, namely the system of French
administrative law and the character of French local government, was correct in
relation to an analysis of interactions between people in development control cases.
The second is that those variables were adequately understood.
To justify case study research in this way might be to imply that any case
study would have done. It is important to recognise, however, that the choices that
were made have in practice excluded certain kinds of analysis. Firstly, Lyon is not
like other parts of France. As a communaulé urbaine (urban community) it shares an
administrative structure with only eight other places in France. As a conurbation
with a specialist planning agency funded jointly by central and local government, it
is one of only 30 places in France. Its administration is thus more sophisticated and
more complex than that which obtains in most of France, and there are more
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participants in the planning process. At the same time the constituent communes of
the urban community are in the main far larger and more powerful than the vast
majority of French communes, and some have a longstanding history of local
autonomy. Any residual temptation to say that Lyon is typical of France as a whole
is thus eliminated. Nevertheless the sophistications and the complexities reside
within, and are dependent on, the same explicit understanding of how the country
should be governed and to that extent the cases observed reflect a prevailing culture.
More specifically, the choice of Lyon and of the particular cases on principle
limited an analysis oF the decentralisation of planning powers. The whole of the
urban community had POS in force from well before 1983, and thus there could be
no queion of assessing changing attitudes by seeing which communes had begun to
prepare plans (a necessary prerequisite for the local control of development) in
response to the new legislation. Nor was it possible to compare what happened in
communes with and without a plan but both served by the same administration.
The same kind of limitation applied to the choice of time period for cases in
that it specifically excluded cases determined before the new powers came into force.
One justification for this was that it ensured that the cases were still fresh in the
minds of participants; another that attitudes to events before decentralisation might
have been coloured by hindsight in a way which would have been difficult to
unravel. Nevertheless, there was a niore compelling reason for believing that the
choice of cases did not entirely preclude a useful analysis of decentralisation.
Preliminary investigation had suggested that before-and-after comparisons might not
be very revealing, in that it would be easy to conclude that nothing had changed in
spite of the mt entions of the government. The hypothesis that decentralisation did
not amount to dramatic revolution but could be seen as an interesting staging post in
a continuous evolution of French administration and French planning, suggested that
investigation of how participants responded after the event, and the extent to which
what they had done had only been done because of the new legislation, would be at
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least as rewarding.
The method of choosing the cases of development carried with it other
dangers. Reliance upon sector group leaders' assistance ran the risk of seeing only
those cases which they regarded as interesting, and of their perceptions therefore
colouring the analysis. Nevertheless the perceptions of the sector group leaders were
themselves revealing: the fact that regulations were frequently seen as a problem even
though the regulations were often of the planners' own devising; or that in the central
sector there were no problems between the town hail of Villeurbanne and the
planning agency because of the close working relationships. The nature of the
choices was thus part of the material to be analysed.
More difficult, however, was the fact that not all the group leaders were able
to identify suitable cases. The reason for this was not self evidently the lack of
potentially suitable cases. On the other hand, all the cases yielded points of interest
that had not been identified by the group leaders. The point of entry may have been
through the perception of what group leaders assumed would have been of interest
given the nature of the research; but analysis went well beyond that perception.
2.24	 Back ground Research and Sources
The work on the case studies was backed by reading on French planning law,
on French local government and upon the decentralisation of powers. On all these
there is a fairly extensive literature in France. A detailed reading of the code de
l'urbanisnie was essential and was simplified by using the regularly updated annotated
version edited by Bouyssou and Hugot. Various text books provided an overview of
the law and a commentary on it. Prats' book already referred to (Prats et al 1976) and
Tanguy's study (1979) went beyond the interpretation of legal texts towards a
consideration of cases which was invaluable.
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The law and the text books was backed up by two other important sources.
The first were ministerial circulars that were issued in conjunction with the new
legislation. The status of these circulars is roughly equivalent to their British
counterparts, although those connected with decentralisation are mainly concerned
with current administrative procedure, and all contain detailed directives to prefects
and mayors. To that extent they exemplify the relationship, between central and local
government in France. The second was the professional press. From 1982 onwards
there were innumerable articles explaining the decentralisation of powers, and many
of these have been cited in this thesis. A particularly valuable source proved to be
the weekly, Le Moniteur des travaux publics, which contains regular news items on
new legislation, current practice, the state of planning and the development industry.
None of this literature is readily available in Britain. A final source for the case
study of Lyon, not used systematically, was the local press. The quality of local
journalism in Lyon-Mati,i and Le Progrs is not high, but there is regular reporting
of local development news. More reflective local journalism was available in the
RhOne-Alpes regional edition of Le A'fonde, which appeared for the first time shortly
before the main study visit. By 1987 this had been joined by Lyon editions of the
national dailies Liberation and Le Figaro.
2.3	 The Problems of Research in other Countries
By embarking upon a research project which did not seek to compare systems
of planning, the methodological problems of comparative studies were eliminated.
But studying in a foreign country and iii a different culture carries with it dangers
that must be recognised and overcome. Any model of the research process that casts
the researcher as the detached, observing eye overlooks the associated quality of this
kind of case study research noted earlier. Moreover, the commitment is essentially
in two dimensions: on one axis to the study in hand, on another to a series of
U	 '1
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professional, academic and philosophical concepts, however poorly expressed, that are
the legacy of so many years thinking and working. These Anglo-Saxon attitudes run
the grave risk of colouring the interpretation of the case studies to the point of
saying, because this planning system is not British, it fails.
One way out of this dilemma is to ensure that there is an evaluatory frame of
reference that is derived from the culture itself, by asking what the system's declared
aims are and how far they have been achieved. That places a high premium on being
able to use and interpret the language of the culture being studied. Williams (1986)
insists on the desirability of understanding the language of the countries studied in
comparative research; for the present study it was indispensible.
Understanding and using the language has to operate at various levels
however. First, there is the ability to understand the general intentions of usage, the
deployment of habitual phrases or constructions and other nuances of style. Second,
is the ability to understand professional jargon. Here the problem is twofold. The
easy part of the task is learning terms which have precise definitions by virtue
perhaps of the statutes. More difficult is understanding those technical words whose
meaning is not precise or which are used in different ways in different Contexts. The
classic case for a British researcher is the word amënagement which might be
translated variously as improvement or development with suitable qualifying
adjectives, but which largely eludes easy or precise translation. Third, is the ability
to use the language. Here again there are two aspects to the problem. One is the
ability to frame questions to elicit the desired reply. The other is using language as
a means of developing an understanding of its nuances. The process of formulating
and communicating ideas in a foreign language is itself part of the research process.
To say that the researcher simply has to immerse himself in the system to be
studied and make the evaluation internal to that system would be to give a false
impression, however. The Anglo-Saxon attitudes persist obstinately. Sooner or later
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the question arises as to whether such and such a planning instrument or such and
such an administrative management 'is like' something already familiar to the
researcher. The value of such a process is not really in the comparison. The real
purpose is to discover what it is about the phenomenon that does not match
experience, and by understanding what it is not, to locate the phenomenon securely
in its system rather than make inferences about its position by false analogy.
Comparison of this kind also serves as an antidote to hubi:is. For however much a
foreign researcher may believe he understands the system he is studying, he is
essentially an outsider, with all that the term implies for both detailed observation
and lack of insight.
A final comment must be made on the use of translations in the thesis.
Wherever possible, English translations have been found for the French terms. The
original French has been retained, however, wherever an English translation would
be confusing or insufficiently precise. Thus enquête publique is not translated as
public inquiry because they conjure up very different phenomena in the two countries
even though a dictionary definition would suggest the translation cannot be faulted.
Many organisations and some planning instruments are known in France by their
acronyms. These have been retained and explained in each chapter on the first
occasion which they are used. The acronyms are certainly confusing, but are less
unwieldly than full titles. Quotations from French writers are given in translation
which are by this author except where noted.
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3.	 THE PATTERN OF FRENCH LOCAL GOVERNMENT
	3.1	 The Traditional Pattern
The purpose of this study is to enquire into the nature of decision-making
within the development control system and by looking closely at the way decisions are
taken, to understand the nature of the control exercised and the power that all the
actors within the system exercise. It is impossible to undertake such a study in any
meaningful way, however, without understanding the assumptions about the nature
of authority and responsibility that decision-making implies: who, in other words,
is acting for whom, and where does their power to act came from. The s.tructure and
purpose of local government and its relationship to central government thus quickly
become to be seen as key issues. And the more one explores these key issues in the
French context and compares them with the British context, the more one is forced
to adopt a different attitude and a different vocabulary: not central government but
I'Eial; not local councils but maires. To embark upon a detailed consideration of
French local government is not, therefore, a digression. It is essential to an
understanding of how land-use changes take place.
Insofar as anything very much is known about French local government in
England, it is seen as a highly centralised system dominated by Paris, and based on
the sternest rationality. The contrast with a British system in which local government
has a fair degree of autonomy, and which is based upon pragmatism and an ability
to muddle through, is thus easily made. Such images are curiously distorting. The
lack of autonomy and the degree of central government interference in British local
government is striking in a system that is in theory dedicated to local accountability
and control. So, too, the dilution of central power and the confusion of roles in
French local government puts paid to any concept of stern Cartesian logic. We need
to explore in what the real differences consist.
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3.1 1
	 The Conce p t of the State
The starting point for a discussion of French local government has to
be with the concept of the state, which as Dyson (1980) has shown is as absent in the
Anglo-American intellectual tradition as it is prevalent in continental European
thinking. It is particularly strong in France. Under the ancien régime already, the
idea of national unity was becoming a preoccupation, that found its resolution in the
person of the absolute monarch. Indeed while the King personally exercised power,
the unity of the state came from him in a way that permitted a certain diversity
among the population (Guichard, 1976). The Revolution and the introduction of a
democratic system removed the very force that kept France unified and the diversities
began to look threateningly disruptive. And the diversities were real enough. In
1790, for example, nearly half the population of France either spoke no French at all
or were unable to carry on a sustained conversation in the language; only 12 per cent
could speak the language purely (Rickards, 1974). The response to this potentially
centrifugal tendency was to substitute the concept of state for the concept of
monarchy and to invest the state with the status of a legal institution. The opening
words of the French constitution thus stress the unity of the state as a prime
consideration: La République Française est une et indivisible The
administration set in place by Napoleon was destined to ensure that these were not
merely empty words. At the same time, another important feature of the concept of
state in France, is the extent to which it may be personified. The absolute monarch
whose power came from the divine right to rule had gone, but the state as a legal
entity could still be represented at all levels of the national hierarchy: by the
President (or Emperor), but also by the prefects in each of the déparlements, and the
mayors in each of the communes.
The concept of unity of the state has had to coexist since the Revolution with
the new-found desire to mobilise a local democracy. The establishment of the
communes was in part at least motivated by such a desire to develop local control over
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local services. Thus the law of 14 December 1789 entrusted to the municipal council
"the management of the entirety of public services within the communal boundaries"
(Bourjol, 1975) which suggests already the exercise of democratic liberties. This was
no mere administrative function: for de Tocqueville for example
"Communal institutions are to libert y what schools are to science; they
put it in the grasp of the people and make them taste the possible uses
of it by habituating them in the use of it."
(quoted by Guichard 1976, p. 201).
Such a bias has entered deeply into French thinking. Bourjol quotes the rapporteur
of a bill in 1946 as saying,
"The French Republic is one and indivisible. Nevertheless it recognises
the existence of local authorities whose past and the common will of
whose residents confers the character and the right to administer
themselves freely within the framework of the general laws of the
nation."
(Ares-Lapoque quoted by Bourjol 1975, p.113).
The vision of the lowest level of local government as being the seat of
democracy thus appears deeply ingrained, but is also to some considerable extent at
odds with reality. The law of 1789 gave the communes the power to administer
services of public utility, but the act of 28 pluviOse an VIII specifically forbade
communal intervention, and while acts of 1837 and 1884 provided communal councils
with a consultative role, the state has by and large acted to restrict democratic
involvement in the administration of public services. The Bonnevay Act of 1912, for
example, which set up the system of 'habitations a bon marché' (low-rent housing, the
precursor of the 'habit atioiis a lover modërë', the current public sector rented housing
system) specifically excluded them from local authority control.
There is a very real tension, then, between the belief in unity of the state and
the desire for local democracy and one which lies at the heart of the debate about
decentralisation in France. Lagroye and Wright's (1979) analysis helps to put the
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relationship between centrol and local government into perspective: they refer to
local government in France as a 'conceded domain' in which the state grudgingly
allows local authorities to undertake certain functions without necessarily granting
complete local control over these functions. The comparison is with the 'residual
domain' of British local government, where central government has long recognised
that certain functions are more appropriate for local government to perform within
certain limits and without interference from central government. This has allowed
central government to act as an arbitrator in cases of dispute and to provide the
necessary protection against inequitable decisions at the local level. It could act in
this way precisely because it was not directly implicated in the day-to-day decision-
making of local authorities.
The theory of local government in Britain depends on a view of the state as
a loose aggregation of a series of different organisations, no one of which alone
represents the state as a whole; as Barker (1930, quoted by Dyson, 1980, p.5) put it,
"There is a bundle of individual officials, each exercising a measure
of authorit y under the cogniscence of the courts, but none of them, not
even the Prime Minister, wielding the authority of the state."
The safeguard for the citizen is the system of checks and balances that this
aggregation of institutions provides; the role of the law appears to be rather that of
a longstop.
In France, however, central government cannot act as an arbitrator precisely
because it is iniplicated in day-to-day decision-making at the most local level. In
such a system the law becomes far more critical as the safeguard for the citizen
against the whims and vagaries of individual governments and politicians. The law
defines the state but it also controls the state's behaviour: it provides the rules by
which both the state and the citizen must conduct their lives and the means by which
they interact. The law enters deeply into daily life and is dedicated to providing
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certainty for the administrator and the adniinisiré alike. Paradoxically, it is a system
that was one of Napoleon's totalitarian reforms, but "has survived to provide one of
the most systematic guarantees of individual liberties of the individual against the
state known at the present day" (Brown and Garner 1978, p. 15). The continuity of
administration from the highest reaches of central government to the smallest
commune can thus be envisaged, because when needed the law can provide the
necessary redress. But the tension between the democratic intentions of the
maintenance of the commune as the prime unit of local government, and the desire
to maintain the unity of the state, suggests that local government in France depends
on at least two conflicting rationales. Indeed Machin (1979) identifies four separate
systems of local government in France each with their own idea of legitimacy, and
an exploration of this analysis is revealing.
3.12	 The Systems of Local Government
The first of these systems, and the best known, is the prefectoral system
introduced by Napoleon. After the Revolution, the Constituent Assembly struggled
to find an appropriate means of unifying the country by providing administrative
units that were "unitaire et égalitaire" (unitary and egalitarian) (Francois 1976) and
the country was divided into 90 (now 96 in Metropolitan France) dêpartenients which
were intended to break with old provincial loyalties by crossing traditional boundaries
and by substituting the names of geographical features for traditional provincial titles.
In practice, some at least of the traditional boundaries were adhered to: if the
départenient of Aisne could be composed of parts of Picardy, Champagne and tIe-
de-France (Francois, 1976) the départe,nerts of Dordogne and Ariege, though both
taking their names from rivers, had boundaries that were more or less identical to
those of Périgord and the Comté de Foix respectively.
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In a desire to improve centralised control Napoleon placed within each of
these départenients his own emissary, the prefect, who took the place of the elected
assemblies of the Revolution and who was there to ensure that orders from Paris were
carried out in the provinces. This chain of command was further developed by the
existence of sub-prefects, of whom there might be between two to five in each
déparlen?enl responsible for the subdivisions known as arrondissernents, and finally
by the mayors of the communes who became, like the prefects, agents of the state,
and who brought the power of the administration to the smallest units of population.
The success of this system lay in the way that it not only introduced control from the
top downwards, it also permitted the flow of information upwards. . It is hardly
surprising that the system was retained throughout the changes from empire to
monarchy to republic that the country experienced during the 19th century, as a
major means of ensuring proper and stable administration. It is also significant that
the fragmentation of the country into a constellation of communes that for the most
part were, and are, tiny in surface area and population, was a key factor in ensuring
that every member of the population was brought close to the power of the state. A
final point to note is that just as the Emperor or President personified the state for
the time being, so his agents in the déparlenients and communes effectively
personified the state at their respective levels.
The Third Republic introduced what might be described as the second system
of local government, of locally elected municipal and departmental councils,
exercising like their British counterparts a wide range of responsibilities in the
provision of services. Within this system, the existing actors added new roles to that
of state agent. The prefect became the departmental council's chief executive, with
a responsibility for preparing the annual budget; the mayor from being a state
appointee, was henceforth directly elected by members of the municipal council.
Neither mayor nor prefect lost their former roles, however, and their position in
relation to the elected councils possibly even strengthened their quasi-presidential
power. Certainly the communal councils do not act corporately in the way that
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British councils do. As Machin (1979) puts it:
"After his election, the mayor wields most of the powers of the council.
Only at the annual budget meetings can the ordinary councillors
influence the policies of their mayor." p.36
Of course in the larger councils there is too much work for the mayor alone to handle
but his or her tasks are shared by the election of deputy, mayors (maires-adjoints)
with specific responsibilities who in their own fields may wield considerable power.
In Lyon, for example, the mayor has no fewer than 22 assistants and no commune in
COURLY had less than two deputies (COURLY, unpublished information). The
result is to create a caucus, which is not to be equated with the collegial quality of
British councils and committees.
A third system that Machin identifies is that of the democratically elected
parliament. The salient point here in what would otherwise appear not to be part of
local government at all, is the way that the fragmentation of majorities has led to
deputies being able to bargain strongly for favours from government for their
constituencies in return for support in parliament. Furthermore, advance consultation
with deputies in the appointment of prefects was still apparently the rule in the
1970s. The desire and the ability to use parliament in this way is strengthened by
another feature of French government, the cuniul des mandats (accumulation of
public office). Election to the office of mayor may well be the first stage in an
important political career, which will not necessarily entail relinquishing the post of
mayor. Deputies, senators and members of the government may well be mayors and
their seniority at the level of central government is often reflected in the importance
of the communes of which they are also mayor. Thus Chirac, at the time of writing
Prime Minister, is mayor of Paris; Chaban-Delrnas is mayor of Bordeaux, Defferre
was Minister of the Interior and mayor of Marseille; Mauroy is mayor of Lille and
was Mitterrand's first Prime Minister. In the conurbation of Lyon, the mayor of
Lyon, Francisque Collomb, is a Senator and Charles Hernu, mayor of Villeurbanne,
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was Minister of Defence until March of 1986, and notorious in this country for his
role in the scandal surrounding the sinking of the 'Rainbow Warrior'.
The fourth system of local government that Machiii identifies is that of the
ministerial field services. Their origins are once again Napoleonic, although they
derive ultimately from the old elite corps of the ancien régime. Napoleon, however,
set in place a comprehensive system of expert officials in . each of the dépariemenis,
among the foremost of which were the engineers of the Ponis-ei-Chaussées. In
principle these elite corps were subject to the prefect, but in practice they have
always had considerable freedom as local agents of their ministries in Paris and have
therefore become a power to be reckoned with.
There are perhaps two significant points to be noted here. The first is that
the concept of elite training and the building up of formidable administrative and
technocratic expertise appears to be part and parcel of an attitude to the state: a
strong administration is necessary to the maintenance of the state's unity and the
control of the potentially wayward provinces. It is a bulwark against political
instability. Interestingly, the power of the technocratic elite has increased rather than
declined in the post-war period. The products of the École Polytechnique and the
École Nationale d'Administration, the two institutions that are geared specifically to
producing high-ranking civil servants, are to be found in the highest echelons of
government, and have particularly since the I 960s found their way to political posts.
Indeed, the existence of those elite corps is seen as a major factor in the regeneration
of France and the economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s (Ardagh, 1977). What
applies in the highest reaches of the civil service also applies further down the
system. For planning and development, the graduates of the École des Ponts-et-
Chaussées were traditionally responsible for, and still in large measure control, the
operation of the planning system, in spite of the emergence of the newer breed of
planning professionals with whom they must increasingly work (Wilson 1983).
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The second point is the way in which the decentralisation of ministerial
services into departmental field services has been done in order to strengthen central
control and not to make central power either more accountable or necessarily more
responsive to local needs and local people. The establishment for example of the
Ministère de I'Equipement (Ministry of Infrastructure) in 1966, with its system of
field services in the dëparten?enls, the Directions departernentales de l'Equipement
(DDE) which remain in place in spite of the disbanding of the Ministry itself and the
creation of several smaller ministries, was a direct response to the threat that Lyon
posed to central power in attempting to establish its own planning agency (Thoenig,
1979). The field services, therefore, are powerful and extend the control of Paris
over the activities of the country as a whole. But the departmental directors of the
DDE are particularly well placed to plead the cause of their areas to the Ministry in
Paris, since as fonctionnaires d'auioriië they have delegated owners to act on behalf
of central government (Garrish, 1986). There is a sense therefore in which this
centralised control is also responsive to local need and in which Paris can become
sensitised to the needs of the regions.
3.13	 Central Control and Local Power
Local government in France is thus a far more complex structure than the
popular image of centralised control would have us believe. Indeed Machin's analysis
leaves us wondering what the impact of these four different types of local
government really is and who within this system actually holds the ultimate power to
take or to influence decisions. The fear of Paris is proverbial: among residents of the
provinces anti-Paris jokes are legion and appear to betray a bitterness that is deep-
seated. Equally indicative is the view that the TOY (Irain grande vitesse; high-
speed train) which has reduced journey times between Lyon and Paris to two hours,
so far from bringing Parisians closer to Lyon has made Lyon part of the grande
banljeue (the Parisian outer suburbs). As Guichard (1976) put it: "In French
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administration the slope favours the State." (p. 92) This in itself, perhaps explains,
on the other side of the coin, the fierce commitment to retaining the commune as the
base unit of local government; again Guichard's view that, "each of the 36, 394
communes of France is irreplaceable." (p. 201), is echoed by many commentators.
But this is a point to which we must return later. The view of the domination of
Paris, must be modified not only by the knowledge of decentralisation of activities,
but more importantly by the relationships that exist between the four systems and the
actors within each. Crozier's and Thoenig's (1982) analysis is useful here:
"What characterises the management of public affairs is not necessar-
ily a disequilibrium of power in favour of Paris; it is rather the
diffusion of power and the confusion of responsibilities right down
the territorial hierarchy between administration and local leaders
(notables). Influence is concentrated at each level, and not only at the
top, in the hands of a very small number of people."
Indeed instead of straightforward top-down control, on close inspection
public administration in France reveals a highly complicated interplay between the
most important elements in the systems. The model that has been widely advanced
to explain the system is by Thoenig's much discussed principle of regulation croisée
(cross-regulation) which Crozier and Thoenig (1976) describe as:
"a phenomenon according to which the regulation of a relationship or
an organisational channel is performed by members of another
organisalion which is itself eventually regulated by the former." (p.
566)
Others have elaborated the theme (for example Dupuy, 1985; Machin, 1981)
and Crozier and Thoenig (1976) themselves recognise that not all relationships
between centre and periphery can be characterised in this way and that "the really
powerful are always those who can escape the rule of the system" (p. 566).
Nevertheless it offers important insights into the way in which French administration
works.
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The public official of the DDE is linked to the mayor of the commune for
whom he or she is providing some kind of expert service, but may equally be linked
upward to the departmental council or prefect. Because each party are likely to be
engaged simultaneously with the different parties, each is capable of simultaneously
controlling and being controlled. Moreover, any pair of actors may rely upon a third
party to reach an agreement who is likely to impose a preconceived solution.
Relationships between any two partners is likely to be complex, because though in
theory the power they wield may be unequal, they frequently become interdependent.
And finally, though there may be no direct hierarchical control by the upper reaches
of the system over the lower echelons, the criss-crossing of relationships may ensure
that there is effectively indirect control being exercised (Dupuy, 1985). In planning,
the classic relationship is that between the mayor and the official of the DDE. In
theory much of the power traditionally rested with the DDE because they had the
expertise that most mayors lacked. In practice because engineers from the DDE often
act as agents for the commune for public works programmes, and receive a fee for
doing so, they will need to win the confidence of the mayor to further their own
position (Wilson, 1983). In the event of dispute, the prefect is there to adjudicate.
There are further complications in this system, as Dupuy shows. The general
pattern of relationships between mayors, councillors and officials in the state services,
the heads of those services, the prefect and the president of the general council of the
department, are substantially modified in the large towns. They are also substantially
modified by the curnul de niandais which allows actors to by-pass the normal pattern
of networks. The impact of both these, and particularly the former, will be seen in
the case study of Lyon. But neither factor outweighs the general point that must be
made about French local government: that the equilibrium that exists is based upon
the relationships of individual key actors; that the informal contacts are of prime
significance; and that power shifts between actors in the system. This equilibrium is
not to be compared with the system of checks and balances in the English system in
which the balance is between institutions and not individuals and the state is seen
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only through the actions of these institutions in relation to each other.
Centrality is not therefore a question of the state calling all the tunes, but the
involvement of central government at every level of local government is equally
unavoidable: it forms an essential part of the equilibrium; it provides the organising
partners for elected representatives and locally employed officials alike; it creates a
focus for bitterness and jealousy. Indeed, this system is perhaps more characterised
by its continuity than its centrality. There may be no logical connection between the
systems of government that Machin (1979) identifies, but a curious unity does emerge
from the muddle through the interdependence of each of its parts. The unity and the
indivisibility of the French Republic appears to be based on the mutual mistrust and
the endless round of bargaining which locks its actors together.
The role of the commune and its mayor within this system needs to be looked
at in more detail if the questions of power and accountability are to be understood
fully. If centralisation is perceived from outside as an obvious characteristic of
French local government so to is its fragmentation. The fact that France still retains
36,433 communes as the basic unit of government looks incomprehensible from a
country which long ago relegated its parishes to the role of consultative bodies. We
have already noted, however, the importance that the French ascribe to the commune
as the seat of democracy, and as the point at which the citizen is brought into close
contact with the state: it also becomes a bulwark against the encroachment of the
state on local affairs. These three conflicting roles are only comprehensible in the
light of the discussions above on the nature of the system as a whole.
The communes vary enormously, as might be expected given their vast
number, with the large cities counting their populations in hundreds of thousands
down to those where populations are to be counted in tens. The overwhelming
majority are, however, tiny in population. The statistics can be presented in many
ways: 86 per cent of all communes in 1983 had populations less than 1,500; only 9
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communes had populations greater than 200,000; but the message is the same (see
Table 3.1). All these communes are identical.in the eyes of the law, but in practice
their differences are as great as their differences in the populations. As service
providers, for example, they range from those small communes that can only provide
a water supply and sewage disposal in combination with their neighbours, to the big
towns that have large numbers of employees and offer a wide range of services
(Thoenig, 1979). The handful of very large communes have always had considerable
power and have exercised considerable autonomy, as in the case of Lyon. The small
communes have mostly lacked both.
We have already noted how the power, such as it may be, of a commune is
expressed in the person of the mayor. Indeed the process appears to be two-way.
The mayor derives his or her prestige from the scale of the resources and the size of
the commune lie or she controls, but the commune will increase its prestige by the
extent to which the mayor comes to hold higher political office. The dominance of
the mayor is underwritten by various factors. Once elected, the mayor holds office
for six years, and although in principle it is the council that elects the mayor, it
appears that as often as not the incumbent mayor or mayoral candidate selects fellow
candidates in the electoral list (Dupuy, 1985). Certainly the longevity of mayors is
proverbial. Chaban-Delmas has been mayor of Bordeaux since 1946; Lyon has had
only three mayors since 1905, of whom the first, Herriot, was in power for 52 years
and at one time combined the office with that of President of the Republic; and an
assistant mayor of Vénissieux could describe himself as a jeune ëlu, having only been
elected in 1977 (Fischer, personal communication). Another factor is the extent to
which mayors are seen as being above local politics and can adopt a paternalistic role.
They are thus well placed to impose decisions on the various factions who would
otherwise find it difficult to reach compromises (Birnbaum, 1979; Dupuy, 1985).
If the mayors of the large towns are people of national standing, the majority
gain their authority from the extent to which they reflect the interests of their
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commune. In 1983, for example, 36 per cent of all mayors were farmers or farm
workers, though this has declined from 45 percent in 1971 (Birnbaum, 1979). Other
large groups include tradesmen, artisans and other heads of industrial and commercial
Table 3.1
	 Distribution of Communes in Metropolitan Fran_hy
Population in 1983
Pop u I at iou	 no. of communes	 percentage
	less than	 100
	
inhabitants
	
200 -	 499
	
II
	500 -	 1499
	
II
	1500 -	 2499
	
2500 -	 3499
	
3500 -	 4999
	
5000 -	 9999
	
II
	10000 -	 19999
	
II
	20000 -	 29999
	
II
	30000 -	 39999
	
40000 -	 49999
	
50000 -
	 59999
	
60000 -	 79999
80000	 99999
	
II
100000	 149000
	
II
	150000 -
	 199000
	
TI
	200000 -	 249000
300000 and over	 II
4104
18209
8909
2049
935
660
799
388
162
68
51
29
24
11
19
8
4
5
36433
11
50
24
6
3
2
2
2
0.1
0.01
100
Source: Association des Maires de France; reproduced in Urbanisnie 53/202
June/July 1984.
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enterprises and private sector salaried workers, but the liberal professions remain
relatively poorly represented, as Birnbaum observed. There has, however, been a
shift since 1971 away from the traditional occupations towards the professions which
might suggest a gradual modernisation of the office of mayor (see Table 3.2).
Interestingly, though the hold of the traditional occupations over the office
of mayor appears to be weakening somewhat, the actual style of mayoral government
was reinforced by changes introduced by the Act of 31 December 1970 which Bourjol
(1975) saw as increasing 'municipal presidentialism". There were three factors. The
first was the need for at least 50 per cent of the municipal council to agree the calling
of an extraordinary general meeting. The second was the power to delegate certain
functions of the council to the mayor. The third was the approval of the budget was
to be given by chapter and not as hitherto by article. The combined effect of these
factors is to increase the power of the mayor and to weaken the ability of minority
groups to control the way in which the mayor exercises that power.
We might argue therefore that the attachment to the institution of the
commune is not rooted simply in an adherence to a belief in grass-roots democracy
or in a desire to provide a counterweight to the centralising tendency of the state. It
appears to come, too, from the extent to which the commune reflects a traditional
pattern of life which has been increasingly under threat since the war. The threat has
perhaps reinforced the desire to retain this last vestige of the rural France of peasants
and artisans which provides a unit of government that alone in the administration of
the country people can identify with as part of their heritage. For the mayor the
commune provides a power base, be it never so paltry, and perhaps it is hardly
surprising that mayors of communes should cling tenaciously to the territory that
gives them authority.
nos
	 %
13,319	 37
	
4,270	 12
	
5,005	 14
	
1,981	 5
	2,799	 8
1,219	 3
474
	6,288	 17
	
1.090	 3
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Table 3.2:
	 Mayors of Communes b y Occupation
Agricultural workers and sailors
Heads of commercial and
industrial undertakings
Private Sector Employees
Liberal Professions
Students and teachers in primary,
secondary and higher education
Civil servants and Local
Government Officers
Employees in Nationalised Industry
Retired Civil Servants, Local Government
Officers, members of the Armed Forces
Others including Housewives
TOTAL	 36,445	 100
Source: Association des Maires de France; reproduced in Urbanisme 53/202
June/July 1984.
3.14	 The Traditional Pattern: Some Conclusions
Out of this confusing pattern of centralisation and decentralisations, the
wielding of power in Paris and the tenacious clinging to power in the communes,
several threads emerge. The first is the extent to which the system is highly resistant
to change and the reasons for it are not hard to find. In many ways it must suit the
state to deal with 36,000 communes because few have the resources to be able to
mount a real threat to the services of the state. The power of the DDE, for example,
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is not likely to be questioned in a rural dëparle,neni, because few, if any, of its
communes will be able to afford to look elsewhere than the DDE for advice and
same
technical assistance. By theAtoken, mayors have shown themselves highly reluctant
to lose such power as they do wield. Individually, most mayors carry little real
weight, but collectively through the Association des Maires de France they constitute
a considerable lobby whose cause is well advanced by the few who do have power
that the cuniul de mandais confers. As a group, therefore, mayors are always able to
ensure their views are proven at government level. The cross-cutting pattern of
regulation that Dupuy (1985) describes also appears to reinforce the innate
conservatism of the system; for if one of the actors in the network is missing, the
justification for the others' existence is threatened. Indeed the system appears to
as
encourage the development of new organisations only insofarAthe old ones are not
removed. The creation of the urban communities coniniunaulës urbaines, for example,
discussed below, adds another layer to the hierarchies of elected representatives and
officials and has required much adjusting of roles, but none has lost his or her power
to intervene in the system.
The second thread is the one of accountability. To an Anglo-Saxon mind,
there appears to be only an accountability of decision-makers to the electorate, and
much conflict of interest, within French local government. Indeed we are forced to
conclude that citizens have relatively little direct control over local decision-making
because no elected representative has much discretion to act, and the role of mayor
as agents of the state as much as a servants of their electorates is still present. But
French expectations of their local government system are clearly different, if the
population believe that the mayor should be above politics (Birnbaum, 1979) and
become a guardian or protector who can rise above petty jealousies. The system
though partly justified by local elections, is not solely based on accountability by way
one
of the ballot box. The system is, however, Awhich is capable of being responsive to
the needs of the populations it serves. Mayors are indeed-close to their electorates:
they do identify with each other. The existence of the commune goes far to
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counteracting the problem of the remoteness of government from ordinary people
that is a major preoccupation in the reorganised British local government system. As
Gerbet (1973, quoted by Bourjol, 1975) put it in a report on the regrouping
communes:
"But besides often being a school of democracy, the management of
the commune which is effected by the simple citizen, whose devotion
to the communal cause cannot be too highly praied, ensures that jn
the remotest corners of the countr y there is an administration of rare
quality and humaneness." (p. 352)
Equally, the departmental field services of the ministries are, as we have argued, well
placed to plead their area's cause in Paris, even if they are only accountable to the
population of the departement though the trade-offs and agreements with mayors or
through democratic control exercised over government in Paris.
Both these threads are essential to an understanding of how decisions on
applications for planning permission are handled and determined, particularly in the
light of the decentralisation of powers under the Mitterrand reforms. But resistant
though the system has proved to change, the inadequacies of the systems of local
government have provided the substance for repeated attempts at reform. Before
turning, therefore, to decentralisation itself and the changes since 1982, it is necessary
to reflect upon those attempts at reform that preceded decentralisation and
particularly those that have taken place in the post-war period.
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3.2	 The Reform of French Local Government
The question of reform in the French local government system is as vexed as
the description of the system of itself for the very reason that the justifications for
reform tend in many different directions. Specifically, reforms that appear to have
increased local decision-making power have in practice sometimes derived from a
desire rather to increase, or at least maintain, state control over local authority.
There are perhaps three dimensions to the analysis of reform that need to be
considered. First of all, there is the question of motives. Some of the r.eforms have
been undertaken with the desire to ensure the continuity of state control. Some,
again, are concerned with the efficiency of service provision and a desire to
modernise local institutions, some, yet again, are borne of a desire to introduce a
greater rationality into the country's government and distribution of resources
(Gourevitch, 1980). Secondly, there is the question of operational scale in that
reforms have been undertaken or attempted within central government, at regional,
departmental and communal level. Thirdly, there is the question of means by which
reform has taken, whether through decentralisation of powers, the deconcentration
of activities or the displacement (délocalisalion) of organisations.
These terms need explanation insofar as they are important to an under-
standing of the current reforms. Within the French system, decentralisation is used
to mean the transfer of both activities and the decision-making power to local
authorities. Deconcentration implies that here is no sharing of power with local
authorities, but that decision-making is brought closer to the population by giving a
degree of autonomy to local state services. Displacement implies that only activities
and not decision-making powers are transferred (Cahiers Francais, 1982).
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3.21	 The Reform of Central Administration
Considering, firstly, the reform of central government institutions, the one
which is perhaps most relevant to this thesis was the creation of the Ministère de
1'Equipement in 1966 and the creation of new combined field services (the DDEs) in
each of the départernents which brought together construction and highways (Ponts-
et-Chaussées). This new ministry emphasised the importance that de Gaulle placed
on urban development and in theory was designed to shift the power from the
engineers, who had traditionally held sway, to the newer breed of planners with
architectural or social science training. The Ministry has changed its. title and its
attributions several times since 1966, but the field services have remained intact, and
although Sorbets (1979) has highlighted their weaknesses, from the point of view of
the communes, they still appear to be forces to be reckoned with. The reorganisation
thus had a twofold impact. It was first of all a modernisation measure designed to
make land-use planning and development more efficient and rational. It was also a
reaffirmation of central government power achieved by the deconcentration of
activity to the dëparienieiis: the very fact that DDEs have delegated authority
ensures not only that decisions may more easily reflect local needs, but also that
power remains finally with the state. The creation of the new ministry and of the
DDEs was only one among a number of similar attempts to deconcentrate activities
of the state. Thoenig identifies two periods, from 1954 to 1968 and from 1969 to
1973 in which the government sought to lessen the burden of decision-making in
Paris in order to streamline the administration and thereby maintain central control
(Thoenig, 1979). Local authorities gained nothing from this shift.
The development of the regions reflects even more clearly the mixture of
motives that has accompanied administrative affairs in France, and though not
directly relevant to the grant or refusal of planning permission, is nonetheless
revealing of the relationships that exist between centre and periphery. Much of the
impetus for regional development stems from a rationalist model initiated by by
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Gravier's (1947) now famous book Paris el Ic desert francais which pointed to the
growing imbalance between Paris and the provinces and the need to return to a more
ordered hierarchy of settlements. Such thinking was developed into administrative
practice with the establishment in 1963 of the Delegation a l'Amenagement du
territoire et a l'Action regionale (DATAR) and the designation in 1965 of the
rnélropoles d'équilibre, the major provincial cities that were to be developed as
counterweights to Paris. The significance of these reforms is that they were inspired
by, and maintained the control of, central government. DATAR was located within
the cabinet office; its head had every access to the highest reaches of government and
its creation was to interpret terms of the National Plan in spatial and economic terms
for the regions (Grémion and Worms, 1975; Ardagh, 1977; Thoenig, 1979). Moreover
it was DATAR that set up the planning study groups for each of the mCtropoles
d'Cquilibie. It was, as Thoenig remarks a major administrative reform, but a reform
which involved little deconcentration, far less decentralisation, of power.
The establishment of the planning regions, in 1964 tended in the same
direction. The departernents were grouped into 21 regions within which the prefect
of the most important dOparternenis would become regional prefect presiding over a
regional administrative conference and a 'regional mission' of civil servants. The
region thus may have acquired a geographical and administrative identity (Thoenig,
1979, p. 81) but it did iiot modify the way in which the administration acted
(Grémion and Worms, 1975, p. 232), nor did it give the region the status of a
territorial authority. It was, as Gourevitch (1980) points out, a prime example of
deconcentration in which Paris had relinquished none of its control.
De Gaulle's reforms of 1969, had they been approved, would have had a much
more significant impact primarily because they would have devolved real power on
the regions. The reasons for the adverse reaction to de Gaulle's referendum need not
concern us here, and indeed Gourevitch doubts that de Gaulle need have lost at all.
It does, however, reveal the strength of opinions to the effective devolution of power
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both from above and below. Ponipidou's reforms of the regions in 1972, though
certainly a rationalisation of the previous structure, was 'safe' because once again
there was no real transfer of power. The 'new' regional councils that Pompidou
instituted were not elected and were able to debate and advise but not execute.
3.22	 The Reform of Local Administration: The S yndical de Communes
The question of appropriate regional government is a relatively recent issue.
The reform of the communes is a question of much longer standing, and has a much
more direct bearing on the implementation of planning policy through the control of
development. Attempts to amalgamate communes to form larger units have by and
large made little headway. Immediately after the Revolution, the Directoire had
proposed the concept of the grande commune (large commune) which was not
implemented, and the Vichy régime tried regrouping communes, but as a way of
increasing state control rather than decentralising power to effective units of local
government (Bourjol, 1975, pp. 311-2, 329-31). The most recent venture was the
statute passed in 1971 known as the Marcellin Act (after the then Minister of the
Interior) which proposed to identify those communes in rural areas or where there
was "continuous urban development" which did not have the resources to cope with
their own development and which would therefore be candidates for fusion. But the
measure was permissive and the results disappointing. By 1974 there had been 775
fusions involving a total of 1901 communes, but this represented just over a fifth of
fusions recommended by prefects and the decline in numbers of fusions after 1972
is witness to the lack of enthusiasm created by this measure (Bourjol, 1975, pp. 350-
1). The commune seemed to be more or less untouchable and its status has been
confirmed by successive statutes.
Yet if the status of the commune has been confirmed, the smallness of area
and population of most of the communes was recognised as a problem for the
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provision of services, from as early as the late 19th century. The solution that has
always achieved most mileage is the - mainly voluntary - grouping of communes into
syndicates which was first made possible by a law of 1890. Since then the number
of such syndicates has burgeoned, and are to be found in all parts of the country.
Indeed, there can be few communes which do not act jointly with some or other of
their neighbours for the provision of some kind of service. By 1970 there were
broadly speaking three types of intercommunal cooperation: the syndicate, the
district and the urban community. We need to look at each of these in turn.
The syndicat de communes exists essentially in two forms: the. syndical de
vocation unique (SIYU; single-purpose syndicate) and the syndical de vocation multiple
(SIVOM; multiple-purpose syndicate). The former, as its name implies, exists for the
better provision of a single service, be it electricity supply, water or sewerage, by the
cooperation of several communes.
The latter is a response to the growing realisation that the single purpose
syndicate was inadequate for the increased number of services which communes were
required to provide and was made possible by an act of 5 January 1959. But in either
case the services provided jointly are agreed voluntarily although since 1959 a simple
majority of communes is all that is required, rather than complete unanimity.
Traditionally the SIVOM was created either by the will of the communes themselves,
or by the prefect securing the agreement of two-thirds of the communes with more
than half the population, or half of the communes with more than two-thirds of the
population (Maurice, 1976; Thoenig, 1979). The syndicate is administered by a
committee consisting of two delegates per commune, which elects a president and a
presidential bureau in the same way that the mayor and the assistants are elected in
the communes. The president "assures the execution of the committee's decisions
and represents the syndicate in law' (Maurice, 1976, p. 15). In 1983 there were 1,980
SIVOM in existence affecting 19,157 communes and more than a third of the
country's population. The average population was just over 10,000 (MULT, 1985),
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but the large majority of communes are presumably involved in some kind of
syndical grouping and sometimes several.
The district is in effect a type of SIVOM for which some tasks are prescribed
by the act of 1959 and others may be added by agreement. The district has been seen
largely as an instrument for urban areas which cover more than one commune and is
supposed, therefore, to act as a integrating agency. The creation is rather more
formal in that the general council of the dëpariemeni must agree as well as the
constituent communes, but once again two-thirds of the communes with more than
half the population or half the communes with two-thirds of the pop.ulation may
agree to the formation of the district and until decentralisation, the prefect had the
power to agree its formation. The district is represented by a council whose members
are delegated by the communes and who elect a president and vice-president. The
communes representation may vary according to the commune's population. The
district (and indeed the SIVOM) thus has a formal existence as an ëtablissement public
with a personnalite morale: that is to say its constituent members have a common
purpose with an administrative centre and is recognised in Jaw as an entity (Maurice,
1976, p. 12). It may also, unlike the SIVOM, raise its own taxes (Richard and Cotten,
1986). It is not, however, a local territorial authority.
Unlike other syndicates, the law lays down certain obligations on the district
and its constituent conimunes. It must, for example, provide a housing and fire
protection service, although other services may be added if the communes decide to
delegate them to the district. Communes are not free to withdraw from the district
once they have joined, although new communes may be added if the district council
approves. There are many fewer districts than SIVOMs. In 1983 there were 147
covering a population of 5.4 million, and whereas almost all déparenients had several
SIVOM, only just half the déparlenienis had a district at all. Once again the size of
these districts was small by the standards of British local authorities with an average
population of just over 37,000 (MULT, 1985). A district like that based on Dijon,
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with thirteen communes and a population of 218,000, is thus untypical but represents
the possibilities of this kind of grouping. In addition to its obligatory services, the
Dijon district is also responsible for waste collection and disposal, land acquisition
and public transport. It also provides through its planning agency forward planning
and development control advice to the communes, but it is typical of this kind of
grouping that with the exception of Dijon itself, the communes have not delegated
their authority in planning matters to the district (Burdin, personal communication).
The third type of grouping is the urban community (coninlunaulé urbaine)
which was created by an act of 1966 and part yet again of a desire to modernise the
administration of the largest cities. Unlike the other forms of grouping, the law
prescribes much more closely the duties and responsibilities of the community; there
is much less discretion left to the constituent communes to determine the extent of
powers that the community can wield. Four of the nine urban communities were
those of Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon and Strasbourg imposed obligatorily by government,
but the law allows for the creation of urban communities in built-up areas that exceed
50,000 population and communes around Brest, Cherbourg, Dunkerque, Le Creusot-
Montceau-Les-Mines and Le Mans have also formed urban communities.
The list of services that are transferred to the urban communities is long (see
Table 3.3) but in addition to these services, communes may also delegate
responsibility for cultural and sports facilities, open spaces, public lighting and social
and health services. The communities are able to perform these functions because
they may raise taxes on property, and employment and on residence in the same way
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Table 3.3
	 Statutory Duties of urban communities (communautés urbaines)
-	 forward planning and plan preparation
-	 Designation and equipping of Zones d'arnë,iagenient concerles(ZAC; concerted
development zone, see below p. 1 3
-	 housing service and local HLM (habit ations äloyer moderé; low cost housing)
organ isations
-	 fire service
-	 urban passenger transport
-	 secondary schools and colleges of further education
-	 water, sewerage and waste disposal
-	 cemetaries and abattoirs
-	 roads and road signs
-	 car parks
Source: Maurice (1976, p. 16)
that the communes do; they receive a part of the income tax generated by the
population; and they can raise a precept on the sums generated by central government
to communes. It is also important to note that though forward planning and the
creation and development of :ones danuiiagenie,il concertë (ZAC; for an explanation
of this term see below) are all part of the urban community's statutory
responsibilities, processing applications for development is not (Maurice, 1976).
The integrating effect of these communities on the urban areas they serve
should not be underestimated, particularly when it is remembered that Bordeaux and
Strasbourg consist of 27 comniunes each, Lyon of 55 communes and Lille, 87
communes (MULT, 1985a). On the, other hand the urban community is still not a
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territorial authority to be compared with a British district and the communes do not
lose their status by virtue of this kind of grouping.
On the face of it, these syndicates of communes have gone far towards
overcoming the fragmentation of authority that the multiplicity of communes creates.
The practice is less reassuring. First of all the great bulk of these groupings are in
the most permissive form, that of the SIVOM. Indeed Maurice recommends this form
of association precisely because it is voluntarist in nature:
"By staying closer, at least in appearance, to a tradition of autonpmy,
the syndicate of communes appears to be the most reassuring formula
for communes who wish to keep pace with the times without at the same
time relinquishing their individuality."
(Maurice 1976, p.17)
In other words the SIVOM is a very good way for communes to have their cake and
eat it: they lose little of their independence by membership and yet off-load some
of the more troublesome aspects of service provision that would otherwise be their
responsibility. Worse, the cooperation does not always appear to work. 95 per cent
of the communes in the département of Lot were already members of SIVOM in
1975, but "for a third this formula disguised what in effect were syndicates with a
single attribution." The district for Tours "has never worked" (Bourjol, 1975, p. 353).
Bourjol concludes:
"Too often, indeed, a SIVOM is accepted for fear of a district, and a
district in the wake of a refusal of an urban community . . .. Is it
really possible under such conditions to establish rational and serious
local government upon what is little more than a fiction?"
Moreover the pattern of syndicates over the country as a whole appears to be chaotic
in its current state, even if they did work. Guichard makes the point graphically by
presenting the mythical département of Bordurie with "some of its existing
subdivisions" (p. 133) and says:
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"We still teach in ow. schools the inextricable confusion of France in
1789 in order to demonstrate the progress brought by the revolution.
If school programmes were less rooted in the past, what could one say
about the current state of our country? . . the same conunune may be
tied to another by a specialised syndicate, with others in a SIVOM,
with yet again others in a mixed syndicate. The indispensible unity
of the commune is compromised. The citizen certainly benefits from
more and more services, but is regarded less and less as a citizen and
more and more as a consumer." (Guichard 1976, p. 28)
3.23	 The Guichard Report
This critique is worth analysing because it appears in the context of the
second major attempt at local government reform between 1945 and 1982. The need
for reform was increasingly recognised as necessary during the years immediately
after De Gaulle's resignation and Giscard D'Estaing was eventually pushed to
consider a review of the possibilities for devolution by events in Perpignan in 1975.
Giscard's response, announced in a speech at Dijon in November 1975, was to set up
a commission headed by Olivier Guichard, mayor of La Baule, Deputy of Loire-
Atlantique, formerly government minister and first General Delegate of DATAR
(Gourevitch, 1980; Thoenig, 1979). The commission's terms of reference were of the
widest, their only real commitment was to produce the report within a year:
"The Commission will seek to define the scope, the organisation and
the functioning of local institutions; the division of corn petencies and
resources between them and the state; their means of providing services
and the status of the personnel in local public employment; the
conditions under which citizens may participate; the status of mayors
and municipal councillors.
"The Commission will also appli' itself to defining the obstacles of
whatever kind that efforts to decentralise have encountered and until
now have limited their effectiveness."
(Giscard D'Estaing letter to Olivier Guichard: foreword to Guichard, 1976).
Guichard's response as a Gaullist and a modernist (Gourevitch, 1980) and in
the light of Giscard's stance as someone dedicated to the département rather than
region (Thoenig, 1979) was to focus closely upon reform at the level of the
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déparienieni and commune. The current divisions of Bordurie offended against
rational thinking but for Guichard went further, because the chaos he saw was
neither efficient nor democratic.
On the one hand a real local democracy required the survival of the commune,
although maybe this was in recognition of the impossibility of proposing the abolition
of communes. On the other, the grouping of communes was essential to their
continued survival. The Guichard report therefore recommended the creation of
coinniunities of communes for rural as well as urban areas, which would provide for
an orderly integration of services and would permit the development of the necessary
complementarity of town and country (p. 212). It would also permit the proper
distribution of local taxes and prevent large differences between urban and rural
communes. And the survival of communes in ordered groupings was more likely to
assure the continuance of a real local democracy than the current chaos.
The proposals of the Guichard report were relatively straightforward. In the
conurbations and towns over 200,000 population the principle of the urban
community would be extended, to cover 25 built-up areas outside Paris that exceeded
the limit in 1975. For rural areas, communes would also be grouped into communities
of some 10 to 20 communes with a population of anywhere between 5,000 and 35,000.
These rural communities, might be linked to the nearest medium-sized town where
there was a strong interdependence of town and rural hinterland, but the report also
allowed for single communes of perhaps 30,000 population upwards to become
communities in their own right. Finally, there was provision for cooperation between
communities although this represented the least developed part of the report's
proposals. The approach was thus relatively constructive because it did not advocate
the abandonment of the commune; but it did envisage a major recast of local
government functions and an appropriate level at which they might be provided.
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Guichard's proposals were not entirely without precedent. Alain Peyrefitte,
after castigating the French for their lack of. civic awareness in Le Mal Fran çais
(Peyrefitte, 1976), had proceeded to propose, in 1975, a structure of local government
that suppressed the region and introduced the district with an elected executive, in
his book Déceniraliser (cited by Crozier and Thoenig, 1982). Guichard, however, did
not envisage the direct election of the community councils; rather there was to be an
expansion of the principles laid down for the urban communities in the statue of
1966. Guichard's structure was thus recognizably like that which already existed; it
reconfirmed the importance of the commune; it rationalised relationships which were
then chaotic; it introduced a measure of equity into the financial arrangements for
communes, but it was hardly a radical departure. Yet even these reforms appeared
unpalatable to mayors, and when a questionnaire on decentralisation was circulated
to elected representatives in 1977 a significant omission was any reference to
syndicates. The government took no action before the elections to the legislature in
1978. In 1979 a bill was introduced, the Bonnet Act, which drew its inspiration from
the Guichard report and was approved at its first reading by the Senate on 22 April
1980. But it was already too late: it did not come before the National Assembly for
debate before Giscard d'Estaing was voted out of office. Within less than a year,
Mitterrand's government having been elected on a manifesto in which
decentralisation was a major issue, brought forward legislation that was very different
from its predecessor (Gourevitch, 1980; Gontcharoff and Milano, 1985).
3.3	 Decentralisation: the Mitterraiid Reforms
The Mitterrand government took office with a commitment to change local
government with strong lines that were distinctly different from those of their
predecessors. The work of the reform was very largely that of Gaston Defferre,
mayor of Marseille and Minister of the Interior. It is hardly surprising therefore that
whereas the Gaullist Guichard, deputy and first head of DATAR should have been
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concerned about the rationality and efficiency of a local government structure,
Defferre's main concern was with the "rights and liberties" of the communes,
départenienls and regions as they then stood. The main thrust of his decentralisation
proposals was to ensure that each level in the local government hierarchy was able to
administer itself freely, with minimum interference from the State. The reforms did
not therefore begin with a discussion of the tasks which it was appropriate for local
authorities to perform and then to consider the appropriate level at which the tasks
should be carried out. Nor were the reforms presented in a single package. Defferre
chose instead a three stage process: first, a redefinition of the way in which the units
of local government should be free to conduct new affairs; second, a transfer of tasks
to those newly liberated local authorities; and third, the transfer of resources
(Flockton, 1983; Gontcharoff and Milano, 1985).
3.31	 The Defferre Act and Beyond
The Act of 2 March 1982 thus set about to shake off the yoke of Jacobin
centralism. First and foremost, the power of the prefect's tutelage was removed.
Second, the three levels of local government were formally required to exercise no
control over each others' activities. Third, the prefect, renamed Cornnzissaire de Ia
Republique (Commissioner of the Republic), was restricted to vetting the legality of
decisions taken. The structural changes that this law brought with it affected the
déparlernenis and the regions more than the communes. Since 1871, the communes
had had their democratically elected council headed by the mayor and had been
constituted to administer their activities freely, even if they had only been able to
administer freely what the state decreed. The déparienienis were also in principle
democratic and independent institutions, but in practice labowed under the severe
disadvantage of having the prefect as their chief executive. The Defferre Act,
therefore, set the déparienieni free of prefectoral control by transferring powers to
the president of general council who thus ceased to be a mere figurehead. The
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regions gained by having from March 1986 directly elected councils, and so becoming
full territorial authorities in their own right (Gontcharoff and Milano, 1985).
The Act of 7 January 1983 and subsequent legislation comprised the second
major stage of the process, defining the tasks that the newly liberated authorities
would undertake. The basic principles of these statutes were stated to be eightfold:
1. There was to be no removal of local authority powers, only the
addition of new ones:
2. The transfer of powers was not intended to attack the
preeminence of the State;
3. The transfer was not designed to create the tutelage of one
level in the hierarchy over another;
4. The transfer of specific tasks were defined by the function of
the place of each level within the hierarchy such that:
communes	 would be responsible for the control of development and
providing local infrastructure;
départenients would be responsible for social support requiring local
solidarity;
regions would have the responsibility for planning, stimulating
and encouraging activity in social, economic and
cultural spheres;
5. The transfer would be accompanied by the corresponding
transfer of resources;
6. The means necessar y for the exercise of these powers would
be provided;
7. There would be an effort to deconcentrate those activities which
would remain the State's responsibility;
8. Transfer of compelencies would lead to definitions of certain
local authority obligations as being in the public interest.
(DEniocratie Locale, 1982)
The means by which hierarchic control of one authority of another was to be
avoided was by giving each type of authority its own specific field of action. For
example, the commune, or the group of communes, was to become the unit to which
planning processes were to be devolved, both in terms of plan making and in the
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implementation of plans through the control of development. The commune could
of its own accord initiate work on a plan d'occupation des sols (POS: local land use
plan) and the mayor would, once the POS had been approved, sign permissions to
build (perniis de construire) in the name of the commune. Similarly, the Act of 7
January 1983 made it possible for groups of communes to embark on a strategic plan
(schema direcieur). All these had been tasks, as we shall see later, which had hitherto
depended on the prefect or the director of the DDE, even if the mayors had become
iii recent years partners in the process. In principle the change proposed was
tremendous: here was real responsibility, which made the vision of the Third
Republic, of communes able to determine their own destiny, a reality. The final
element in the decentralisation prograninie has been the transfer, from 1985 onwards,
of staff at departmental level from the ministerial field services to the departmental
councils.
The transfer of power and responsibilities has also been accompanied by a
measure of fiscal reform. The Giscard government, following on recommendation of
the Guichard report, had already introduced the dotalion globale de fonctionnernent
(DGF: operating block grant) which is a revenue support grant intended like its
British counterpart, to be redistributive in effect. To that, the Mitterrand
government has added the dot ation globale de dCcentralisaiion (DGD:decentralisation
grant) which was intended to compensate local authorities for the increased costs
incurred by the transfer of powers. The final grant to local authorities in the
dotation globale d'Cquipenieni (DGE; infrastructure grant) which is a subsidy on
capital expenditure by the communes and the départements. It replaces earlier
funding that was allocated according to categories of development (Garrish, 1986).
The grant, it has been argued, is itself a decentralisation measure in that it does away
with the technical and financial control of individual projects by the state and allows
local authorities to know in advance what they will receive each year for
infrastructure. Its distribution is according to a preset formula, and thus each project
does not have to be justified separately (Democratic Locale, 1983).
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3.32	 Decentralisation in Practice
So much is the theory of the system of reform that was initiated in 1982; the
development of the theme in relation to the system of land-use planning must be the
subject of a separate chapter. There are nevertheless some general observations
about the way in which decentralisation has worked in practice that are relevant.
The first observation to be made is that decentralisation in France cannot be
compared to local government reform in Great Britain, because in principle it
affected some of the fundamental processes on which the state itself is funded: as
Gontcharoff and Milano note:
"The free administration of local authorities must lead to a redefinition
of the state." (p . 45)
No wonder, then, that Mitterrand's opponents on the right, like Debré, argued that
decentralisation threatened the unity of the Republic (Nivollet, 1982a) or that
Guichard himself could object that the suppression of prefectoral tutelage would lead
to chaos in the ddparteinents and unease in the communes (Nivollet, 1982b).
It is also no wonder that as the Defferre Act was elaborated in successive
statutes decrees and circulars meant it should be sought to ensure that wider
decentralisation, the unity of the state should still be protected. The Conseil
constitulionnel (Constitutional Council) for example took the view that acts of local
authorities would only become enforceable after being submitted to "a representative
of the State' (i.e. the prefect) and a second statute, that of 22 July 1982, spelt out five
categories of decisions which would have to be submitted in this way, and to which
level within the prefectoral hierarchy they would have to be submitted. The same
statute also spells out the considerations under which the contrOle de lëgalité should
be examined by the prefects and when read in conjunction with the appropriate
circulars, it becomes clear that the legal control exercised a posteriori becomes a very
formidable check indeed on local authorities. An Anglo-Saxon would wonder why
78
such control is actually necessary, if rights of individuals are guaranteed by the
courts; a French rejoinder might be that without this control the decentralised France
would be a federal state without federal law (Chabanol, personal communication).
The state exists as a legal institution, and if local authorities were to flout the law
they would not merely infringe the rights of its citizens, but threaten its very
existence.
Those who, with Thoenig (1986), argue that subsequent legislation has
substantially weakened the impact of the Defferre appear to have a point. The point
is reinforced by those who argue that tutelage under the old system was not by any
means always the heavy hand of the state intervening in local affairs. Guichard
(quoted by Nivollet, 1982b) argued that tutelage hardly existed, arid the prefect might
more usually be cast in the role of friend and adviser to the mayor of the small
commune, rather than as the oppressor appointed by Paris. Decentralisation has
deprived local authorities of this kind of support and has replaced it with a new
uncertainty, that of not knowing how the prefect will interpret the law in respect of
any given decision. Moreover, given the number of decisions subject to control, a
prefect is bound to act selectively in pursuing infringements of the law, thus
encouraging mayors to 'chance their arm' in the decision they take. The law has
modified the relationships between mayors and prefects, but it has not lessened the
possibilities for state interference. Thoenig also suggests that decentralisation may
lead to a new form of tutelage by default, by déparlernents over communes, and by
larger communes over smaller communes, even though the Defferre Act specifically
forbids it, as départements and larger communes begin to create the technical services
that can be made available to communes which lack them.
The second observation that must be made about the Mitterrand reform is
that, in spite of the fact that decentralisation appears so threatening to the concept of
the state, it nevertheless proceeded with relatively little opposition. This is all the
more surprising given that the history of local government reform in France since the
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war has been fraught with failure. The explanations exist on several levels. Perhaps
first of all, the momentum for reform that had built up under de Gaulle and his
successors had reached a climax in the 1980s that required a solution to be found.
More importantly, the Defferre Act left existing structures intact. There was no talk
of amalgamating communes, and the Marcellin Act was repealed; the dëpartenients
gained an apparently tangible autonomy and the regions had existed for long enough
to make their creation as full local authorities an acceptable step forward in a way
that previously it had not been. On the other hand, the ministerial field services were
retained with as important a role as ever in the carrying out of technical services (see
below p. 13 and even the prefect remained, albeit under a new title (though one so
unwieldy that the term prefect remains in current usage). In this respect the fact that
the decree of 31 July 1985 on the transfer of staff from DDEs to the general councils
has caused difficulty precisely because it has upset existing structures, is highly
significant (Lacroix, 1985c). Finally, the step-by-step approach to decentralisation
has had the effect of giving elected representatives a taste for increased power before
they felt the impact of increased responsibilities.
A final reason for the acceptability of decentralisatiori may have been the way
in which it appealed to the desire to find community roots. The stress upon the local
community Jaillardon (1983) argues is based upon a false projection of a return to a
localised past, which in practice the decentralisation proposals cannot really offer,
and yet which ensures a popular appeal.
The very acceptability of the Mitterrand reforms, based upon an entirely
unmodified structure, suggests another reason why the autonomy will be hard to
achieve. The cross-cutting pattern of regulation is in no real way affected by the
changes and therefore the mutual interest of all parties is to maintain the status quo
ante. Central government staff in the field services of the ministries as a group
would inevitably tend to be against decentralisation; there would equally be occasions
when mayors of communes would only too gratefully slough off responsibility for
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unpopular decisions on the state services. At the same time, the Mitterrand reforms
did not give most communes the means to employ their own technical staff, and so
mayors are forced to rely on state provided technical advice even if the power to take
decisions is devolved on them. But the arguments are more complicated than that.
There is a growing consensus among commentators that the long-term effects of
decentralisation will be to favour the large towns at the expense of rural and smaller
suburban communes. In urban areas the will to take decisions on their own behalf is
matched by a technical capacity to do so. In the rural areas, the limitations on the
effective exercise of power will ensure that things remain much as they have always
done (see for example Jamet, 1983; Meny, 1984; Bouzely, 1984 and Tho.enig, 1986).
The heterogeneity of local government in France is thus likely to increase:
"More and more, each local situation will be jn its own category
France is reinforcing its heterogeneity and local management will
become more and more diverse."
(Thoenig, 1986, p. 9)
For critics of decentralisation this might be seen as carrying with it the implication
of a threat to the unity of the system; yet it could equally be seen as perpetuating the
old fragmentation which gives central government a powerful leverage over local
authorities.
The third observation must relate to the effect of decentralization on the
public at large. The Mitterrand reforms can be criticised in terms of an appropriate
response to the country's need for local government reform whose implementation has
been only partially successful. So it can be seen as an inefficient solution to a
nevertheless correctly defined problem. But what of the implied intention to bolster
local democracy? We have already noted Jaillardon's (1983) argument that
decentralisation trades on a sentimental vision of a return to community roots. She
also doubts whether public participation or increased communication are at all likely
under the new structure, even if they have been regularly invoked as a justification
for change. In the last analysis "local democracy is decidedly not for the people: it
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remains the preserve of its customary users, the professionals, the elected
representatives' (p. 23). Jamet (1983) and Thoenig (1986) take up the same theme.
Representative democracy may have been enhanced, but direct participatory
democracy has not, and the relationship between elected representatives and the
electorate remain unaltered.
3.3 3	 Conclusions
This debate that has accompanied local government reform makes it clear that
any move towards decentralisation faces formidable obstacles if it is not to be devoid
of meaning. There is firstly the inertia, the in-built conservatism of the system itself,
where the equilibrium of forces that the relationship of the different actors in the
system creates ensures that change is not readily accepted, and where the commitment
to existing structures is also mutually advantageous. Reform based upon existing
structures like the Defferre Act is therefore most likely to be easily accepted, but is
also least likely to lead to radical change. To conclude the argument simply in terms
of the naked self-interest of the participants in the system is to overlook the real
conceptual difficulties that decentralisation creates for the French, however. The
unity of the Republic of France remains a touchstone against which reform is
measured, and decentralisation invariably threatens the concept at its very heart.
Yet to conclude that decentralisation has not worked and cannot work would
be too simplistic. Major reform is likely to take many years to mature: a real
evaluation of the success of decentralisation must wait until at least the mid-1990's.
Then, choosing the right criteria for evaluation is equally importaht, and to use,
consciously or unconsciously, British yardsticks, would be inappropriate: French
local democracy will never look like British local democracy. Finally, there has been
real change in the new legislation which does affect the roles of the principal actors,
though perhaps not always in the way that was intended. The question of who takes
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decisions and on whose behalf cannot be answered in quite the same way in 1986 as
it could have been in 1980 even if the real answers in 1986 differ from the concept
of the Defferre Act. The nature of the changes can only really be understood in
relation to practice and to specific tasks to be performed. It is the nature of French
town planning and to the development control system that we must now turn.
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4.	 THE FRENCH PLANNING SYSTEM:
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK, PROCESS AND PRACTICE
4.1	 French Administrative Law and Planning
The previous chapter explored the administrative framework within which
decisions on planning matters are taken, and in particular the impact of Mitterrand's
decentralisation programme on existing structures. We need now to turn to the
planning system itself to see how the framework is used in formulating land use
policy and controlling the activities of developers. This chapter contains, therefore,
a description of the system of development control that operates in France and the
policy bases that are used to justify decisions in terms of legal provisions and
procedures; it looks at the principal actors in the process; and it looks at the impact
of decentralisation on the specific development control powers. It concludes with a
preliminary evaluation of the effects of a regulatory system on the practice of
planning and of the effectiveness of the measures to decentralise powers to mayors
of communes. But a proper understanding of the French planning system first
requires an understanding of the status and role of administrative law in French
administration.
4.11	 Administrative Law and the Code de I'Urbanisnie
Though it has long been recognised that Britain does indeed have a body of
law which can be properly qualified as 'administrative' the subject has always been
problematic for British writers of law. The influence of the great 19th century legal
theorist, Dicey, apears to have remained strong: he dismissed the idea that Britain
had, or could have, an administrative law like France's, and argued that legal
relationships between citizens and the state were as between named individuals. The
state had no special status or powers and was to be accountable before the common
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courts (Harlow and Rawlings, 1984). Flowever untenable such a view may be in the
face of the realities of modern administration, it nevertheless indicates the
fundamental shift in philosophical stance that is required in dealing with French
administration where the existence of a separate body of law and system of courts is
accepted as crucial to the proper government of the country.
We noted in the previous chapter how the abolition of the monarchy led to the
creation of the state as a legal entity and how the unity of the republic was assured
by law. This of itself implies that the state must have a general and corporate status
within the law that sets it apart from the mass of individual citizens. By extension
it also appears that the relationship between the state and its citizens is niediated
primarily by the law. The law provides codes for action such that state and citizen
know what is expected of each and it provides the guarantee against the unbridled
exercise of political power. French administrative law also explicity controls the
relationship between the various parts of the administration and therefore underpins
the whole of the elaborate structure examined in the previous chapter (Harlow and
Rawlings, 1984). There is an essential paradox here. Administrative law has been the
means of controlling absolutism yet was the mainstay of Napoleon's absolutist
administrative structure; yet again it has emerged as providing one of the foremost
guarantees of individual rights in Europe (Brown and Garner, 1983).
The paradox is less important for this thesis than some other features of
French law. The first is the relative roles of parliament and the executive in the
creation of law. There is no distinction between primary and secondary legislation
as in Britain, and the acts of parliament (lois), decrees of the executive (dëcrets) and
ministerial orders (arrêtës) are not at all to be compared with the relationship between
British acts of parliament and the statutory instruments and orders. The French
parliament's power to legislate is, for example, limited in practice by the list
appended to article 34 of the constitution which confers the power. More
significantly still, the acts passed by parliament are only effective once decrees have
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been formulated by the executive, and these decrees which spell out in detail how the
statutes shall be applied have equal legal standing with the acts of parliament and are
subject to the same legal control. The same is true of orders made by prefects and
even mayors.
The second point is the system of special courts that exist to adjudicate in the
event of dispute. Napoleon set up the Conseil d'Etat (the Council of State) even
before he became emperor to consider the legality of acts of the administration.
Under the Third Republic the Conseil d'Etat became in effect the common law judge
of acts of administration and was the only recourse in the event of dispute. By 1953
the volume of work made it imperative to deconcentrate the work of adjudication and
26 (later reduced to 24) iribuneaux adrninisiraiifs (administrative tribunals) were set
up to deal with the body of the work. The Conseil d'Etat reverted to the status of
longstop, a court of appeal against the decisions of the iribunaux. The iribunaux are
full courts of law, and are presided over by judge, the juge adniinisiraiif. Their
mode of operation is inquisitorial and not adversarial: the judges take it upon
themselves to establish the facts (Brown and Garner, 1983). Moreover the
proceedings of the iribunaux are not a hearing in the American sense. Though there
will be written submissions, they may or may not be read in court: but significantly
they are used as the basis for questionning by the judge (Chabanol, personal
communication).
Weil (1965), writing from within the system, notes two weaknesses of French
administrative law as it is constituted. The first is that the enforcement of
administrative law depends on the willingness of the administration to execute a
decision and a determined administration can in fact thwart the decision of the court
if it is so minded. Weil argues that in practice this weakness should not be
exaggerated, although it underlines the power of the administration. The other
weakness he identifies is the emphasis that the system lays upon the judicial aspects
of decision-making and the lack of interest in the process by which decisions are
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taken.
This in turn suggests a third, more general, point. The distinction that is
made in Britain between law and policy, however blurred the boundaries may be in
practice, clearly does not obtain in France: policy can only be elaborated as law and
applied through legally binding regulations. In Jowell's terms, administration is
legalised, because it is only by this means that political waywardness may be checked.
And the accountability to the courts ensures that decision making is also judicialiseci
in the event of dispute. The stress is thus overwhelming upon legality as the
touchstone of good decision-making. There appears to be a concern neither for
process nor for appropriateness. The overwhelming desire is to establish the certainty
of rights, duties and procedures.
The implications of this system for town planning are considerable. The legal
basis for town planning in France is the code de I'urbanisnie (the town planning code)
which brings together all the acts of parliament and the decrees and ministerial orders
into a single volume. Its complexities and ambiguities are legion, however. The
cross-referencing that must be done between the statutory and larger regulatory
sections make interpretation often very difficult. The first part of the order, about
a third of the total, is devoted to the clauses of the various acts of parliament that
have to do with land and development. Articles in this section are prefixed with the
letter 'L'. The second part, more than half the total, consists of the decrees which put
the statutes into effect and are thus vital (to a far greater degree than the General
Development Order in Britain) to the implementation of the acts. Indeed, this part
contains some of the most important legal provisions of the whole code which deal
unequivocally with matters of principle and not just detail. In some cases the
relationship is specific in that the articles of the statutes refer forward to regulations
to be made by the Conseil d'Etat and contained in the second part of the code: such
is the case with general provisions for land use. In other cases there is no explicit
reference in the first part of the code to later regulations, and the regulations approved
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by decree elaborate in a sometimes confusing fashion the intentions of the acts. In
this part of the code the articles are prefixed with the letter 'R'. The third, and least
significant, part of the code contains ministerial orders which elaborate aspects of
procedure, including, for example, standard notation for plans. In this last part, the
articles are prefixed by the letter 'A'.
The official actors within the system do not therefore have authority to plan
and control development within broadly defined limits; they are charged to carry out
the duties and implement the policy prescribed in the articles of the code. Any
planning document they prepare must itself take on the legal character of the code to
be effective. All decisions on planning matters become legal decisions. They are not
decisions within the law; they are in a sense the law. Any challenge to decision-
making can only be in the form of a judicially resolved conflict; judicialisation of
the process ensures a conflict-oriented approach to development control and also to
plan-making. Thus we shall argue that the system is strong in protecting individual
rights in the event of dispute, but weak in policy formulation and discussion, which
tends always to be conceived as a dispute. The civic quality of public debate and
involvement whose lack worried Peyrefitte (1976) is actually inhibited by law.
4.12	 French Administrative Law and Discretion
How, if at all, does a legal system of this kind confer discretionary power?
Obviously there is no sense in which French administrative law can leave decisions
to be taken freely within certain broad limits in the way that British acts of
parliament governing the conduct of local authorities do. There can be no equivalent
to the discretionary freedoms contained in S.29 of the Town & County Planning Act
1971. But an examination of the code de I'urbanisn?e reveals as would other parts of
administrative law, that if there is no global discretion available there is, nevertheless,
the formal possibility offered clause by clause of interpreting the law in the light of
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circumstance. Typically this is expressed in the substitutionof the word peul (may)
for the word doit (must). The extent to which this is true in French planning law is
a point the legal textbooks do not fail to comment on (e.g. Jégouzo and Pittard, 1980;
Labetoulle, 1982).
That the legal textbooks do comment on these permissive clauses in the code
is worth noting, because it indicates how far discretion stretches the intentions behind
the legal system: the safeguard against the whims and vagaries of decision-making
referred to in the previous chapter is weakened. It is worth noting, too, to whom that
discretion is offered, because that to some extent restores the balance: the discretion
is essentially a technical, not a political, one, to be exercised by the administration
and not by elected representatives. Even before decentralisation, however, this gave
mayors some kind of formal stake in the process in their capacity as agents of the
state. The exercise of that discretion is in principle controlled in two ways: through
the hierarchical chain of command from mayors to the ministerial field services and
the prefect and then to the ministries in Paris; or through the courts. The juge
adniin jsiratjf can, and from time to time does, rule that a particular application
represents une erreur manifesle d'appréciaiion (a manifest error of assessment).
Thus there is administrative discretion offered by the law on the basis of a
point-by-point consideration of how the law is to be applied. It need hardly be
added that even where the law does not offer discretion, we would expect to find
individual attempts t interpret the law through various forms of special pleading.
Once again the protection against abuse is first and foremost through the hierarchy
of the administration. The extent to which this guarantees the accountability for
decisions taken must be open to question.
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4.2	 The French Plannin g System
It is within the context, then, of a system of fixing legal rules for
behaviour that the French planning system must be considered, and which gives the
French planning system a very different character from its British counterpart. The
context is all the more important for the fact that superficially there is direct
comparability between the systems. Both seek to control development; both have a
two-tier hierarchy of plans which propose long-term, large-scale strategy over a wide
area and detailed land-use policy which is site-specific. The similarities end there.
The framework of the system is on closer examination, itself very different from that
offered by the Town and Country Planning Acts and when the framework is coupled
to the pattern of authority and responsibility in local government as presented in the
preceding chapter, it is clear that town planning is not at all the same activity in each
country. The point is reinforced by the fact that the decentralisation laws did not
affect the fundamental characteristics of the system at all. What they did was to
change the way in which the system of plans and control were to be used and
therefore, it might be argued, the nature of the policy and the decisions taken.
4.21	 The Control of Development
Given the subject of this thesis, it is reasonable to look first at the way in
which development is controlled. The first point to make is that superficially the
permis de consiruire may be compared to the planning permission in that both are
necessary for development. The very title however of the perniis - ' a permission to
build' - indicates the extent to which the control is more concerned with construction
than with land use and this orientation becomes clear from the key text, Article
L421-1 of the code de l'urbanisnie.
"Whoever wishes to erect or have erected a building, whether for
residential use or not, whether or not it comprises foundations, must
first obtain a permission to build ... the same permission is required
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for works carried out on existing buildings when the use of the building
would be changed, the exterior appearance would be modified or extra
floors would be created."
We may note that the clause is both more and less all-embracing than the S22
of the Town and Country Planning Acts. There is no reference to the 'mining,
engineering or other operations" that are thought to be suitable subjects for planning
control, though in practice these are covered in France by other legislation, for
example, the code niinier (minerals code). We may also note that "material change of
use" is also not specifically an issue for control except as an adjunct to physical
change. At the same time, Art. L421-1 covers physical changes to buildings which
in the British system are either explicitly excluded from the definition of
development or at least do not require express consent. Control of development is
thus fragmented, although the unity is probably maintained through the nature of the
administration by the Directions départementales de l'IEquipement (DDE;
departmental field services of the Ministry of the Environment).
There are two other authorisations that are also important in the system. The
first is the cerlifical d'urhanisme which in effect allows the developer to establish use
'constructability" of a given site (Art. L4l0-l). The certificate is in effect a
preliminary perniis de construire because the terms of a certificate cannot be called
into a question if' an application for a permis is lodged within one year of the
certificate being issued. The second is the perniis de démolir. Demolition control is
not universal in France, but is controlled in all communes with populationsof more
than 10,000 and in all communes within 50 km of the walls of Paris, where the
motive is the protection of housing, and in defined areas of natural and architectural
interest (Arts. L430-1 and L430-2; Bouyssou and Hugot, 1986).
A third form of authorisation must also be referred to at this point. The
control of the subdivision of land has been an issue ever since the chaotic
development of the Paris suburbs in the interwar years in which landowners sold off
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inadequately serviced plots to individuals. The lolissernent with its separate form of
permission occupies a hall-way position between the formulation of the plans and the
control of development, because the authorisation to subdivide contains a plan and
regulations that are binding on eventual purchasers and which form the conditions
under which subsequent pernlis de construire may be applied for and granted (Arts.
L315-1, R315-39; Tribillon, 1985). All these forms of permission are processed in
rather similar ways, such that although legislative base is different in each case, the
procedural characteristics and the forces that affect the decision are directly
comparable,
4.22	 The Polic y Base for DeveloDment Control Decision-Makin g: the
Rèi,'lenze,it national urhain
The basic framework for the determination of applications for permission to
build are contained in an extensive section of the regulatory part of the code de
lurbanisme known as the Rt'glenieiit national urbain (RNU; national urban
regulations) containing 32 separate articles grouped into five sections. They are
specifically not concerned with the procedure for determining applications which are
dealt with elsewhere, but with the grounds on which the decision must or may be
taken, It is intended to be a finite compendium of the proper considerations for
determination. The evolution of the RNU would seem to be a very good indication
of the striving for administrative certainty that was referred at the opening of this
chapter. The first elaboration of rules in the code appears to have been in 1955 as a
means of creating a uniform base for decisions throughout the country; hitherto
where there was no plan in force there could only be recourse to municipal or
departmental sanitary regulations, whose scope was inevitably limited (Labetoulle,
1983). The RNU was modified by decree in 1977 which, as Bouyssou and Flugot
(1986) note "reinforced yet further the discretionary power of the administrator
which characterised the previous regulations" (p. 323).
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With the exception of eight articles noted at the outset which apply
everywhere, the RNU is designed to apply to those communes which do not have a
plan d'occupation les sols (POS; local land-use plan) in force. In 1979 two-thirds of
the country, albeit containing only one-fifth of the population, was subject Only to
the RNU (Labetoulle, 1983); at April 1984 the proportion increased because older
style plans ceased to be valid after decentralisation (see belpw) and less of the country
was covered by a valid document.
Various points about the RNU must be emphasised. The first is to repeat that
it, and it alone, provides the grounds on which permission may be granted or refused
in the communes to which it applies: the law makes no provision for reference to
other material considerations, and authorities may not invent reasons for refusal that
cannot be justified by reference to an article of the code. The second is the extent
to which the RNU is concerned with physical layout and design. Three of the five
sections of the RNIJ deal respectively with the siting and servicing (localisation et
desserte); location and volume of buildings (implantation el volume des constructions);
and aspect. The remaining sections, containing only four of the 32 articles, deal with
the application of the rules in specific circumstances, the final article relating
specifically to the protection and development of coastal regions. The third point is
the extent to which the RNU nevertheless confers discretionary freedoms upon its
users. 17 of the 32 articles grant direct exercise of discretion; ten allow the
imposition of conditions; a further three imply in their wording that conditions may
be imposed. The typical wording of such articles reads, "permission may be refused
or granted only subject to special conditions." For the most part those on whom the
discretionary power is conferred are not named, and in principle the power is
accorded to whoever has the power to determine applications. Two articles, however,
confer a specific discretionary freedom on the prefect. Art. R1l1-20, for example,
gives the prefect the power to allow departures (derogations) from the three
preceding articles which specify the way in which buildings may be sited in relation
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to others and certain volumetric limitations. Art. Rlll-5 similarly allows the prefect
a freedom to waive limitations in the siting of buildings in relation to motorways and
major roads, here qualified by the need to obtain a proposal for such a waiver from
the DDE. It must, however, be clear that ensuring who within the complex web of
local and central government actually exercises the discretions contained in the RNU
is one key to understanding where the real power to take decisions lies.
One further global control must be referred to which does not form part of
the RNU, but which is applied everywhere in the country: the plafond legal de
densjté (PLD; legal density limit). This control was essentially a legal plot ratio
control whose aim was both to control density and a fiscal measure to boost taxes. As
conceived in 1974, it set a blanket plot ratio of 1 for all of France apart from the city
of Paris where the figure was raised to 1.5. Any developer exceeding those limits was
required to pay for the value of the land which would be necessary to accommodate
the extra floorspace if the limits were adhered to. Subsequently the limits were
modified, and Art. 112-1 gives communes the choice of raising the ratio to up to 2,
or 3 in Paris, a measure apparently designed to stimulate construction activity by
reducing the tax burden (Tribillon 1985).
4.23	 The Hierarchy of Plans
Though the RNU still applies to the greater part of the surface of the country,
it may be understood, at least in principle since decentralisation, as a stop-gap before
the total coverage of the country by planning documents. In effect this is conceived
as the substitution for a set of national regulations by local regulations which can be
more closely related to local needs. The plan therefore must be understood first and
foremost as a legal document which has parity of status with the RNU for the area
to which it applies. French commentators thus contrast the RNU with the
réglernentation locale that is represented by the system of plans (see for example
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Jégouzo and Pittard, 1980; Chapuisat, 1983). In a sense it is an almost secondary
consideration that the plan should be an instrument of planning policy, a fact of
which Jégouzo and Pittard in their text book feel the need to remind readers. We
need therefore to look closely at the nature of the system of plans and relationship to
development control decisions.
The present system of plans was put in place in 1967 by the Loi d'orientalion
fonciere (LOF; Outline Planning and Land Act, Wilson, 1983). Before 1967 acts
passed in 1919, 1943 and 1958 had all required the preparation of plans. The
procedure made possible by the earlier acts was evidently very cumbersome and their
effects limited, even though it seems that plans prepared in the late 1940's were still
in force in 1978. The 1958 act produced a more comprehensive and more manageable
system of plans with a plan directeur d'urbanisnie (PUD; town guidance plan) which
might apply to one or several communes, and a plan d'urbanisrne de detail (detail
plan) which could apply to any defined sector within a PUD to provide greater detail.
There were a number of criticisms of the system in terms of the nature of the
document and the manner of its preparation, but for the first time France had a
widely used system of forward planning which provided the kind of regulatory
control that was being looked for. Nearly 5,000 of these PUD were produced and
"several thousand" remained in force in 1978 (Jegouzo and Pittard, 1980, p. 36).
4.23 1	 The schema directeur
The LOF brought further changes both to the procedure for preparation,
which will be dealt with below, and to the nature of the plans themselves. Once
again there was to be a two-tier hierarchy, but whereas under the 1958 act the plans
were essentially similar in their impact, the schema directeur d'amenagemeni ci
d'urbanisnze (SDAU; strategic plan) and the plan d'occupation des sols (POS; local
land-use plan) were intended to be, and are, distinctly different from each other.
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The code, as Tribillon (1985) notes, makes it clear that the SDAU were conceived as
'administrative documents that direct and coordinate" and therefore were to be
compared to economic development plans (p. 184). Prepared for a 20-year period
to cover an area usually smaller than an English county, but covering several, if not
many, communes. Their import was to set the major lines of development, but not
to control the detail of the implementation of schemes. As Tribillon notes again, they
were essentially instruments by which the state could recover control over the
development of the country. They are not, therefore, a regulatory document like the
PUD or the POS and have relatively little bearing on the day-to-day process of
development control decision-making. With some exceptions, they are not opposable
in law by third parties.
Two points must be made about the SDAU in passing, however. The first is
that these plans were almost the only attempt to provide for general strategic thinking
in land-use planning. But the French do not appear to have translated the success of
their sectoral planning into spatial terms, and the SDAU have had no more than a
checkered pattern of success in directing and controlling physical development.
Wilson (183) argues that the fact that most SDAU were started in the light of inflated
expectations of growth in the 1960s and the relative lack of interest that politicians
show in matters at higher than communal level led to a rapid disenchantment with
SDAU in the 1970s. Certainly the figures confirm the lack of popularity if not
necessarily its causes; by 1984 only 187 SDAU had been approved.
The second point is the question of their status in relation to development
control decisions. As Tribillon (1985) puts it "the legal effects of the SDAU have
proved extremely embarrassing" (p. 194). Art. Rl22-20 of the code as it stood before
decentralisation required that POS, and zones darnenagement concerlE (ZAC) had to
be compatible with the SDAU (the relevant article is now R122-27 whose wording
is comparable). The SDAU could not, however, in principle be directly invoked in
determining an application for permission to build, although legal opinion appears to
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be divided on that score. The status of the SDAU once approved looks doubtful,
therefore, and there has been the tendency forthem to be quietly shelved (Chapuisat,
1983).
4.232	 The plan d'occupaiion des sols
Unlike the SDAU the PUS has precisely the character of a regulatory
document that was referred to earlier. Proposed usually for single communes, the
plan is designed to place every parcel of land in an appropriate zone and. to give each
zone its own regulations. The code gives explicit guidance as to how the PUS should
be presented. Art. Rl23-16 establishes the need for a plan (documents graphiques),
a set of regulations and an explanatory report. Part I of Art. R123-18 requires the
identification on the plan of urban zones and natural zones. The urban zones 'U' are
those which have infrastructure in existence or under construction of a capacity to
take further development. The natural zones 'N' are further divided into four classes.
First, there are zones 'NA' in which development is possible provided coherent
proposals for servicing and developing the land are brought forward. Second, there
are zones 'NB' which are partly serviced but in which future servicing, and therefore
future development, is not envisaged. Third, there are zones 'NC' protected for their
agricultural value. Finally, there are zones 'ND' to remain unbuilt either because of
environmental dangers or because of their landscape, ecological or historical interest.
The PUS must also identify woodland areas to be protected or created (espaces boisës
classes), areas for specialised activities and sectors to which specific architectural
prescriptions will apply (see Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1
	
Zonin g in Plans d'occupation des sols
Urban Zones
Zones U urban zones in which the capacity of existing public
services or services in the course of being provided
allow the immediate possibility of new development.
Natural Zones comprising as needs may be:
Zones NA zones destined for future urbanisation following a
modification to the POS or the creatkrn of a ZAC or
the provision of infrastructure compatible with a
coherent development of the zone.
Zones NB
Zones NC
Zones ND
These zones	 may
zones in which there is partial servicing which it is not
intended to reinforce.
zones to be protected for their agricultural value or the
richness of the soil or sub-soil.
zones to be protected on the one hand because of risks
or harmful effects or on the other because of their
attractiveness or historical or ecological value.
in ci u de:
Es paces boisés classes ii conserver ou a crCer
classified woodland to be conserved or created.
Zones for specialised activities
Sectors in which three-dimensional block plans impose special requirements where
architectural controls are exercised.
Source:	 Code de l'urbanisnie, Article R123-18.
The second part of Art. R123-1 8 is permissive and lists six other types of area
which may be identified in the POS. These include: zones which are subject to
special conditions in the interests of the provision of public services, health or safety;
road and footpath lines to be protected; zones for public works and open spaces; areas
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of construction or rehabilitation where floorspace ratios must be exceeded; areas
where the demolition of all existing buildings is a prerequisite of winning a
permission to build; and areas of architectural and historic interest.
To some of these zones special regulations either in the code or elsewhere will
apply; such is the case with classified woodlands which are covered by Arts. R130-
I to 16. In general, however, the regulations are created specifically within the
context of the POS, but once again central government has established a system of 15
articles which must be included for each zone even though the precise content of
these articles is left to local decision-making. This system is confirmed by ministerial
decree (arrêté) in Art. A 123-1 which also indicates plan notation. It is particularly
to be noted that articles of 14 and 15 of the POS regulations concern plot ratio
(coefficient doccupation des sols; COS) which are applicable and the conditions under
which those limits may be exceeded. These are particularly significant in terms of
the payment that must be made by virtue of Art. R332-1 if the limits are exceeded.
As for the PLD (see above) the formula requires the payment of the value of the
additional land that would be required if the COS limits were adhered to for the
developments as proposed. This participation pour dépassenient de COS is not paid
in addition to payment for exceeding the PLD. Jégouzo and Pittard (1980) note that
before the existence of the PLD there could have been a temptation to fix the COS
at a relatively low level in order then to offer authorisation to exceed the limits and
thereby increase the comniune's revenue. After the introduction of the PLD the
temptation would have been to fix the COSTa ratio of one in order to incite
developers to exceed the PLD limits and require the payment of the excess. They
offer no evidence to suggest that this has in fact happened.
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4.233	 The zone d'an1énagernenl concerté
There is another type of forward planning document that in effect forms a
third level in the hierarchy of plans: the zone d'arnenagernent concerlé (ZAC;
concerted development zone) which, if a point of reference is required, is very
roughly equivalent to the British action area plan. The ZAC is a defined zone which,
if created within the context of a published or approved POS, must be in zones U or
NA and its specific purpose is to bring land forward for development of any sort
(Arts. L31 1-1, R3l 1-1). Though the ZAC is created by a declaration by the
appropriate public authorities, the implementation of development may be entirely
carried out by the public sector or by the private sector, or by some combinations of
the two. A ZAC may be created on a green field site, on one that is partly
developed, or in a city centre. The important point to note, however, is that where
a ZAC has been declared the provisions of the POS will be expanded and replaced by
a new regulatory document which only applies to the zone, the plan d'aniënagernenl
de zone (PAZ; zonal development plan). In all respects the PAZ regulations will
resemble those for the POS except that the density is expressed not in terms of a COS
but in terms of floor space in each block (Art. R3l1-lO-3). Once a PAZ is approved
there is right of pre-emption (Art. L21 1-6).
The ZAG, like the POS and the SDAU, was a creation of the LOF and was
originally seen as a device for implementing the SDAU rather than the POS. It
thereby was originally separate from the POS and a system of control through the
granting of permissions to build. Such an open-endedness led to a discrediting of the
device which was then brought firmly back into line in 1976 (Chapuisat, 1983). The
zoning of the POS must be respected even though the regulations are supplemented
by the PAZ; ZAG may not be discontinuous in zones NA, although a single ZAG may
be created in several discrete locations in urban areas. And within the ZAG there is
now a requirement to seek a permission to build which must be in conformity with
the PAZ. The POS and the PAZ are therefore directly comparable documents.
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4.24	 The Relationshi p of Plans to Development Control Decisions
Within these types of planning document the first point to note is the extent
to which the rules attempt to predicate the future of every last parcel of land, and the
way in which, therefore, decisions on development control are in theory made in
complete security. The actual process of determining a request for permission to
build is thus primarily a checking of the legality of the application against the rules
in force in the POS (or of course in the RNU where there is no POS). The
relationship between the development control decision and the plan is thus very close
indeed, but the plan becomes essentially a control document, with a strongly negative
force.
The second point to note is that in addition to the general question of
discretion accorded by the regulations, there is some possibility offered both in the
RNU and in POS to depart from a regulation in specific circumstances. Originally
the possibility of dërogaiions (departures) was wide (Prats et al., 1979), but in 1976
frequent abuses of the system, particularly in the creation of ZAC without regard to
the zoning in the POS which was regarded as a prime example of a "maxi-derogation"
(Bouyssou and Hugot, 1976), was stemmed by new legislation. In particular,
departures from the POS were limited to "minor adaptations made necessary by the
nature of the soil, the configuration of the plot or the character of the adjoining
buildings" (Art. L123-1). This still allows some leeway for interpretation, but has
stopped the major abuses. On the other hand the possibility of modifying the POS
(described in detail below) exists in two major forms; the safeguard is that a
modification and revisions must be both submitted to an inquiry procedure which
prevents the kind of administrative collusion described by Prats (see Booth, 1986).
The third point to note is that the POS, as well as providing the regulations
by which all must abide, also, in its detailed form, sets out a programme for
infrastructure development, by identifying road lines, public utilities and open
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spaces, and by the zoning of land for future development (zones 'NA'). At this point
reference must be made to the possibility that exists for communes to raise
contributions from intending developers for the provision of services. The primary
means for this is through the taxe locale d'ëquipenzent (TLE; local infrastructure tax)
which was introduced by the LOF to replace the medley of different ways of raising
money for services that had preceded it. The principle is simple, and is outlined not
in the code de l'urbanisnie but in code gënéral des inzpols: a hypothetical value for
a proposed building is determined by applying a standard rate per square metre and
the tax is determined as a percentage of the value so derived. The rates vary
according to building type and the percentage is normally 1 per cent bit may by
declaration of the municipal council be varied to 3 per cent, and to 5 per cent where
the prefect approves. The tax is levied obligatorily in communes with over 10,000
population, but elsewhere niay be levied alter declaration by the municipal council
(Chaix and Stefanini, 1986; Chapuisat, 1983).
There is, therefore, a clear relationship between the allocation of zones NA
in a plan, the determination of permissions to build and the commune's advantage in
taking a decision which is added to the advantage that development brings in
increasing the tax base generally. Here, then, we begin to see a point at which in
principle decisions may not simply be arrived at by the application of the regulations,
but where developers may be able to acquire some bargaining power with communes
anxious to increase their financial independence. The constraints of the law may not
be so absolute as they at first appear.
The final point to note is that, just as in the RNU, the regulations of the POS
and the PAZ may contain permissive clauses. Indeed the scope to include such
clauses is even greater given that the regulations apply to known local conditions.
The POS like the RNU, therefore, allows the possibility of the exercise of discretion.
The possibility of discretion provided by a document prepared in the light of local
conditions suggests that the possibility of negotiation with applicants which again
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gives the lie to the immutability of the legislation. And, once again, as with the
RNU, the possibility of discretion and negotiation raise difficult questions about the
exercise of power and the accountability of decision-making. Once again it becomes
imperative to investigate who actually controls the process of plans preparation and
the determination of applications for permission to build. To do that requires an
exploration of the actors involved and the process by which decisions get taken.
4.3	 Participants in the Plannin g Process
So far we have looked at the permission to build and the policy documents
that inform the decision on the permission to build in the light of their status as
documents. To understand how the system really works some account must be given
of those involved in the process. In the analysis of conflict in planning decisions,
Tanguy (1979) makes a useful distinction between the following groups: landowners;
professionals in the construction industry, and civil servants. Helpful though this
distinction is, for a British readership, and in light of the subject of this dissertation,
other categories need to be included.
4.31	 The Public Sector
Some account has already been given of the public sector responsibilities in
local government. We need now to consider their specific roles in planning. It is
essential, for example, to understand the respective contributions of the mayor, the
DDE and the prefect and to understand how their general outlook affects planning
and development control decisions. We need also to understand something about two
other groups of technical staff, the planning agencies and the growing corps of
municipal staff (i.e. staff appointed by the communes) which represent the non-
traditional part of the public sector.
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4.31 I
	
The Mayor
The mayor of the commune has always been a prime participant in the
planning process even though until the decentralisation act of 1983 his or her role was
in a formal sense limited; specifically, mayors were empowered to sign permissions
to build in their role as state agents; they were involved in the preparation of the POS
which moreover required a declaration of the municipal council in favour before
being approved by prefectoral order. But they were not empowered to initiate plan
preparation and nor in most cases could they process applications for permission to
build within their own commune. An exception to that general rule for applications
to build was made in 1977 when communes with populations of more than 50,000
having an approved POS and with the technical resources to tackle the processing
were empowered to do so. Yet few apparently did. In 1978, of 55 communes who
fulfilled those conditions, only 16 had taken up the possibility (Jegouzo and Pittard,
1980). A year after the figures were 61 and 18 respectively (Labetoulle, 1982). One
of these was Dijon who in 1978 took responsibility for granting permissions to build
and entrusted the processing to the Agence d'urbanisrne de l'agglomeration
Dijonnaise (Burdin, personal communication).
Nevertheless the informal involvement of the mayor could, even before
decentralisation, be much more important than the formal powers would imply. First
and Foremost, there was a general advantage in becoming involved in plan
preparation, because promoting development increased the commune's tax base, and
brought the possibility of better services to increase electoral advantage. There was
moreover the fact that practically the cooperation of the mayor was important if the
plan was to go ahead or the decision on an application to be approved. A mayor
could thus exert considerable leverage, a point that will become clearer in discussing
the process itself. On the other hand, not all niayors were equally capable of taking
planning issues on board and Wilson (1983) for example reported that the question of
the personality of the mayor rather than his or her political affiliation, in spite of
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differences between the parties on urban problems, was cited as being paramount.
4.312	 The DDE
Before decentralisation, therefore, mayors were not legally empowered except
in a few cases to deal with development control. Instead they were heavily dependent
on the services of the state, which in practice meant the field services of the old
Ministére de l'Equipenient, (lie Directions départementales de l'Equipement (DDE;
Departmental Directorates of Infrastructure) which since March 1986 have been
accountable to the Ministére de l'quipement, du Logement et de l'Amenagement du
territoire et des Transports (MELATT; Ministry of Infrastructure, Housing,
Development and Transport). Each of the dëpartenients has such a field service and
the great bulk of planning work, whether the technical studies necessary for plan
preparation or the processing of applications, was, and is, done by them. Before
decentralisation, their role was to advise the mayor in his or her capacity as an agent
of the state, and thereby exerted great influence over the outcome of decisions. Yet
their power even before decentralisation was not unlimited. For one thing, they had
a stake in (lie planning process in as much as proposals for public works in POS may
mean increased income from fees for DDE officials supervising the work (Wilson,
1983). For another, a mayor in dispute with the DDE would appear to have had the
possibility of lobbying against their influence either with the prefect or with the
Ministry in Paris. Clearly a mayor's power to do so would depend on the degree of
influence acquired from the iniportance of the commune and the exercise of the
cuniul des niandais.
Within the DDE, the classic organisation has been described by Wilson (1983)
as consisting of four groups, the groupe d'ëiudes el de prograrnnialion (GEP) has a
responsibility for plan preparation; urbanisine opërationel ci consiruclion (UOC has
responsibility for the processing of applications for all types of permission;
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infrastructure, for provision of roads, sewers and water; and finally a group with a
responsibility for administration. The staff within the DDE are a mixture of
fonctionnaires (civil servants) with tenure who come through the grandes écoles and
who are destined to occupy senior posts, and contractual posts offered to those
(relatively few) staff who have a formal education in town planning or perhaps in
geography or the social sciences rather than in engineering. Only in the GEP,
moreover, is the staff multidisciplinary. Typically, therefore development control is
handled by staff who are not professionally trained town planners, but who are well
versed in the administration and will have direct access to legal skills.
4.3 13	 The prefect
The role of the prefect has of course changed dramatically since decentra-
lisation. Before 1983, the prefect can be seen as both initiator and ultimate authority
for much of the planning process. POS could only be undertaken as a result of a
prefectoral decree; the prefect's approval was needed for decisions on applications for
permissions to build if there was a dispute between the mayor and the DDE, for
permission to create a lotissernent or a ZAC (Jegouzo and Pittard, 1980). Yet the
prefect's direct involvement in plan preparation was slight, if Wilson's findings hold
good for the country as a whole. In issuing a prefectoral decree for the start of a POS
he or she would be bound to take advice on the willingness of the mayor to become
involved in the process and the willingness of the DDE to undertake the work. The
prefect could not avoid being susceptible to the opinions and attitudes of others, even
if the ultimate authority rested with him or her.
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4.314	 Planning agencies
Mayors, the DDE and the prefect form the traditional trio of actors in the
planning process, but they are not the only public authorities involved. Perhaps the
most important from the point of view of this thesis has been the setting up from
1960 onwards, of specialist agencies to handle planning policy for specific areas, the
agences d'urbanisme (planning agencies). These agencies were the response to the
growing complexity of planning problems in the major conurbations, and represent
an interesting partnership between central and local government. In part they may
perhaps be said to reflect the inadequacies of the GEP in dealing with planning
problems; in part, perhaps, a desire on the part of the state not to lose the initiative
in planning to the municipalities. The earliest of these agencies to be set
up was the Institut de I'Amenagement et de l'Urbanisme de Ia Region Ile-de-France
(JAURIF) whose role is strictly unlike those of the other agencies and whose work is
regional rather than sub-regional and local. The first provincial agency was that of
Rouen created in 1963. Most, however, date from after the passing of the LOF in
1967 and reflect the new order of plan making that the act initiated. Moreover,
central government was clearly enthusiastic about the potential of these new
organisations, and the VIth National Plan recommended that all conurbations of more
than 150,000 should have such an agency, although this was not mandatory and
smaller conurbations like Troyes,Chalons-sur-Marne and Saint-Omer also now have
agencies (Danan, 1976) (see Table 4.2).
1978
1970
1978
1970
1974
1974
1968
1968
1965
1960
1970
1978
1969
1974
1974
1975
1978
1976
1967
1972
1971
1963
1967
1974
1967
1972
1967
1973
1978
29
31
27
26
28
29
33
26
33
30
20
20
24
29
21
31
25
28
36
33
32
34
36
27
31
27
32
24
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Table 4.2	 Agences d'urbanisme 1984
EQQ.pjatioflQf date of
area served creation
(1982)
percentage
of expenditure
funded by
central government
Aix-en-Provence
A.gers
Bell ort
Bordeaux
B rest
Chalons -sv'- Marne
Dunkerque
Grenoble
Le Havre
LAURIF
Lyon
Mantes-la-Jolie
Marseille
Maubeuge
Metz
Nancy
Nantes
Orla ns
Paris
Reims
Rennes
Rouen
St-Etienne
St.-Omer
Strasbourg
Toulouse
Tours
Troyes
Valence-Romans-sur-Isère
160,000
255,300
113,600
588,800
208,600
65,100
262,600
531,800
274,500
7,903,000
1,124,000
136,700
922,500
132,140
162,400
262,000
480,700
113,700
2,189,000
270,200
286,000
447,300
444,700
65,100
492,500
486,000
242,000
141,000
272,300
Source: MULT, 1985a
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By 1984 there were 30 such agencies in metropolitan France (MULl, 1985a)
although ten of the conurbations identified byDanan still did not possess one. Their
legal Status according to Danan is diverse: at Rouen the agency was set up as a société
civile under private company law; but most of the rest would appear to be
associations Loi de 1901 (associations formed under an act of 1901). But the
organisation is broadly the same: some Sort of controlling council exists with
representatives of local authorities, the state and other interested bodies to oversee the
work of the technical services which may consist of both directly employed staff and
staff seconded by the state. Their expenditure is shared by the participating local
authorities and the state. On average, the state's contribution is about a third, but the
range varies according to the agency. In the early years of setting up an agency the
state contributions could be as high as 62 per cent (in the case of Reims; Danan,
1976). In 1984 the range was between 20 per cent and 36 per cent in metropolitan
France (MULT, l985a).
Not all the expenditure is regarded as being subject to grant aid; however: on
average 10 per cent is to be raised through external financing of projects for which
the agency is consultant. The LOF also provided for the creation of agencies as
ëtablissenzents publics in Art. Ll21 -3 of the code de l'urbanisrne, such that they would
acquire status within public law. But the appropriate décret d'application has ever
been passed, perhaps because the state did not wish to preempt a decision on the
form of local government during the l970s, and because in any case the form of
association possible under the act of 1901 was more responsive to local circumstances
than an établissenient public was likely to be (Danan, 1976). Art. L121-3 was in any
case abrogated by the act of 7 January 1983.
A salient feature of the agencies is their multidisciplinary character. They are
in that respect very different from the DDE with their heavy reliance on traditional
civil servants. Architects, economists, geographers, sociologists, town planners,
landscape architects and computer programmers are all to be found (see Table 4.3).
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What is perhaps noteworthy is that at any rate in the early 1970s, the largest single
group was architects, followed closely by economists; qualified town planners were
much less well represented.
Table 4.3	 Disciplines re p resented among_staff of Agences d'urbanisme 1974
per cent
architects	 17.8
economists	 16.6
technicians	 14.7
engineers	 9.8
sociologists	 8.0
geographical
	 8.0
town planners	 8.0
computer programmers	 5.5
librarians/architects	 3.7
landscape designers
	
0.6
lawyers	 0.6
others	 6.6
Source: Danan, 1976
This line-up of expertise for some will appear to be a suggestion of
inadequacy, however. At Dijon, for example, contrast was made between the
director of the DDE of COte-d'Or, a product of the prestigious École polytechnique
and the director of the Agence intercommunale d'Urbanisme de l'agglomeration
dijonnaise (AGIUD) with only two years' professional training at the Institut
d'urbanisme (Briand,personal communication). Danan notes the under-representation
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of lawyers among agency staff, and their complete absence in some cases.
Compared with much of the rest of French administration these agencies
represent a strikingly fluid and pragmatic response to a particular need. For Danan,
they were examples of the new order, and as institutions were best adapted to coping
with the fragmentation of local authorities and to integrating the various actors in a
coherent way; they foreshadowed clecentralisation. Indeed he regarded them as the
only possible solution to proper urban planning policy making, and given the nature
of French administration, preferable to town planning which is directly under the
control of the communes. This would appear also to be part of the self image of
agencies. AGIUD expressed the desire not to be like the DDE in its handling of
applications for permission to build (Burdin, personal communication), with an
emphasis being placed on speed of processing, meetings with applicants and offering
advice to mayors.
4.3 15 Municipal staff
Although the bulk of planning work is done by the DDE and to a lesser extent
the agencies described above, it must not be forgotten that communes can, and do,
hire their own staff for planning work. Inevitably it is only the large communes that
are in any position to do so, and the first call for staff is not for planning work.
There is also the problem that municipally appointed staff do not enjoy the same
remuneration or conditions of service as state civil servants, and that it is therefore
seen as an inferior form of employment. Another possibility is for communes is to
set up an atelier municipal d'urbanisnie perhaps using a private consultant to do so.
Such an atelier was the basis for the later town planning agency at Lyon. It is of
cause equally possible for syndicates of communes to employ staff. AGIUD, for
example, is not a planning agency of the type referred to by Danan, as it is entirely
a creature of the district of Dijon and receives no state funding. The importance of
municipally appointed staff is bound to increase as a result of decentralisation.
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Table 4.4	 Planning courses in France 1985
Members of the Association pour Ia Promotion de l'Enseignement et de Ia Recherche
en Aménagement et en Urbanisrne (APERAU) offering DiplOmes cI'études
supérieures spécialisées
Cycle supérieur d'Ameriagernent et d'Urbanisme
Institut des Etudes politiques de Paris-Il
Institut d'Urbanisme d'Acaclémie de Paris
Université de Paris-Yfli - St. Denis
Institut d'Aménagement regional
Université d'Aix-Marseille-lIl
Centre d'Etudes supérieures d'Aménagement
Université de Tours
Institut d'Urbanisme
Université de Grenoble
Cycle d'Urbanisme
Université de Lyon-Il
Institut d'Urbanisme de Paris
Université de Paris-XII- Marne-Ia-ValIée
Other universities offering planning subjects in specialised courses
École des Ponts-et-Chausées
Marne-Ia-VaIIée
Université de Brest
Université de Paris VlI-Jussieu
Université de Paris X-Nanterre
Institut de l'Amenagement du territoire et de l'Environnement de
l'Université de Reims
Institut d'Aménagement
Université de Bordeaux
Université de Caen
	 Source: DehT$,
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There are two observations to be made about the public sector participants in
the process. The first is the extent to which technical expertise is frequently not
under direct political control at the local level. The DDE and the agencies will do
work on behalf of individual communes, but they are ultimately answerable in the
one case to the ministry in Paris, and in the other, to their council. Moreover a clear
distinction between the (political) decision-makers and the (technical) advisers, which
is in principle the basis on which British local government works, does not obtain; and
just as we noted in the previous chapter the continuity of administration between
central and local government, so, too, there is a continuity of technical and political
inputs into the planning process.
The second observation must be on the role of professional town planners
within the participant groups. On the face of it, the relatively low representation of
planners even in the agencies must be surprising. But for as long as planning work
remained in the domain of state,and civil servants with tenure educated through the
traditional channels remained in charge of the process, the status of the professional
town planner, and therefore the incentive to seek, and yet again therefore, to provide,
professional education, has remained low. There has been change however, and a
survey by the journal Urbanisnze in 1985 listed seven courses offering postgraduate
diplomas (diplOrnes d'études supOrieu!j specialisëes: DESS) and seven other courses
covering aspects of planning (see Table 4.4). But the degree of professional self-
awareness that the existence of the Royal Town Planning Institute with its educational
policy and validation of courses represents has still to come in France.
4.32	 Developers
The second group of participants in the planning process of whom some
mention must be made are the developers and applicants for permission to build.
Manifestly they cannot be considered in any sense a homogeneous group and are as
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diverse in character as their British equivalents. Three categories of developer which
are not mutually exclusive are, however, sufficiently different from anything to be
found in this country as to be worthy of comnient.
4.321 ArnOnageurs
The first kind is the arnénageur (site developer) whose role is not to put up
buildings, but to prepare land so that others may do so. They have a key role in
presenting proposals that will convert NA zoned land into fully serviced sites, either
through the lolisserneni procedure or, by the declaration of a ZAC. The serviced land
is then sold on either as plots to individual purchasers (typically in the case of a
!olisse n!ent) to put up their own houses, or in larger units to house builders who will
develop speculatively, on lines similar to their British counterparts. A commune that
is working to promote development is almost certain to need an arnënageur to assist
in the process. There may well then be a mutuality of interest between the mayor
and the site developer; moreover the site developer will acquire an important
promoting and surveillance role over the activities of the eventual purchasers of the
plots. Of course site developers may also be construction companies, but there is tax
advantage not to be, so it would appear: whereas builders and prornoleurs
(developers) are charged VAT at 18.6 per cent, for aniënageurs the rate is only 13.2
per cent (Brignais, personal communication).
4.322 Sociëtës d 'economic niixte
The second kind consists of that peculiarly French invention, the sociClC
d'ëcononiie mixte (SEM; mixed economy company) which have a large part to play
in both site development and in construction. Their main characteristic is that their
controlling boards consist of both private sector and local authority delegates. Thus
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they remain inde jiendent organisations in which nonetheless the public sector will
have a considerable stake. These companies are then available for individual
communes to use for specific development projects. As Sorbets (1979) explains,
"These mixed economy companies hold great attractions for locally
elected representatives as they allow them to assert their auihority as
counsellors (sic) and planners and force the completion of a certain
number of projects."
( pp . 161-2).
4.323 Offices publics des habitations a love, modéré
The third kind consists of the fully state-controlled organisations of which the
most obvious is the network of offices of' the habitations ñ loyer niodéré (HLM; low
rental housing) which is the only forni of state-controlled housing provision but
which is controlled centrally and not by local authorities. However, local mayors may
be involved in the administration of the local offices of the HLM, and they constitute
therefore yet another organisation in which local authorities have a stake and yet will
also act as the authorities' agents for carrying out development proposals.
The point to make about these three kinds of developer is that just as the clear
distinctions between central and local government and between politicians and
technical officers that we are accustomed to make in Britain do not really obtain in
France, so too the clear distinction between public and private sector developers has
to be abandoned in favour of a spectrum of development agencies from the fully
public to the fully private which as often as not operate in partnership with central
and local government. For a given site in an urban area, therefore, the commune, the
urban community or district, the DDE, an SEM and a private sector holder may all
be involved. The interdependence of the organisations becomes apparent in the case
studies in chapter 5; the relationships between them are often very complex. The
to
model of cross-regulation proposed by Thoenig and Dupuy and referred Ain the
previous chapter must be seen as involving more than simply the mayor, the prefect
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and the DDE. There is a real question of who controls whom.
4.324 Developers and the development lobby
Although developers as a group present many features which make them
appear distinctly different from their British equivalents, it is also true to say that
there is in France a developers' lobby that operates in rather the same way as it does
in England and which voices some at least of the same complaints. There is, for
example, a big growth in organisation house builders mainly in the 1970s whose
operations are comparable to British speculative developers in scale and type. The
company that classed itself as "Number one developer in France" in 1985, Group
Maison Familiale (GMF), had 3,879 completions in its grouped housing sector in
1984. Yet the firm, which started in Cambrai in 1949 only appears to have developed
as a national rather than a regional organisation from 1974 onwards (GMF, 1985).
The market has opened up in such a way as to allow foreign firms to enter the field:
Wimpey now has a French offshoot which was expecting to start 400 houses in the
Ile-de-France in 1986 (as against 9,743 starts in Britain in 1985) (Monileur, 1986e).
Not all private housing is put up on grouped estates of the kind that are
familiar in Britain. Rather more appear to be built for individual clients on plots in
lotissements or ZAC. The total starts of this kind in 1985 amounted to 186,342
dwellings or some 65 per cent of the total. The usual process is for a purchaser to
select a house from a catalogue which the builder then puts up on the site. The site
works have of course already been undertaken by the site developer. The largest
builder of one-off houses of this kind, Phénix, had no fewer than 7,798 starts in 1984
(Moniteur, 1986e) while GMF had about as many completions of individual houses
(3,696) as it had of houses on estates in that year (GMF, 1985).
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Three major preoccupations seem to concern developers in the 1980s. The
first is the lack of building land. The second is the extent to which, particularly since
decentralisation, decisions on the release of land are more a creature of political will
than of respect for the law. The third is the vexed question of the participations
(coi*ibutions for service provision) through the payment of TLE and other contribu-
tions. Developers express themselves forcibly on all three subjects: they are in no
doubt that they are hoist by the activities of wilful local authorities, and that in the
end it is the purchasers of the houses who pay (Bouteille, 1986; Berroeta, 1986). They
argue that the lack of building land makes it hard for developers to refuse the terms
on which they are permitted to develop. The context for this debate, however, has
been a sharp downturn in building since 1984 (Maugard, 1986; Moniteur, 1986c) and
this no doubt lends an edge to the arguments.
4.4	 The Process of Plau Preparation
Though the subject of this thesis is development control decision-making,
enough has been said already to indicate that the relationship between decisions on
applications for permission to build and the POS is a very close one. Indeed it can be
argued that the justification for the control process rests in part on the way in which
the plans themselves are prepared. We therefore need to look at the plan-making
process as well as the way in which applications are dealt with.
Commentators appear to agree that not only did the LOF introduce a strategic
capacity into the French plan-making system, it also made it a participatory process.
Before 1967, the PUD was a creation of the technical services of the state which was
handed to the commune as a fait accompli. The LOF in its provision both for SDAU
and POS emphasised partnership, and the formal structure of the process was
designed to emphasise this partnership between local authorities and the services of
the state in the groupe de travail (working party) charged with the preparation of the
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POS. The fact of partnership did not of course mean that the state was not still
heavily implicated in the decision to proceed and in the technical preparation of the
plan (Chapuisat, 1983; Tribillon 1985; Burdin, personal communication).
4.41	 The Sta ges of Plan Preparation
The stages of the preparation of the POS as it would have occurred until 1983
are shown in Figure 4.1. The point to emphasise is that there are within the eleven
steps shown five major thresholds. The first is the prefectoral decree , to proceed,
without which no preparatory work can be undertaken: the initiative thus remained
firmly with the state. Yet we have already suggested that the prefect would not have
decreed the start of a POS if the DDE and the mayor of the commune been willing
to become involved: the DDE in particular would have been well placed to nullify
the effect of the decree if they lacked the resources to embark on the POS.
4.41 I The groupe de travail
If the instruction to proceed remained with the state, at the second major
threshold, the setting up of the working party, the initiative was handed on to the
commune for whom the POS was being prepared. The mayor took the chair of the
working party and therefore in principle is charged with the coordination of the
work: other members of the working party would be officials from the GEP of the
DDE, representatives of the Direction departementale de l'Agriculture (DDA; the
field service of the Ministry of Agriculture) and the Chambers of Commerce and of
Agriculture.
The realities of the process were evidently rather different. Tribillon talks of
the working parties as being as often as not a confrontation rather than a partnership,
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flgure 4.1
	
The Process of POS Preparation before and after 1983
Before 19
Prefectoral decree (arrêtë) to start POS
Constitution of the groupe de travail.
Mayor takes the chair
Draft (projet de POS) sent for formal
consultation to state sources
Recommendations sent back to groupe
de travail and revisions made as
necessary
Draft POS submitted to municipal
council for comment
POS published by prefectoral decree
and becomes opposable aux tiers
Enquête publique
After 1983
Decree (arrêté) of the municipal
council to start POS
State is involved in the groupe de
travail, as at their request may be the
ddpartenient, the region and other
professional bodies. Mayor takes the
chair
Municipal council decrees (arrélé) the
draft POS which is sent for
consultation
Revisions made to the draft POS as
necessary
Mayor publishes POS. Where there is
SD the POS becomes opposable
immediately. Where no SD the prefect
has one month to propose
modifications before POS becomes
opposable
Enquete publique
Groupe de travail considers conclusions
of enquêle publique
POS returned to municipal council
with conclusion of enquête publique
and groupe de travail's observations
POS is approved by prefect
Groupe de travail considers conclusions
of enquéte publique
POS approved by deliberation of the
municipal council
Sources:	 Wilson (1983) p. 162; Gontcharoff and Milano (1984) pp. 59-61.
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with initiatives for proposals being taken by the DDE officials, except perhaps where
a commune had its own planning offices. Wilson's work (1983 and 1985) in the
northern region suggests that working party meetings were dominated by a dialogue
between the mayor and the senior civil servant from the GEP, and that the mayor's
input tended to concentrate on matters of procedure and on matters of detailed,
physical planning rather than on broad policy.
4.412 Publicatio,z of the POS
The third significant threshold after the working party have finished their
deliberations and external consultations is the decision to publish (rendre public) the
POS formally which again was done by prefectoral decree. The significance of this
stage is that, although the POS was not by then formally approved, it could
nonetheless be applied to decisions taken on applications for permission to build and
be opposed by third parties: in Tribillon's (1985) words,
"the draft POS produced its full legal effect once it had been published
by act of the administration of the State, even before the procedure
for approval properly speaking had been initiated."
(p. 111)
It was also, we should note, brought into effect before any public consultation had
been undertaken.
4.4 13 The enquêle publique
The threshold, that of the enqu&e publique (public inquiry), does for the first
time bring the public formally into the preparation process. As Macrory and
Lafontaine (1982) have described it the enqute publique is in no way to be compared
with the local plan inquiry in Britain. it is not, for example, a hearing at which
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interested parties may make a case and cross-examine, and be cross-examined by.
those responsible for the preparation of the POS. A commissaire enquêfeur (inspector)
is, however, appointed to lead the enquêle, but until 1983 was appointed by the
prefect from a departmental list of some 50 to 100 names. In principle this inspector
is independent but he or she is very often a former civil servant, and wl,1e t is
'thought preferable" to appoint someone not from the commune for which (he POS
is being prepared, it is also believed that he or she should flve "not too far from the
place of the enquête (Bourny, 1986). The inspector once appointed makes his or her
own investigations as well as receiving observations from anyone who cares to
examine the plan. The enqilcie must last at least a month (Art. R 123-Il) during
which pci iod the public must be informed when they can make representations.
4.4 14 Approval of i/ic POS
The fifth threshold is that of the formal approval of the plan by prefectoral
decree at which point it ceases to be a provisional document. We should perhaps note
that the prefect's decision was not necessarily based upon the findings of the enquêle
alone; indeed the eiqui'/e is not at all to be understood as providing "a focus for
argument leading to a decision' but a method for investigating public reaction'
(Maci ory and Lafontaine 1982, p. 23). We should also note that the municipal council
was formally consulted at two points in the process: immediately after the di aft plan
emerged from the working party and immediately before the final prefectoral
approval. Once the POS has been approved the possibility of re"ising or modifying
it exists, as we have ali eady noted. There are three ways in which this may be done.
The least involved is the updating (misc ñ jour) of a POS by the inclusion of, for
example, the boundaries of a ZAC or a sec/cur sauvegard once they have been
approved or ii a project of public utility (d'uli/ilé publique), all of which have their
own procedures for testing public reaction (Art. Rl23-36). Tile modificaiou of a
POS in force is the procedure adopted for changes to zoning or icguiations which do
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not affect the genera! character (ëcouonhie) of the plan. An enquête publique must,
however, be organised (Art. Rl23-34). The revision procedure is for those changes
which do affect the fundamental character of the plan and for those changes the
working party is reconvened as for the initial preparation (Art. R123-35) and the
referrals to the municipal council and to the enquêle publique take place in the manner
described for the initial preparation of the plan.
To describe the process set up by the LOF as consultative therefore appears
at least in principle to be fair. Even before decentralisation, the local authority was
installed as a key partner in the process and the public's reaction was being sought.
The mayor, by presiding over the working party's deliberations , was potentially being
given a controlling hand in the way the plan evolved. But Wilson's work and
Tribillon's observations would suggest otherwise. For elected representatives, the
technicalities of the process and the limited understanding of what a POS could
achieve or of the issues that it should address, effectively militate against
participation. For the public, the procedure allows reaction when
Table 4.5	 General Dcv clopinent Control Statistics for France and England
FRANCE
Applications lodged	 1982	 1983
permis de construire	 655,583	 640,183
cerl ificats d'urbanisrne 1	 376,600	 373,570
permis de demo/jr	 14,404	 13,953
permis de lotir	 9,091	 8,184
(housing only)
[Figure are metropolitan France only]
ENGLAND
Applications determined	 1982L3.
	
1983/84
Planning permission	 382,000	 404,000
[Figures are rounded to the nearest thousand and are given for the British financial
year].
Sources:	 France MULT, 1984, l985a
England DOE, 1987
'I
1 numbers 01 decisions.
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proposals have already been prepared but no possibility of helping to define
objectives before the plan is produced in draft. Certainly at first glance it would
appear that the group with the technical expertise, the DDE, would have a controlling
role in the preparation of the POS. Yet again, the structure of the system is such that
for a determined participant it will be possible to by-pass the DDE by having
recourse to the prefect, and in specific cases at least a knowledge of the informal
networks that exist will be at least as important as a knowledge of the formal process.
4.5	 Processing applications for Permission to Build
The discussion of the plan-making process in the previous section is important
to the understanding of the decision making in development control for two reasons.
The first is the general point that in principle the decision on the individual
application is much more closely tied to the POS because of the legal standing of the
zoning and regulations and their specifically comprehensive coverage. The second
reason is that the system appears to assume that because the public are invited to react
to the draft proposal for the POS there is no need for public participation at the
development control stage. We must reiterate: processing an application is about
establishing the legality of the proposal in the light of the regulations in force. The
public thus have a right to challenge a decision once taken, but there is no locus for
them to be involved in the process of determining the application.
The scale of the work involved is illustrated by Table 4.5: for permissions to
build alone, there were more than 50 per cent more applications in France than in
England in 1982 and 1983 and if all the four major forms of development control are
included, the competent authorities must deal with over one million applications per
year. Yet the average number of applications per commune was less than 30 in
metropolitan France in each of the two years.
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The process by which applications for permission to build are dealt with is
presented graphically in Figure 4,2. The diagram relates specifically to the
processing of applications a/Ic,' the Act of 7 January 1983 had taken effect (in April
1984) and for those communes which have a POS in force but use the DDE to process
applications. Some parts of the diagram, most notably where it deals with the
conirôle de ldgaliu are thus specific to the period after 1983; and some
responsibilities have been modified. The changes brought in by decentralisation are
determined in Sections 4.63 and 4.64 below; but the general process has altered little.
4.51	 The Applicant
Unlike the British development control system, it is not open for anyone to
apply for permission to build in France. The applicant must either own the land
outright or be in possession of a lease or be someone "with proof of title to build on
the land" (Art R421 -1-1). Therefore the idea of the permission as establishing a
proprietorial right of' the owner rather than the proper use of the land is firmly
enshrined in French planning law, and further highlights the contrast between the
permission to build and the British planning permission. The applicant must also
(since 1977) have recourse to an architect for all but minor development (Art. R421-
1-2); the limits for non-agricultural building are set such as to allow individuals to
build a house for themselves (Labetoulle, 1982). For the rest, however, the applicant
is required, as his or her British counterpart would be, to supply location and block
plans, together with details of the servicing of the buildings, and elevations. For
buildings greater than 3,000 square metres in communes without an approved POS,
an impact assessment must also be included (Art. R421-2). Where the development
would entail work for which other kinds of permission is required, for example the
demolition of buildings or the felling of trees, the application for permission to build
must be accompanied by applications for the appropriate permissions which are
determined concurrently.
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Figure 4.2	 The development control process
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4.52	 Time Limits
Before decentralisation the application would normally have been sent to the
DDE, except in those for communes which had acquired the right to do the
processing of applications themselves (see above pJ 03). The first task then in the
process is the check that must be made of the completeness of the application, and
the processing period cannot begin until the application is complete (Art. R421-13).
Thereafter the 'competent authority' which in almost all cases was the DDE, except
for those for communes with delegated powers, had a minimum period of two months
for dealing with the application, but in practice the period could be extended to up
to six months according to specific circumstances. Thus an extra month is added if
there is consultation with a ministry or its field service or a public body not
undertaking the processing; another may be added for applications for more than 200
dwellings or applications for communal and industrial development when over 2,000
square metres of floorspace. Yet a further month is allowed for applications which
would be a departure or even a 'minor adaptation" from the regulations in force.
The consultation of national commissions automatically raised the period to six
months, as did consultation on commercial development that had to be referred to the
departmental commissioner appointed to deal with such applications (Art. R421-18).
That final six month period was reduced to five months by decree in 1985.
The respect of these time limits is guaranteed by the sanction of the automatic
grant in most cases of a deemed permission (perniis lacitp) if there is no formal
response within the appropriate period (Labetoulle, 1982). The sanction appears to be
operative insofar as less than one per cent of all permission granted in 1982 and 1983
were deemed (MULT, 1984 and 1985a). Since Labetoulle reports, presumably on the
basis of statistics from the 1970's, that "only a little more than three per cent of
permissions are deemed" (p.80), the effect of reducing 'administrative inertia' could
be claimed to be successful. Officials also reported infornially that in practice
decisions were never left to go by default, and that there was usually a perfectly legal
way of extending the time limits necessary for the processing of an application
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Ta bi e4.6
	
Time taken to process applications for permis de construire and
planning permission in France and England
FRANCE	 1983
number	 per cent
Total applications determined
in February	 50,224	 100
of which applications lodged
after 30th November in
preceding year	 38,180	 76
1984
number	 per cent
46,332	 100
37,301
[In practice these figures underestimate the percentage of applications
processed in three months. MULT corrects the figures by assuming
half of all applications determined in February and lodged in
November were nevertheless processed in three months. This brings
the percentages to 82 per cent and 85 per cent from 1983 and 1984
respectively.]
ENGLAND	 1982/83
	 1983/84
number	 per cent	 number	 percent
Total applications determined 382,000
within 8 weeks	 268,000
within 8-13 weeks	 78,000
over 13 weeks	 35,000
Sources:	 France MULT, 1984, 1985a
England DOE, 1987
	
100	 404,000	 100
	
70	 278,000	 69
	
20	 88,000	 22
	
9	 39,000	 10
(Briand, personal communication). The statistics available for 1983 and 1984 show
that of the permissions granted in February of those years, 76 per cent and 81 per
cent respectively had been lodged in December or later. For comparative purposes,
the equivalent proportion of applications for planning permissions processed within
thirteen weeks in England and Wales was 90 per cent and 91 per cent in each year
(see Table 4.5). As with England and Wales, however, the French statistics vary
enormously by départenient. Slightly less than a third manage to process 90 per cent
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or more of all permissions granted in three months or less, in Paris in both years
recorded, the figure was 10 per cent and 13 per cent, and some other départenients'
performance was apparently poor.
4.53	 Consultations
Once the application has been formally acknowledged the processing
commences. There are two aspects to this work. One is the checking of the
application against the regulations of the POS or the RNU. The other is a round of
notifications and consultations that may have to be undertaken. The striking thing
to note is that all these consultations are with other official bodies except the routine
seeking of the mayor's opinion. Thus departmental field services of health, fire and
safety, employment and agriculture may all be consulted (Booth, 1985). Perhaps the
most significant contribution is with the departmental Architecte des Bãtiments de	 '
France (ABF; historic buildings officer: his or her service is now known as the
Direction départementale de l'Architecture) who has a right to direct a decision on
all permissions to build within the field of visibility of a historic monument
(monument classé) or building entered on the supplementary list of historic buildings
(irnnieubte inscrit) (Art. R421-38-3/4). Since the ABE is yet another arm of central
government, the extent of central government control over large areas of older towns
whose fabric may be continuously within the field of visibility of historic buildings
can be imagined.
There are other forms of consultation which are of a different order from the
referral to other arms of government. Until 1984 most dépariernents had two
consultative bodies, the Commission départementale d'urbanisme (CDU; Departmental
Town Planning Committee) and the Conference permanente des permis de construire
(CPPC; Standing Conference on Permissions to Build). These two bodies exist by
virtue of Arts. R611 and R6l2 of the code and combined both members of the
administration and elected representatives. Before decentralisation they ensured a
measure of consultation with elected representatives on permission to build. The
per cent
100
95
0.6
5
0.2
1983
flu mber
617,086
584,826
2,709
31,111
1,149
per cent
100
95
0.5
5
0.2
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Table 4.7 Applications processed in 1982 and 1983 for p ermi.s de construire,
certificats d'urbanisme and p laniiin g permission in France and
;!igl and
FRANCE
1982
Permis de construire 	 number
Total applications processed 631,594
Total permissions granted 	 598,421
of which tacit permissions	 3,730
Total applications refused 	 31,673
Total sursis ?z statuer	 I ,500
1982	 1983
Certificats d'urbanisme
	
number	 per cent	 riurn*oer	 peT ceM
	Total applications processed 367,126
	
100	 352,723	 100
Total cerlificals granted	 276,043	 75	 259,844
	
74
Total certificals refused	 91,083	 25	 92,879	 26
[Figures are for metropolitan France only. The figures for certificats
d'urbaizisrne omit the dëparternents of Yvelines and Seine-St.-Denis
which provided no breakdown of permissions and refusals in these
years.]
ENGLAND
1982-83	 1983-84
	
number	 per cent	 number	 percent
	
Total applications processed 382,000 	 100	 404,000	 100
Total permissions granted	 334,000	 87	 353,000	 87
Total applications refused 	 48,000	 13	 51,000	 13
[Figures are rounded to the nearest thousand and are given for the
British financial year.]
Sources	 France MULT, 1984, 1985a
England DOE, 1987
decree that gave them statutory existence was not, however, renewed after
decentralisation, to simplify administration and because it was thought that they
would adversely affect the exercise of the new powers granted to mayors in the Act
of 7 January 1983 (Monileur, 1985).
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Another consultative body, the Conseil d'architecture, d'urbanisme et de
l'environnement (CAUE; Council for Architecture Planning and the Environment)
has had its existence reconfirmed. They were set up by an act of 3 January 1977 and
by 1986 were in existence in 87 déparlenienls, although they are not obligatory. Their
role is advisory, to the decision-makers, and educational, for the public at large
(Moniteur l986d). A final consultation will be with archiiecies-conseil (consultant
architects) who have been employed to advise the DDE in their work since 1950 (Arts.
A614 - I to 4).	 -
Consultations are thus very largely technical with some emphasis being placed
on the quality of architecture design. But there is no consultation with the public,
and the public need not be made aware of the contents of the application until after
the decision has been taken; although since the Act of 18 July 1985, the public have
been informed of the lodging of an application.
4.54	 The Decision
The decision taken on the application can be either a refusal, an outright
approval, or an approval subject to conditions, which as we have already noted, may
be applied by virtue of specific clauses in the POS or the RNU. Table 4.7 shows the
number of permissions to build granted and refused in 1982 and 1983. The refusal
rate was constant in each year at just under 5 per cent. This may be compared with
the refusal rate for applications for planning permission in England and Wales in the
same years of 13 per cent. The total number of applications for permission to build
is of course some 50 per cent greater in France than the numbers of planning
applications in England and Wales.
There is a further possible outcome, that the competent authority may ask for
a stay of decision (sursis a slaluer). There are five possible cases when such a stay
is possible. Two concern land which has been defined for an operation declared to
be of public interest (Art. LIII -9) or public works project (Art. Lii 0-10). The other
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three concern areas covered by POS, ZAC or secleurs sauvegaidés whose plans are in
the course of being prepared (Arts. L123-5, Art. 123-7 and Art. L313-2). These
stays of decision represent a very small proportion of the total decisions taken.
Before decentralisation the decision was in principle taken by the mayor
acting in the name of the state. There were, however, exceptions to the general rule
set out in the then Art. R421-32, which required the authorisation to be given by the
prefect. These included large buildings, the granting of departures or approval of
minor adaptations used in areas where the mayor and the DDE were is dispute
(Labetoulle, 1982). On the other hand, it appears that in routine cases that devolve
on the prefect, the prefect may delegate his authority to the director bf the DDE
(Booth, 1985).
4.55	 1mlementing the rermission
The process does not end with the grant or refusal of permission. The
applicant is bound to post a site notice giving details of the permission granted which
must remain in place until the work is completed on the development. At the same
time a notice of the permission must be displayed at the maine for two months (Art.
R42l-39). At this point there is a legal right of third parties to consult the permission
file (Art. A421-9) and to oppose the decision that has been taken. From the point at
which the permission is granted the applicant has a two-year period in which to
undertake the development before the permission becomes invalid. The permission
also becomes invalid if work is stopped for more than a year (Art. R421-32). The
work, however, must be properly started, unlike the token start that the law requires
in Britain, to accept that a planning permission has been taken up (Bouyssou and
Hugot, 1986). Before starting work, the beneficiary of the permission must give a
declaration of the start of work to the niairie (Art. R421-40) and within 30 days of
its completion, a further declaration must be made (Art. R460-l). This declaration,
if made by an architect, will include a statement that the building conforms in its
location, use, character, appearance, size and the treatment of its surroundings, to the
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permission granted. Where this statement is not included it is for the DDE or the
agency which carried out the determination ofthe application to make its own check
(Art. R460-3). Providing the work does conform to the permission granted, a
cerlificat de con! orniilé is issued by the prefect to the developer.
4.56	 Oij posin g and Enforcing the Decision
The final part of the process that must be examined is the right to oppose and
enforce the decision once taken. As we have noted, for the public at large, the only
formal involvement in the process is the right to oppose the decision on the grounds
that the competent authority had acted outside its legal powers (I'excès de pouvoir).
Such a case is conducted before the juge adminisiratif and can only be introduced by
someone who can demonstrate a direct personal interest in the decision. This gives
the same status to a third party opposing the grant of permission and the applicant
appealing against a refusal. It is, however, possible for the judge to rule on the basis
of an erreur rnanifeste dappréciation (manifest error of judgement) of the authority
in reaching the decision, a fact which may be particularly Important wherever the
regulations allow a measure of discretion (Jegouzo and Pittard, 1980). Third parties
may also have recourse to civil law if a completed building has in some way infringed
the law and causes direct personal prejudice to the plaintiff (Labetoulle, 1983). For
the enforcement of planning law by the administration there is recourse to criminal
action; the code does not contain its own sanctions for infringements.
The lodging of a appeal to the tribunal administralif does not suspend to the
permission to build, in the same way that an enforcement notice does not of itself
stop the illicit activity or building in Britain. The judge may, however, upon request,
order a stay of execution of the permission (sursis a execution du permis) if it is
thought that a permission would be difficult to undo once acted upon; if a state
representative has asked for the stay of execution a judge may issue it within 48
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hours, although the prefect must in principle demonstrate that the permission would
infringe public liberties if implemented. For the public at large the period of delay
within which the stay of execution may be ordered is one month, and there are no
sanctions for exceeding that period (Art. L421-9; Monileur 1985a).
4.6	 Decentralisation of Planning Process
The previous chapter presented the general principles on which the
decentralisation of planning powers was based, and some observatiops about its
acceptability and its implementation were made. Such observations need to be
supplemented by a rather more detailed presentation of what actually happened as a
result of the Acts of 7 January and 22 July 1983, if a proper evaluation of the impact
of decentralisation on planning is to be attempted. The first point to make is that
decentralisation has done little to modify the system of plans or the method of
control, with one or two important exceptions. The major thrust was the transfer of
responsibility for processes that were already well established. The major changes are
then as follows:
-	 the preparation of the schema direcleur is undertaken at the initiative of the
group of communes to which it will apply, who share " a community of social
and economic interests" (Art. L122-1-1).
-	 the preparation of the POS is undertaken at the initiative of the commune
concerned (Art. L123-l).
-	 in communes that have an approved POS in force for more than six months
the mayor of the commune is empowered to sign permissions to build in the
name of the commune (Art. L421-2).
In addition to each of these, some consideration must be given to two further
factors that are vital to understanding the impact of decentralisation on the French
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planning system: the provision of technical and professional support for the decision-
makers and the accountability for the decisions taken, specifically through the
conirOle de lëgalilé.
4.61	 The Schema Directeur
The changes in the preparation of the schema directeur (SD) do not bear
directly on the subject of this thesis, yet do shed some light on the equivocal nature
of decentralisation. The first point to note, however, is that the 1983 ict in effect
relaunched the by then discredited SDAU by emphasising its role as a document
linking economic development strategy (aniCnagemenl du lerriloire) with local land
use regulations, and the modified title is a reflection of its new direction (Tribillon,
1985). The freedom of communes to take the initiative in the preparation of their
documents is by no means unfettered. Though the decision to proceed is at the
initiative of the group of communes the boundary of the SD is still set by prefectoral
decree and agreement among the communes does not have to be unanimous. The
prefect must only obtain consent from two-thirds of the commune representing at
least half the population of the area, or half the communes representing two-thirds
of the population (Art. L122-l-l).
The preparation of the SD is then carried out by an existing ëtablissemeni
public de cooperation interconimunale (EPCI) which would mean either a district or
a communaulé urbaine, or by a syndicate set up especially to prepare the plan (Art.
L122-1-1). But the state has been given considerable right to interfere in the work
of preparation. The prefect must be allowed to fix with the president of the EPCI
the ways in which the state will be associated in the preparation of the plan, and the
DDE is cast in the role of information gathering and of assuring that the state's
interests are properly represented (Art. R122-5). Finally the prefect has the right to
request the preparation of an SD where national policy directives (prescriptions) or
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pro jets d'inlërêl gnëraux (PIG: project in the public interest) make it necessary to
do so (Art. L122-l-4). As Tribillon (1985) remarks, this is autonomy but not
independence and the reserve sanction of Art. L122-1-4, which allows the prefect
to take matters into his or her own hands where the request is not complied with, is
positively authoritarian.
4.62	 The Plan d'Occu yalion des Sols and the Zone d'AniénaRerne nt Concerté
If the principle of decentralisation looks somewhat strained in the provisions
for state interventions in the preparation of the SD, the arrangements for the POS are
freer. The decision to proceed with a POS is now left entirely to the municipal
council, and the preparation is 'at the initiative and under the responsibility of the
commune" (Art. Ll23-3). There is no longer the statutory requirement for communes
with populations greater than 50,000 to prepare a POS (Jégouzo and Pittard, 1980).
The POS is started by municipal decree and its final approval is by municipal decree
(Art. L123-3--1) (see Table 3.2). The same applies to the modification or revision of
a POS already in force (Arts. Ll23-4, Rl23-34 el. seq.). Even with the POS,
however, the state has a reserve power to demand the modification of the POS to
make it compatible with an SD or a PIG (Art. Ll23-4-l). Embarking on plan
preparation therefore entails a long-term commitment to maintaining local land-use
regulations for the commune's area.
The decentralisation of the ZAC procedure was not introduced until 1985 in
the Development Act (Loi d'aniénagenzent) of that year, and applied from 1st April
1986 by the decree of 14 March (Sitruk, 1986), where a POS has been approved the
creation of a ZAC becomes the responsibility of the mayor in most instances. But the
prefect retains control of the process where there is no POS or where the ZAC is
being proposed by the state or covers several communes (Art. L31 1-1).
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The commune may delegate its responsibility to an EPCI in both the
preparation of the POS, the ZAC and the PAZ.
One other novelty introduced by (lie act of 7 January 1983 has been the
commission de conciliation (conciliation board) which may be appealed to in the event
of conflict between the participants preparing the SD, POS or ZAG. The board is
appointed by the prefect and consists of six elected representatives and six others,
who may be professionals, but who will have a knowledge of planning (Arts. R121-
3 to R121-l2; Moniteur l984b). As Bouyssou and Hugot (1986) note, however, the
board is not an arbitration panel because it cannot impose a solution.
4.63	 The Perniis de Construire and Other Authorisations
Decentralisation of powers of plan preparation to the commune is directly
linked to the decentralisation of the control of development. The principle is that in
those communes with an approved POS the mayor was empowered from 1st April
1984 to process and sign permissions to build in the name of the commune (Arts.
L41l-2, L42l-2-1). In other communes, the processing remains the prerogative of
the state (Art. R421 -25) and as before, the mayor signs, but in the name of the state.
Moreover, in these communes where a POS is approved the mayor is obliged to take
this responsibility: as Art. L421 -2-1 puts it, 'the transfer of competence to the mayor
acting in the name of the commune is definitive". Starting a POS, therefore, is not
merely a commitment to producing land-use regulations for the commune, but the
first step towards taking full responsibility for local action. There is a further
incitement to taking (lie step. In those communes which do not have a POS, the 7
January 1983 act specifically precludes development outside the existing built-up
areas of the commune, except for extensions and modifications of existing buildings,
agricultural buildings and buildings necessary for public services; and buildings
incompatible with residential areas (Art. LI 11-1-2).
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This apparently draconian measure is much less far reaching than it first
seems. In addition to the exceptions noted above, the prefect may make exceptional
cases of other small development if it does not appear to be contrary to the general
objectives of the code and the municipal council has specifically requested that an
exception be made. As Bouyssou and 1-lugot (1986) note this is hardly a total embargo
on development, but the rule of constructibilité liniitée (contained development)
imposes another bureaucratic hurdle for communes and developers and another source
of conflict for communes. The rule was applied from 1 October 1984.
It must also be noted that the effects of the rule of constructibililé linzitée
could be deferred for two years where a commune had initiated a POS and for three
years from 1 October 1984 where the POS had been decreed before that date. The
same applied where communes had interim planning documents in force; the carte
conirnunale and the zone den vironnenient protege (ZEP; environmental protection
zone). For a discussion of the former see below, p.48; ZEP had been created for a
relatively small number of rural communes, to protect them from development
pressure (Bouyssou and Hugot, 1986).
Of considerable interest is the provision that the Act of 7 January 1983 made
for the processing of applications for permission to build. Realising that small
communes would find it difficult to afford to pay the staff required to do the
processing, Art. L421-2-6 offers communes with an approved POS the possibility of
using the services of the state (i.e. the DDE) free of charge. This use of the DDE was
dependent upon a formal agreement between the mayor and the DDE and,
jurisprudence has determined that the use of the state services once agreed applied
to the whole of a commune and to all forms of permission. In making this provision
the government was honouring its intention to provide communes with the resources
to take up their new responsibilities. The practical effect of this provision is to leave
the DDE with an assured future, and although the clause requires the DDE to act in
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permanent consultation with the mayor, there were many French commentators who
believed, with I3ouyssou and Ilugot (1986), that it would nullify the will to
decentralise (see Gontcharofl and Milano, 1984).
There is little that needs to be said about other authorisations except to note
that they have been brought into line with the permission to build. Thus for
lolissemenis Art. L319-l-1 makes the same distinction between communes with or
without a POS, and again, in the former the mayor of the commune takes the decision
in the name of the commune; in the latter the decision rests with the prefect (Art.
R3 15-25-9).
We must note finally that as with the POS and the ZAC the municipal council
is free to delegate its responsibility to an EPCI of which it forms part. In this case,
the president of the EPCI signs the permissions (Art. 421-2-1).
4.64	 The Contrôle de Lé.'alitë
The mayors of communes have been given freedom to take initiatives in plan
making and responsibility for decisions in the control of development. They are,
however, required to be accountable for the actions they take, and in planning just
as much as in other spheres of municipal activity the contrôle de legalite has been
introduced to ensure that autonomy does not lead to anarchy and a disregard for the
law. A joint circular from the Ministries of Town Planning and the Interior
addressed to the prefect, makes the intentions clear:
"Two particular preoccupations must guide you in the exercise of legal
control for planning documents:
-	 to assure that supra-comniunal interests of all kinds are taken into
acconi it
- to preserve the interests of the commune itself by avoiding irregularities
which might .....lead to authorisat ions for development being showed
by illegality.
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You will exercise this important prerogative with the concern to apply
the law but the whole law." (MULT/Intérieur, 1984).
Legal control is seen as specifically necessary to ensure the survival of the
national interest, but also to protect niayors from themselves: in the case of plans to
ensure that subsequent decision-niaking does not become illegal by virtue of the
illegality of the regulations that are used as the basis for permission. We have already
noted that the prefect has a period of a month to comment on a POS which has been
published in the those communes for which no SD has been prepared.
This legal checking of decisions taken applies equally to the permission to
build. The decision must now be referred to the prefect (Art. L421-2-4) who is now
given a two-month period in which to challenge the decision by referring it to the
tribunal adniinisiratif unless the mayor agrees to withdraw the decision. There is
	 ''
then a further two-month period in which third parties may challenge the decision
if the prefect has chosen not to. It perhaps should also be noted that a decision on
a permission to build does not become enforceable until the decision notice is
received by the prefect; the prefect thus retains a double power in relation to the
decisions of the mayor.
A circular from the Ministry of Town Planning (MULT,1985b) addressed to
the prefects spells out in detail how the exercise of legal control should be carried
out, and the directions given are a clear guide to the intentions and the likely impact
of this new form of state surveillance. First of all, the circular emphasises that
contrôle de lëgalitë remains a control a posteriori and in no sense "must it lead to a
double processing of the application". Nor must it consist of a "finicky formal
examination of the documents which would quickly appear to be the re-establishment
of the tutelage that was overturned by the Act of 2 January 1982." The prefect is
urged to take into account two major considerations. First of all, he or she must
ensure the respect of the regulations of the POS, bearing in mind the competences of
the state and of state services, where such a service like the ABF is empowered to
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give a direction (avis con fornie) on the outcome of the application; to public safety
and the protection of open spaces; and to buildings of 'particular importance'.
Secondly, the prefect is required to exercise control impartially such that communes
that do not use the services of the DDE are not penalised by the control. An
appendix to the circular lists in detail the factors to be considered, under four
headings: external legality relating to the competence of the decision-maker; the
respect of procedural rules and the reasons for the decisions; the internal legality in
relation to the POS and the RNU; the control of the inspiration for the decision, such
that it must be seen to be based on the objectives that the procedure was designed to
guarantee; and the control of reasons for the decision in terms of the interpretation
of the legal base and the application of (lie regulations to the specific circumstances.
There is a further point to be made about the contrOle de légalité. The
concept of 'protecting the commune from itself' which is suggested by the circular
has a very practical relevance insofar as the mayor may become liable for
compensation. The developer of a building put up with the benefit of a permission
to build which later is annulled by the tribunal acirninistratif may claim compensation
if the building has to be demolished. Although insurance is available to cover the
eventuality, no mayor is likely to be anxious for this to happen too frequently.
4.7	 The Im p act of a Regulatory S ystem on Plannin g Practice
A full evaluation of (lie effects of a legalised system of policy and the
decentralisation of powers on development control practice must await the analysis
of the case studies. Nevertheless the system as presented raises some general issues
which require examination. The first of these concerns the impact of the regulatory
system on both the content and the process of decision-making. The second concerns
the way in which decentralisation has worked in practice.
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4.71	 Positive Impact
It is reasonable at the outset to consider the evidence on the positive impact
of the regulations in creating an efficient, and accountable system. If we equate
efficiency with speed of processing, various points stand out. First, the maximum
processing period of five months is clearly less than that to be found in the worst
cases in Britain, and the time limits are evidently respected (Labetoulle, 1983). Less
than one per cent of all permissions granted in 1983 and 1984 were tacit (see Table
4.7). The sanction of the deemed permission is clearly effective. On the other hand
we must note that the median processing times appear to be longer than in Britain:
a smaller proportion of applications is determined within three calendar months in
France than in thirteen weeks in this country. On the face of it, a regulatory system
does not appear to offer such advantage in terms of speed.
The cause of the relatively lengthy processing may not be with the regula-
tions, however. There is some slender evidence to suggest that where since
decentralisation processing has been handled by agencies other than the DDE, there
is a marked drop in processing time. In the rural syndicate in the déparierneni of
Hérault cited below, processing time is down to two weeks on average (see below p. 4-
); at Lorient in Finistère, with the communal services in charge, processing is on
average 45 days (Monileur, 1985b); at Dijon, AGIUD claim an average processing
time of six weeks (Burdin, personal communication).
On the question of certainty, we have already noted a tension between the
desire of the legislature to achieve clarity and precision by specifying the conditions
under which decisions may be taken, and the essentially unpredictable quality of the
planning task. The statistics for permission to build, however, suggest that in practice
the French planning system does offer a measure of certainty. The five per cent
refusal rate shows that once an application is lodged French developers have a greater
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degree of success than the British counterparts (Table 4.7). Yet this conclusion
ignores two points. First, the refusal rate for cerlificats d'urbanisrne is far higher, at
25 per cent or more. If the statistics for both forms of permission are taken together
the overall refusal rate is just below 13 per cent, or very nearly that of the refusal
rate in England in both years. That suggests either a measure of doubt about how the
regulations would actually apply, or the desire of applicants to test the system in the
knowledge that discretion might be exercised in their favour.
The second point relates to the phrase 'once an application is lodged". There
must be a question of whether unacceptable development is diverted before the
application stage, or whether developers seek a modification of a POS in order to
promote a development that would otherwise have to be refused. Such questions once
again turn the discussion away from the formal stage of processing to the informal
stage.
The right of redress within the system is founded principally on the
accountability of the decision-maker before the law. The rights of third parties are
greater than those in the British development control system, which offers little to the
public at large if a local authority is minded to approve an application. In France, by
contrast, a third party can ask for a decision to be annulled. By comparison with the
British appeals system, appeals to the iribunaux adniinisiraiifs are rarer: in 1983
there were 3,681 appeals to the iribunaux and the Conseil d'Etat (MULT, 1985a).
Cases now appear to take a long time to be decided upon. The average time for all
cases at the tribunal at Lyon is apparently two-and-a-half years, although urgent
cases may be dealt with in six months, and town planning cases are mostly classed as
urgent (Chabanol, personal communication). Commentators agree that getting a
building demolished that has not been built in conformity with the regulations is
extremely difficult (Fabre-Luce, 1986).
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This form of accountability and redress has the consequence we have already
noted of turning objectors to a proposal into litigants and thus ensuring that they are
seen as individuals with a property interest in the decision rather than citizens with
a wider civic interest in the planning of their areas. Debate on public policy becomes
hard to achieve in such circumstances, because the system places a premium on the
visibility of legal and administrative propriety, but only after the decision has been
taken (Booth, 1985).
4.72	 The Negative Impact
It is clear that Tribillon's view about the negative impact of a rigid regulatory
system is widely shared by professionals in planning. Tanguy (1979) in a study of
DDE staff in four ddpartenients, found that civil servants habitually considered
regulations to be "badly written", "sometimes impossible to apply", and to introduce
"rigidity and heaviness" and that they systematically tried to circumvent the negative
effects (p. 50). The attitudes of Tanguy's respondents was matched by attitudes of
staff in the present survey for whom the legality, though not necessarily the detailed
nature of, the POS, was presented as a constant problem. The view is hardly
surprisingly also shared by developers.
The problems, both legal and technical, with the regulation is nowhere better
illustrated than the problem of the espaces boisés classes (classified woodland; often,
incorrectly, referred to as terrains classes boisCs) in the several POS prepared for the
conurbation of Lyon. The code allows for the identification of woodland in a POS
to which then stringent regulations in Arts. R130-1 to R130-14 apply. Once defined,
classified woodland can only be changed following a full revision of the POS (Art.
R123-34). The problem stems both from the nature of the survey of the woodland
and of the rules that then apply. At Lyon, the classified woodlands were identified
by aerial survey which has led to the inclusion and protection of land which is
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sometimes of doubtful quality. At the same time there has been a desire to protect
the green character of open spaces, particularly in zones U, where it is not necessarily
the intention to forbid all building. The regulations were seen as inflexible and
inappropriate to at least some of the land so designated. An attempt to solve the
problem had been made by distinguishing in one POS between classified woodland
that was and was not subject to the special regulations of the code; an ingenious
device perhaps, but of doubtful legality. An unpublished legal report, commissioned
by the planning agency to shed light on the problem, suggested that, while no judge
would wear the suppression of all classified woodland, the distinction between
classified woodland subject to the regulations of the code and green spaces' (espaces
veils) with their own, more permissive regulations had a valid legal precedent
(Barrau and Jamet, 1985).
Similar ingenuity is to be seen in the treatment of the contained development
rule. It needs little perception to see that what constitutes the built-up parts of the
commune is likely to provide meat for much legal dispute. Even before the law was
approved, the minister had had to elaborate by saying that "built-up parts" would be
taken to mean outlying hamlets and land immediately adjacent to the main settlement
or outlying hamlets (Bouyssou and llugot, 1986). Further refinements to the law have
been made locally, no doubt with the aim of keeping mayors of small rural
communities without a POS happy. In the déparlerneni of Puy-de-DOme for example,
the test of what consists of a part of the commune's current built-up area is taken to
be any radius of 50 metres within which there are four or more buildings and that
any site within a 30 metre radius of these buildings becomes potentially buildable
(Lacroix, 1985b).
Such contortions exemplify the way in which a legalised system of policy
develops ever more detailed sets of rules to make good the deficiencies of the original
formulation, a process that is also exemplified in the increasing complexity of the
RNU and regulations for the POS in the code itself. As Bouyssou (1986) puts it,
144
"Normative per! ectionisni carrying with it the proliferation of
constantly changing legal causes (under the fallacious pretext of lying
then? to contemporary reality) when a text only comes into force after
sonic delay, is in reality a return to byzantium."
(p. 10)
The opposite argument is posed with equal force: there are those who fear
with some justice that the flexibility of response leads to abuses which are hard to
of
contain. The discretion on the possibility of discussion and the usederogations is
highly revealing of the inside understanding of how the French system of planning
should operate. Dërogations were largely outlawed in 1976, because although they
offered the possibility of precisely the kind of pragmatic response Tribillon and
Chapuisat see as lacking, the exercise of the freedom was effectively beyond the
scope of control. The point is expressed by Prats et al. (1979) quoting Braibant et al.:
"The current unease of i/ic French administrative judge arises froni
the question of the yen' laxit y of the 'legality' over which he can
exercise control: 'If i/ic text authorised a departure in an exceptional
case, lie exercises in that exceptional case, only a minimum of control;
lie is practicall y disarmed if the administration is purely and simply
without oilier constraint, autliorised to depart from a rule" (pp. 43-
44).
The essential dilemma is this: the system's accountability before the courts is
lost as soon as the possibility of departures or more limited discretion to act is sought.
The formal response is to articulate the policy contained in the code or in the P08 to
ever increasing levels of detail so that the range of possible outcomes may be
anticipated, but this merely serves to hamstring the system yet further.
4.73	 Deregulation
Under such circumstances and given the new spirit of economic liberalization
which has become the vogue in France as in Britain, it is hardly surprising that
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various voices should continue to clamour for the deregulation of planning.
Commentators like Bouyssou argue primarily from the stance that they doubt the
effectiveness of the proliferation of texts and that by making control more selective
little would be lost. The real thrust of the deregulation has come with the Chirac
government's desire to promote construction and thus, as the Thatcher administrations
have done in Britain with industry, remove as much bureaucratic control as possible.
In March 1986, Pierre Mehaignerie the minister of the newly created MELATT
announced his intention to extend the terms of reference of the existing Danon
commission to consider the scope for the deregulation of construction and town
planning in their entirety (Moniteur, 19861). The Danon commission had, however,
already proposed a round of detailed changes to the code, of which perhaps the most
significant was reducing the processing time of applications for permission to build
to two months or three months where there was a need for consultation (Monileur,
l986b).
There has been one deregulatory change to the code which predates the Danon
proposals. An act of January 1986 applied by a decree in March in the same year has
excluded certain categories of development including certain kinds of minor work
from the need for a permission to build. In place of seeing a permission, intending
developers need only make a preliminary declaration (Arts. R422-2 and R422-3)
which can then be opposed by the competent authority if needs be. It is hard to see
what benefits this brings to the applicant, since the declaration must be accompanied
by a plan and elevations and there is little saving in the time of processing. On the
other hand, it adds to the legal complexity of making an application by introducing
new distinctions. A comment in Ic Moniteur (1986a) makes it clear, however, that
the change arises as much from legal doubts about what constituted a "construction"
in Art. L421-1, and the January 1986 Act therefore succumbed to the temptation of
increasing the complexity of the law in the attempt to simplify and clarify it.
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4.8	 Decentralisation and the Exercise of Develo p ment Control Powers
We have already noted on two occasions, a troubling distance between the
intentions of decentralisation and the provisions of the acts and decrees that put
decentralisation into effect. A statement of powers and provision leaves us far from
clear what the impact of decentralisation might actually be in practice. Inevitably
three years of experience is too short to produce a definitive evaluation of the effects of
decentralisation but sufficient information is available to answer two important
questions:
-	 How far has the transfer of powers been achieved?
-	 How far if at all has decentralisation led to processing of applications by other
than the DDE?
4.81	 The Transfer of Powers
At 1st April 1984, 6,32J communes had an approved POS in force for the six
months required by the legislation and were thus able to process and determine
applications as they thought fit (Moniteur. 1984a). Thus only 17 per cent of the base
units of local government in metropolitan France benefitted immediately from the
transfer of planning powers. As Ic Monileur noted, however, those communes
accounted for more than half the country's population and 40 per cent of the
permissions granted. Decentralisation has clearly led to an upsurge in interest in
preparing POS. Ministry statistics show that more POS were initiated (prescril)
between 1st January 1983 and 1st October 1984 than in the four years previously
which suggests an enthusiasm for acquiring the new powers. By that date some
12,126 POS has been fornially started (MULT, 1985a; see Table 4.8). By 1st April
1985, the number of communes with an approved POS had risen to 7,373 (20 per cent
of the total) and the total number of communes which had started work on a POS had
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risen to 15,099 by the same date (Diagonal, 1985a).
There are groundsfor taking a more pessimistic view, however. Wilson (1985)
argues that the slowness of POS preparation (on average six years) and the relatively
small numbers of DDE staff will mean that even if large numbers of plans are
prescribed, it will be many years before the plans are approved. Again official
statistics would Support such a view. If there was a marked upsurge in starts on POS
after 1 January 1983, the numbers of POS published and approved tell a different
story. Though the marked decrease in the ten months of 1984 niay perhaps be
ascribed to under reporting and the problems of transition, it is clear that output has
not yet niatched starts (Table 4.8). It is also significant that Art. L124-4 allows a
commune to defer the application of the contained development rule until 1 October
1987 if a POS had been initiated by 1 October 1984. The upsurge in starts could also
be seen as an attempt to buy time as much as a real desire to start plan making.
TABLE 4.8 POS started. pubIshed and approved 1976-1984
STARTED	 PUBLISHED	 APPROVED
CumuLative Change Percentage Cumulative Change Percentage Cumulative change Percentage
Date	 total	 change	 total	 change	 total	 change
1.1.76 6,938	 -	 -	 962	 -	 -	 300	 -	 -
1.1.77 7,580	 642	 9.3	 1,752	 790	 82.1	 603	 303	 101.0
1.1.78 8,521
	 941	 12.4	 2,501	
42.8	 981	 378	 62.7
1.1.79 9,371
	 850	 10.0	 3,229	 728
	 29.1	 1,538	 557	 56.8
1.1.80 9,636
	 265	 2.8	 3,998	 769
	 23.8	 2,278	 740	 48.1
1.1.81 10,059	 423	 4.4	 4,960	 962
	 24.1	 3,176	 898	 39.4
1.1.82 10,223
	 164	 1.6	 5,672	 715
	 14.4	 3,847	 671	 21.1
1.1.83 10,405
	 18	 1.8	 6,443	 768
	 13.5	 4,695	 848	 22.0
1.1.84 11,111
	 706	 6.8	 7,228	 785
	 12.2	 5,710	 1,015	 21.6
1.10.8412,126	 1.015
	 9.1	 7,395	 167
	 2.3	 5,945	 235	 4.1
Source: MULT, 1985a
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There is a much more difficult question as to whether all mayors were equally
interested in acquiring the new powers even if the capacity to prepare POS was
forthcoming. Wilson's work (1983 and 1985) indicates that they were not. First of
all, for many communes planning is hardly a major issue. In the départenwnt of
Rhóne, for example, the average number of applications for permission to build
received in 1983 in each commune was only 25; the national average was only just
over 16 (MULT, 1985a). 5,000 communes without a POS received no applications at
all; 15,000 only between one and five per year: the Ministry could take .the view that
many communes did not need a POS (Lacroix, l985a), which suggests a subtle shift
from an argument about local responsibility expressed in the Defferre Act to a purely
technical debate on the need for forward planning policy . Further, there appears to
be little move towards intercommunal cooperation (Wilson, 1983; Lacroix, l985a)
except where it already existed in the districts and urban communities.
Nonetheless not all the evidence points in the direction of inertia. The
Federation nationale des maires ruraux (National Federation of Rural Mayors)
evidently took fright at the contained development rule and encouraged mayors to
establish an interim planning document for their communes, the carte coniniunale
(Monileur, 1984c). These plans have had a short history) and result from agreements
reached between the DDE and communes in same dpaiienieizts after the new decree
on the extended RNU was approved in 1977. They thus have no statutory basis but
were incorporated into the decentralisation bill promoted by Giscard d'Estaing in
1979 (Jegouzo and Pittard, 1980). The Senate apparently hoped to be able to extend
their useful life after the decentralisation acts had taken effect (Bouyssou and Hugot,
1986). Though this was not to be, Art. L111-l-3 waives the contained development
rule for those communes which had "jointly with the representative of the State
agreed the ways in which the rules made by virtue of the Article L111-1 [the RNU]
are applied to the commune's territory" providing a POS had been started and for a
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period of two years. This agreement on the application of the RNU is effectively
what the carte cornniunale amounted to and by. 1st October 1983, 6,720 communes had
such a carte (Moniteur 1984c). Of these, some 1,500 communes thus retained a
measure of control over their destiny even if they do not enjoy full autonomy, by
agreeing how the RNU should be applied, and are committed to proceeding to the
preparation of a POS (Diagonal, 1985b).
The second sign of change is reported by Lacroix (1985a) which suggests that
intercommunal cooperation which is both possible and beneficial to the participants
has taken place in the dëpartenieiit of Hérault where two existing syudicates have
joined together to deal with the processing of applications and studies for POS. The
charge to the communes is low and the processing of applications has been reduced
to two weeks. Lacroix also reports that one dëparternent (Bas-Rhin) has established
a technical agency for processing applications and three others (Dordogne, Landes,
Pyrenees-Atlantiques) have established technical agencies for forward planning which
presumably could also develop a control function in the fullness of time.
The establishment of these technical services at the level of the dEparternent
suggests both the development of local accountability and the reestablishment of
hierarchical control that the Defferre Act was supposed to abolish. The départernents
of course gain real control over their local services, but for the communes such a
technical agency differs from the DDE only insofar as it is not staffed by traditional
civil servants. It is to the wider question of who is providing technical support for
those communes which have acquired new powers that we must now turn.
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I.4.9	 Agencies used for p rocessin g a pp lications for permis de coiistruire
Processing
Agency
The Commune
The DDE
Using another
technical agency
(e.g. SIVOM)
All communes
with transferred
res 0 flS i bill ty
Number of
	 Percentage	 Population
communes	 of communes
204	 4.1	 8,307,551
6,029	 94.5	 23,151,240
	
88	 1.4	 562,194
	
6,381	 100	 32,021,005
Number of
permissions
processed in 1984
38,454
231,729
4,195
274,358
Source: Ministère de 1'Ijrbanisme du Logement et des Transports, 20 April 1984,
reproduced by Monileur, 1985b.
4.82	 The Availabilit y of Technical Support
Given that the services of the DDE were placed at the disposal of communes
free of charge, it is hardly surprising to discover the extent to which newly
enfranchised communes returned to their old sources of help. At 1st April 1984, 95
per cent of all communes able to process their own applications used the DDE to do
so and a mere four per cent did so themselves (see Table 4.9). The recourse to other
agencies was minimal. The surveys carried out by the Association des maires de
France suggests that the pattern is not uniform. Communes with populations under
10,000 only very rarely processed their own applications (two per cent), but 25 per
cent of those with populations over 10,000 were doing so. The same holds good for
the preparation of POS in communes with populations under 6,000. The DDE was
invariably responsible for POS preparation; for those communes with populations
between 5,000 and 10,000 the DDE apparently never works alone and above 15,000
the DDE is only involved at all in 25 per cent of communes (Lacroix, 1985a). The
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point is further reinforced by the existence of technical staff in the communes. Only
seven per cent of communes with populations between 5,000 and 10,000 had at least
two qualified staff working on planning preparation or processing applications,
whereas 57 per cent of communes over 30,000 and all communes over 50,000
population had such staff (Lacroix, 1985a).
There are various observations to be made about these statistics. The first is
the extent to which they represent a massive affirmation of the existing order: as
Lroix (1985a) puts it,
'In this renewed confidence, the DDE, are gathering the fruits of
deconcentration practised over many years".
(p. 43).
But there is more to be said. The distinction between large communes with visions
of independence and the resources to field their own services and rural communes
with neither is striking. Decentralisation appears to be a far more viable proposition
for urban than for rural areas, and to some extent may be said to be no more than a
confirmation of what was already happening before 1983. Equally, for the DDE,
there is some suggestion of residualisation as they became increasingly the guardians
of the rural areas. In the départerneni of COte d'Or, for example, the one large urban
area has entrusted its processing of applications to its distinct technical services,
leaving the DDE to deal with the rural hinterland (Booth, 1985).
The second observation concerns the reasons for choosing the DDE. Popesco
and Zalma (1986) reporting on attitudes to decentralisation in the dépariernent of
Alpes-Maritimes suggest that the choice has not merely to do with the service being
free. Partly, they argue, it is because mayors can envisage no other working
arrangement; and partly, too, they see it as an insurance policy for mayors against
falling foul of the contrôle de légalité at the end of the procedure.
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The third observation has to do with the nature of the technical support that
is given. Popesco and Zalma again offer a useful critique by suggesting that the
system is not neutral. Firstly, the freedom of which is in principle given to mayors
is removed at least in part if the DDE retains its old role. They also suggest that if
a mayor fails to follow the advice given, the DDE will offer no support in the event
of a subsequent legal conflict. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the
system holds positive advantages for the mayor. The responsibility for an unpopular
decision may be ascribed to the services of the state thus diverting the brunt of a
local population's wrath. Booth (1985) reported on the apparently pointless opposition
to a development proposal of the mayor in a commune in COte-d'Or, albeit one which
did not have responsibility for processing applications, which was nevertheless an
attempt to dissociate himself from a decision which was politically unpopular. The
DDE's relationship with the commune under decentralisation is essentially unlike a
chief planning officer and his council in Britain, because the former clearly regards
itself as an autonomous organisation "at the disposal", but not yet under the command,
of the commune.
4.83	 The Co,Urôle de LOj.'alité
The last point that must be investigated is the effect of the conirôle de
lëgalilë. We have already noted that in principle it imposes a heavy constraint on the
actions of communes and some information is now forthcoming about how the control
is actually exercised. A government report published in 1985 restricts the scope of
control and the number of cases referred to the tribunaux adrninisiratifs. Various
points emerge from the report. Of a total of 3,300,000 acts subject to control some
13.5 per cent or approximately 440,000 were on planning matters. Very few were
actually referred ( dãfëres ) to the iuibunaux adniinislrauifs, however. The average was
20 cases per dépariement referred in the first year; but in four dëparlenienls there had
been no cases and the maximum number was only 94. The report also noted that
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cases were frequently withdrawn which the authors suggested was "a sign of
successful consultation between the representative of the State and the author of the
act'. The conclusion drawn was that the "contrOle de lEgalilé had given rise neither
to government by judges or to the replacement of one tutelage by another" (Monileur,
1985a, p. 63).
The figures suggest wide variation in practice between prefects, and Périnet-
Marquet's (1986) study points to some of the difficulties in the départernent of
Vienne. In the first year there were 8,544 acts of town planning subject to control
with only two people employed to do the checking. He rightly concludes that under
such circumstances the control can scarcely be a general one and many decisions will
hardly be looked at. Moreover, Perinet-Marquet takes the view that prefects have
been found to be too lenient in their approach: "for many prefects, better an illegality
than a fight" (p. 270). The conirOle de légalile is thus clearly a discretionary power.
The intentions of government set out in the circular do not appear to be realised in
practice.
There is another effect of the contrOle de légalilé. Until 1983 the juge
administratif existed to adjudicate between administrators and administrés. The new
control effectively requires the judge to decide between the different wills of two
different administrations. Whereas in the past it would have been the prefect who
decided in the event of a conflict between the DDE and the mayor of a commune,
now the prefect must refer the case to the courts:
"Iii the presence of cases which express Iwo different visions of policy,
that of the representative of the Slate and that of the deceniralised
local authority, the juge adnzinisiratif can onl y take a policy decision.
This will be difficult for him, for it is not his task."
(Chabanol, 1986, p. 284).
Chabanol's view, as vice-president of a tribunal administratif is thus
directly opposed to the government's and it suggests yet again that if decentralisation
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has not resulted in a major change it has brought important but subtle shifts to the
way in which existing pai ticipants engage in the process.
4.9	 Conclusions
This examination of the development control process in France both as
it existed before 1983 and as it has been modified after the decentralisation acts
makes plain how different it is from the processing and determination of planning
applications in Britain. The instruction of a permission to build is, it would appear,
primarily about checking property rights and the extent to which a proposal complies
with regulations enforceable by courts of law. Such a concept does not easily
compare either public involvement or discretionary action, nor does it appear to relate
directly to the formulation and maintenance of policy. A regulatory system appears
to emphasise the legality of a decision taken at the expense of its content.
Accountability is achieved either through the administrative hierarchy or through the
possibility of judgement in the iiibu,zaI adrniizisiraiif.
The justification for the lack of public involvement can no doubt be seen in
the process of POS preparation where the enquêle publique offers an extended chance
to the public to comment on the plan proposals. The obligation to fix a site notice
with details of permission once its implementation has started thus allows the public
at large to see that the law as expressed in the POS has been complied with. The
effect of this is to cast the objector in the role of the partie IOsëe (the injured party)
and thus all objections may be seen as no more than an expression of private,
pecuniary interest (Tanguy, 1979): this hardly facilitates the concept of legitimate
public interest in participation.
Though it may be true that discretion sits uneasily with a regulatory system,
we have noted that the formal possibilities for discretionary action exist both in the
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RNU and the POS, though a general description of the system gives little clue as to
who takes the action and how the discretionary power is actually used. The scope for
new informal exercise of discretionary power, through the interpretation of
regulations or through negotiation appear thus to be part and parcel of the French
control system, and the fact that principle and practice are in a state of tension is
something to which Tanguy's work attests.
What, then, is the impact of decentralisation on this control process which
depends so heavily for its justification on its legality? Certainly it has given mayors
the possibility of more executive responsibility but they are as bound as ever to
ensuring that the decisions they take are legally permissible. Whether the simple
transfer of executive responsibility can be equated with the according of
discretionary power is at least open to debate. Do not the regulations bind mayors as
much in their new role as ever they did before 1983?
It is perhaps easier to begin to draw conclusions about decentralisation in the
context of the administrative fraiiiework. On the one hand, the inclusion of the rule
of contained development in the Act oF 7 January 1983 seems to underline the
genuine desire of Mitterrand and Defferre both to encourage plan-making and to
transfer powers to the local level. On the other, all the old actors remain in place,
and the old units of authority persist. We have drawn attention to two factors in
particular which suggest inertia: the availability to communes free of charge of the
technical services of the DDE and the prefects' contrôle de légalité. Both of these
suggest that the commune's ability to administer themselves freely as proposed by the
decentralisation acts is in fact severely circumscribed.
The evidence of the texts and the opinions of French and secondary sources
seem to concur that decentralisation has been no revolution: neither figuratively nor
literally have the administrative boundaries been redrawn. Yet at the same time,
there is also evidence that at least in town planning all is not quite as it as before.
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There are little pointers that suggest if certainly not a revolution, then perhaps an
evolution; the numbers of POS prescrit, the enthusiasm of some of the commentaries,
the suggestion of some of the interviewees for this research that all is not as it was
before.
There is no question but that to get to the heart of the matter, we must leave
the legal texts and the commentaries and begin an investigation on the ground. Only
by adopting a close focus that we can begin to see how the various actors in practice
resolve the dilemmas that their role within the hierarchy of administration and their
duties as prescribed by a body of law pose for them. The study of development
control in the Lyon conurbation that follows was undertaken in that spirit, as an
attempt to understand the informal networks that customary practice rather than the
law provide.
157
	
5.	 PLANNING CONTROL IN THE LYON CONURBATION
	
5.1	 Introduction
We noted at the outset of this thesis that Lyon could hardly be said to be
typical of France and therefore presented considerable difficulties if the aim was to
make generalised statements about the impact of a regulatory system of planning or
development control decisions, and the changes sought by decentralisation of powers
to mayors of communes. Indeed one of the things that distinguishes Lyon is the fact
of its strongly developed desire to control its own destiny and the relative
sophistication of its forward planning. There are those who would argue that
decentralisation did no more than consolidate the progress that had already been made
towards self determination and that the inflexibility of the legal framework is
substantially overcome in the latest planning documents. These assertions need to be
explored in more detail, however; and to be able to do so requires an understanding
of the nature of the Lyon conurbation as a place and of the administration that has
grown up to deal with it. This chapter then turns to the planning policy for the area,
and looks at the control of development and the participants in that process.
5.11	 The Growth of Lyon
To try and characterise a city as ancient and complex as Lyon in a few words
is clearly an impossible task. There is a whole mass of perceptions and physical
characteristics which are more or less relevant to the subject in hand; there is the
question of self-image and the image of the city to outsiders; there is the series of
transformations that have made Lyon in 1986 a city which is totally different from
the Lyon of, say 1852 or 1789, physically, economically, politically and socially.
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	 The départernenis of France
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Physically, the city is distinctive for its location at the confluence of the
RhOne and the SaOne with the city centre located in the long thin peninsular, the
presqu'ule, no more than 750 metres wide that stretches from the slopes of Croix-
Rousse to Perrache, and the hills to the west and north that create abrupt changes of
level. Economically, Lyon is famous by turns as a entrepôt, as a centre of silk
weaving and in the 20th century for the manufacturing industry, not least of heavy
goods vehicles at Vénissieux. Politically, the city appearz as much characterised by
its bourgeois conservatism as by the xevolts of the silk-weavers and their unionisation
in the 19th century, and the radical socialism of its city council, under Augagneur and
Herriot. Socially, it is distinguished by a certain douceur de vie, by its cultural
prominence, musically and artistically and at table where, in a country dedicated to
eating well, its specialities are renowned. Yet at the same time Lyon has had a
reputation for dirt, disease and social unrest, which has persisted with the racial
tension which erupted in the Minguettes estate in 1981 (Deriol, 1971; Latreille, 1975;
Nau, 1986).
The population of the city and its suburbs also grew fast during the 19th
century, and although the population estimates were apparently somewhat inflated in
the early years of the 20th century because as Latreille (1975) puts it, "of the
fascination with the figure of half-a-million' (p. 389), the population the commune
of Lyon attained in 1896, and thereafter maintained, a figure of some 460,000. If the
city's population did not grow much after 1900 that of its suburbs did, and the
commune of Lyon canie to represent a smaller and smaller proportion of the
conurbation's population, until by 1975 more people lived in the suburbs than in the
city itself (See Table 5.1). Perhaps if there is one theme that dominates the history
of Lyon, however, it is that of the city's status within France and Europe, and that
has considerable significance for the way in which the conurbation governs itself and
for the attitudes of the powers that be to development.
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Figure 5.2	 The department of RhOne showing the boundary of COURLY
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Lyon's origins are as Lugdunum, an important outpost of the Roman empire
founded by the Roman general Planeus in 43 b.c. The Roman settlement on the west
bank of the river SaOne quickly attracted a Gahlic settlement on the hills on the east
bank and on the river front a commercial centre based on river trade. Indeed it is as
a centre for commerce that Lyon attained its prosperity and for a brief period in the
15th and 16th century a status as a European metropolis, with trading links from
England to the Middle East, and North Africa to the Low Countries, but the period
of prominence was brief. The growing centrahisation of the French monarchy and the
corresponding reduction of regional power in the 17th century, though not to be
compared with centrahisation after the Revolution, nevertheless, broug.ht the steady
eclipse of Lyon by Paris (Latreille, 1975).
The transformation of Lyon from European capital to provincial centre was
accelerated in the 19th century. Lyon did not lose its position as the second city of
France although rivalry with Marseille was evidently a feature of the period, but it
ceased to be at the hub of a European network of trade routes as the railways linking
France to Italy and Eastern Europe by-passed it. On the other hand, it developed as
a manufacturing centre, and if silk weaving declined in importance, the eastern
suburbs developed a strong industrial base of chemicals and metallurgy, the former
at least deriving from the inclustrialisation of the textile industry. Banking also rose
to eminence. Before 1860 the banks of Lyon were primarily geared to the needs of
textile manufacturers. The founding of Credit Lyonnais in 1863 was evidently a
turning point in channelling the city's wealth, but one which worked to Lyon's
detriment in the end; Credit Lyonnaise transferred its headquarters to Paris as early
as 1870 and it invested its money anywhere than in Lyon (Latreille, 1975).
The desire of the city fathers to recapture Lyon's greatness as a European city
has been expressed by the series of grand projects with which from the second
Empire onwards they have endowed the town. Napoleon III's prefect Vaisse set in
train the first major revitahisation of the town with the creation of the rues Impériale
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and de I'Impératrice (now rue de Ia Republique and rue Edouard-Herriot) in 1853
and 1858 respectively. These had the double function of cutting swathes through the
slums between Place Bellecour and Place des Terreaux and providing a triumphal
axis for the newgare de Perrache to the Town Hall (Leonard, 1961). This was followed
by the abortive attempt in the early 20th century to create a new centre on the east
bank of the RhOne at Les Brotteaux centred on a new station which never fulfilled
its ambition of, becoming a major international junction, and has since been closed
in favour of the new gare de Ia Part-Dieu.
The rhythm, though uneven, has continued since the First World War. The
commissions given to the revolutionary architect Tony Gamier by Herriot fall partly
into the same mold, even if the motivation was as much to create domestic comfort.
The hospital at Grange-Blanche and the abattoir at Gerland both put Lyon in the
forefront of the modern movement in architecture, as would perhaps the housing in
the Quartierdes Etats-Unis had its interpretation of Gamier's proposals in the Cite
industrielle not been so aiid (Garde, 1983). The suburb of Villeurbanne also made
efforts to improve its status and image in the 1930's, with the completion of the
Gratte-ciel (skyscraper: the term is now used to define Villeurbanne's central area),
a paradigm of modern city centre development, with stepped blocks in gleaming
white concrete to the designs of Chambon and Leroux (Lagier, 1984).
The concern to find an international status for Lyon was taken up with
renewed vigour after the war, and more particularly on the accession of Louis Pradel
as mayor in 1957. In a special feature in Le Monde, Ambroise-Rendu aptly
summarised a feeling that prevails in the 1980s:
"The most ambitious L yonnais dream of giving back to their city ihe
status of a metropolis on a European scale. They wish to rival
Barcelona, Milan, Frankfurt or Manchester." (1986).
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Indeed, this concern for the status of Lyon looks from without like something of a
collective neurosis. Books and articles seem to abound with titles like Lyon - yule
mondiale (Deriol, 1971) or the more questioning Lyon, Métropole? (Labasse, 1982)
and there is much discussion of what the appropriate indices of metropolitan status
might be. Yet Lyon has worked hard to achieve that status. In 1961 Leonard could
conclude that nothing had been achieved in Lyon to rival Vaisse's projects; by 1986
the contribution of the 20th century looked far more significant.
First there were the five great estates which were designed to end the housing
crisis of the 1950s, the ZUP (zones a urbanisées en priorise; priority development
zones, predecessors of the ZAGs), at Rillieux and Montessuy-Caluire in the north, la
Duchére to the north-west, Vaulx-en-Velin to the north-east and Vénissieux - les
Minguettes to the south (Gade, 1983). Though the vision of these and of other major
housing developments has turned swiftly sour since the late 1970's, they nevertheless
form part of the accelerating rhythm of project development. Much more successful
but quite as controversial has been the development of a new commercial centre on
the east bank of the RhOne at La Part-Dieu, which was consolidated by the decision
in 1971 of the SNCF (French Railways) to locate a new station on its ligne ii grande
vilesse, (LGV; high speed rail link) opposite the centre (Pelletier, 1985), thus
achieving what the development of les Brotteaux just to the north had failed to do in
the early 1900's. The metro of which the first line has been open since 1978, has
similarly been a cause for civic pride and has resulted in the important gain of the
pedestrianisation of de Ia République and its southward continuation to Perrache, the
rue Victor-Hugo (Barré, 1980). To that must now be added the projects for an
international congress building at quai Achille-Lignon and a cultural and sporting
centre at Gerland where a new building for the prestigious Ecole Normale Supérieur
is also nearing completion. Finally, Lyon has had since 1978 an international airport
at Satolas which is to be linked by a diversion of the existing LGV (Perren, 1987).
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5.12	 The Development of An Administrative Structure for the Conurbation
If Lyon has striven to become a European capital in the past 100 years, it is
true to say that the management of its domestic affairs and its relationships to its
immediate hinterland has been something of a problem. For Lyon did not
traditionally dominate a region. In Roman times, for example, it found itself at the
limits of three Gallic groupings, whose limits were defined by the RhOne and the
SaOne, and these boundaries were to prove extraordinarily resistant to change
(Latreille, 1975). In the early Middle Ages the SaOne marked the boundary between
the Holy Roman Empire to the east and the kingdom of France to the west; Dauphiné
to the south and east of the RhOne was not part of France until the 14th century and
Burgundy controlled what is now the départemeni oY Am (Bonnet, I92). The
provinces of Lyonnais, Forez and Beaujolais which were eventually linked as the
génOralilé of Lyon in the 17th century did not focus on 'geographical and social
unity" (Latreille, 1975, p. 206) and were not wholly dependent on Lyon. Lyon was
a frontier town without its own region properly speaking and no doubt this had been
the very source of its trading strength.
The Revolution perpetuated the old boundaries. The géneralile of the ancien
régime was at first kept more or less intact as one of the new départements.
Subsequently the desire to limit the power of Lyon led to the subdivision of that
déparienient into two to form the départements of Loire with St. Etienne and the
département of RhOne dependent on Lyon. What had originally been one of the
largest départenients thus became the smallest after the (now defunct) département of
Seine. The eastern boundary, however, remained unchanged and followed the line
of the rivers SaOne and Rhone, except in the immediate vicinity of Lyon (Latreille,
1985). The commune of Lyon included the area of Les Brotteaux on the east bank
of the Sane, and the suburban communes of Croix-Rousse, Caluire and La
Guillotière were also in the département of RhOne, but Vaulx-en-Velin,Villeurbanne,
Bron and Vénissieux all remained in Isère, and Rillieux in Am. The future suburban
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territory of Lyon was thus administratively divided. Under the Second Empire there
was some attempt at tidying up these boundaries. Bron, Villeurbanne, Vénissieux
and Vaulx were all transferred to RhOne and the commune of Lyon absorbed the
suburbs of Vaise to the west bank of the SaOne, Croix-Rousse immediately to the
north of the presqu'ile and La Guillotière to the south of Les Brotteaux on the east
bank of the Rhone. But Lyon declined to absorb other communes in 1874, not
wishing to become responsible for the poorly serviced suburbs of St.-Clair, Caluire
and Villeurbanne, and by 1906, Villeurbanne had sufficient civic identity and
political will to resist annexation (Bonnet, 1982; Bonneville, 1978).
The old divisions persisted until the 1960s. The urban area was a'ready
deemed to consist of 10 communes in 1939 (although in this it was not different from
other conurbations in France) (Dumolard, 1981), and it already straddled
departmental boundaries. This had its comic consequences, as for example that while
Lyon taxis were able to set down clients at the entrance of the old airport at Bron in
RhOne, they were not able to pick up passengers at the exit which by mischance was
in Isère. But it also meant that the burgeoning eastern suburbs attracted relatively
little interest. They were peripheral to the concerns of the prefects and general
councils of Am at Bourg-en-Bresse and Isère at Grenoble, and because they were not
in RhOne were ignored by the prefect for RhOne in Lyon. Uncontrolled development
thus took place, particularly along the main RN6 road beyond St. Priest, and the then
mayor of Lyon, Pradel, "took no interest" in the new town of L'Isle-d'Abeau, even
though it was seen as an essential part of the conurbation's strategy for growth,
because it was in Isère (Bonnet, 1982). Lojkine (1974) goes further and declares
Pradel to have been in outright opposition.
The 1960s were to see important boundary changes and administrative reform.
The transfer of sixteen communes from Isère to RhOne meant that at last all the
eastern suburbs and areas in which expansion might take place were in one
dëparlen?enl. To the north-east Rillieux was also transferred from the dépariernent
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of Am. On the other hand the suburban extensions on the north bank of the RhOne
as far as Montluel remain in Am. The census definition of the conurbation still cuts
across three departmental boundaries (Bonnet, 1982), yet presumably for
administrative convenience, the area under study for the new SD only incorporates
communes in RhOne.
5.13 The Creation of the Urban Community
More significant for the administration of planning control was the creation
of the urban community in 1969, one of the four whose creation was imposed upon
the constituent communes after the act of 1966. The rationale for the creation of the
community was the same at Lyon as for the other three: to give a coherent
administration to the conurbation, which, even if departmental boundaries had been
rationalised, was still divided amongst a great number of communes. 55 communes
were linked in the community which then delegated members to the new council of
the Communauté urbaine de Lyon known by its acronym COURLY and for the first
time, a great range of services were provided centrally. The range of services that
COURLY provided are those established by decree in 1968 together with the
provision of school sports facilities. Since the beginning of 1983 the council of
COURLY has comprised 140 members with at least one delegate from each of the
55 communes. The allocation of seats is proportional to the population of the
communes such that Lyon itself has 46 delegates and Villeurbanne 14, but 42 of the
communes have a single representative. The council elects a president and 12 vice
presidents, each of whom has a specific responsibility. Of these members of
COURLY's 'cabinet' six were mayors (including Collomb, mayor of Lyon and
president of the council as well as senator) and four were deputy mayors of Lyon.
The council has fifteen special committees which are charged with advising the
president of the council on matters referred to them. These committees have 24
members each and their membership reflects the general composition of the council,
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with therefore the majority of seats being taken by the centre-right Groupe d'Action
communautaire (COURLY 1986).
To carry out the statutory duties assigned to it, COURLY also has an
extensive administration with some 6,400 employees housed in the imposing premises,
purpose-built in 1978, as part of the Part-Dieu complex (COURLY, 1986). In its
scale, and in the range of services offered, COURLY's administration appears to be
the nearest equivalent to a very large urban local authority in Britain, even though as
we have noted, it is not properly speaking a territorial authority to compare with a
British district.
If COURLY makes the major contribution to the conduct of the conurba-
tion's affairs, its constituent communes are nevertheless members of other
intercommunal syndicates of one kind or another. In 1986 there were evidently nine
such syndicates, all of which included communes outside as well as inside COURLY,
with responsibilities for water supply, sewage and waste disposal and general
maintenance work. Of these the most significant is the Syndicat intercommunal pour
l'enlèvement et le traitement des ordures nienagères des communes de l'Ouest
Lyonnais, which handles domestic waste disposal in nine western communes of
COURLY (COURLY, 1986).
Administrative divisions, the legacy from a very distant past, thus remain a
problem, but the Lyon conurbation has acquired an administrative framework that is
able to consider much of the urban area as a whole and to respond to its particular
needs. The question of the extent of the accountability of COURLY to the electorate
is much more doubtful. At best it is at one remove from the people it serves, given
that the council consists of delegated, not directly elected, members. For this reason,
it cannot be understood as a local authority and does not therefore usurp the role of
the communes. This places administrative staff in what to British eyes is a curiously
ambiguous role. The technical services are accountable both to the council of
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Figure 5.3	 COURLY and its constituent communes
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COURLY and also from time to time, to the communes on whose behalf they may
be working, whether small or large, whether left- or right-wing.
The second point to observe about the acquisition of this new administrative
framework is the fact that it has not replaced any of the existing structures. If the
communes remain the only real local authorities in COURLY, the DDE remains an
important force in the government of Lyon and its suburbs, particularly in the field
of planning. Since 1969, we may argue, local government has become more complex
and not more directly accountable; it has probably made local government more
difficult for the consumer to approach.
Yet the creation of COURLY has increased power for at least some of the
actors at the local level. Mény (1984) notes that with much of local government
opposed to de Gaulle, the State proceeded "with circumspection" in requiring the
formation of urban communities at the Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon and Strasbourg
conurbations (p. 203). Certainly at the outset the creation of COURLY provoked
vigorous opposition from most of the mayors of the departenieni of RhOne, but
Herriot's successor, Pradel, after briefly opposing the bill on principle, "did nothing
to stem an act that considerably increased his political power in the region "(Lojkine,
1974, p. 18). As Lojkine points out, the arithmetic was simple. Whereas in the
general council of the déparienieni Lyon held 37 per cent of the seats and therefore
relied on a political alliance with Villeurbanne and the rural communes, in COURLY
at the outset Lyon had no fewer than 56 of the 90 seats. Thus Pradel, who since his
election in 1957 had, in Machin's words, become "virtual dictator of Lyon" (1980, p.
136), inevitably became first president of the urban community which he was also to
dominate until his death. Unusually, he acted under a self-denying ordinance not to
seek other office in order the better to concentrate on local affairs. Moreover though
Herriot had been his patron his politics shifted well to the right: "He showed himself
more concerned with practical projects than with empty ideological conflict'
(Latreille, 1975, p. 466) and after the relative inertia of Herriot's closing years,
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embarked on a vigorous policy of equipping Lyon with facilities. If Latreille can
portray Pradel as a neutral technocrat Lojkine presents the effect of his policies as
benefitting certain social stiata and significantly advancing the cause of large-scale
capitalistic enterprise. But whatever the interpretation that is placed on Pradel's
policies and their implementation, they can scarcely be described as radical-socialism;
and they emphatically suggest a powerful operator with a well-developed power-
base.
The third point to consider is how far COURLY is dominated by its biggest
partner. In the composition of its presidential cabinet, it is clear that Lyon is still the
major political force in COURLY, and that smaller communes and communes of the
left must feel to some extent excluded from the power structure. As far as political
balance is concerned, tlie fact that Villeurbanne, the second largest commune of
COURLY, is socialist and has a former government minister (1-lernu) as its mayor
must be an important counterweight to the ongoing right wing on the council. As far
as the small conimunes are concerned, the changes introduced in 1982 which allowed
delegates from each of the communes and not simply from an electoral college in
each of the five sectors has been important, as has the fact that the president's first
deputy, Jean Rigaud, is mayor of the relatively small commune of lEcully and thus
maybe helps to ensure that the interests of the smaller suburban communes are
represented at the heart of the presidential cabinet. Yet it must also be said the
Lojkine's strictures in 1974 about the representativeness of the cabinet of COURLY
apply with equal force in 1986. Of the 12 vice presidents none is from the industrial
working class suburbs of the inner ring; of the six who do not represent Lyon all
come from urbanised, formerly rural communes dominated by the new bourgeoisie.
This represents a step back from 1971 when at least the mayor of St.-Priest was
present in the cabinet (Lojkine 1974, p. 22).
The further point is whether decentralisation has made any appreciable impact
on the attitudes and organisation of COURLY and its members. The view of actors
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within the system is that the impact has been slight (Dellus, Ide, personal
communication). Leaving aside the general question of whether the regulations do
in fact permit the proper exercise of power, the belief that the setting up of
COURLY was more important than decentralisation in transferring relationships
between central and local government is generally shared. As Jean Frébault, director
of the Agence d'urbanisme put it in debate at a conference held in 1983:
"They (the large towns) were already in a position to negotiate with
Slate authorities, and their relationships were as between partners and
not as between controller and controlled."
(Caudal-Sizaret, 1983, pp. 89-90)
The truth of these assertions can only be explored through the detailed examination
of the detailed arrangements for development control and the case studies presented
in the next chapter. Before looking at planning control in the Lyon conurbation,
however, we need to consider the nature of COURLY and its constituent communes
in a little more detail.
5.14 The Constituent Communes of COURLY
The 55 communes that were brought together in 1969 are physically,
economically, socially and politically diverse. If Lyon ranks among one of the five
communes that have more than 300,000 inhabitants (see Table 3.1), COURLY also
contains nine communes with populations of less than 1,500 (see Appendix 1). It
follows that if the centre of the conurbation is densely urban, the outer suburbs
remain in part agricultural and their communes traditional in character and outlook.
The area of COURLY covers moreover significant expanses of open country of which
the Mont-d'Or is the most important and forms the best of the conurbation's green
lungs. There are equally significant differences in the distribution of industry, in the
social and ethnic mix of the population and in political representation: thirteen of the
communes have socialist or communist regimes for example, in spite of the very
1976
456,716
116,535
273,022
121,137
53,340
98 .2_63
1,119,013
1982
413,095
115,960
288,953
126,109
58,743
103. 195
1,106,055
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strong Support for the right both in COURLY and in the départernent of RhOne as a
whole. To some extent there is an east-west divide and it is possible to make a crude
distinction between the hilly and attractive and affluent west, with the flat,
industrialised, working-class east.
Table 5.1
Central Sector
Eastern Sector
South-Western Sector
North-Western Sector
Northern Sector
Total COURLY
Population of COURLY b y sector.
1968
Lyon	 527,800
Villeurbanne 119,879
186,873
96,502
40,392
77 .434
1,048,880
Source: INSEE
5.141 The central sector: Lyon
Lyon, by virtue of its expansions in the 19th century, is by far the largest
commune both in population and area. It is also distinctive in being, like Paris and
Marseille, divided into nine arrondissenients, which since decentralisation have
acquired a new significance. A statute of 31st December 1982, known as the PLM
Act (an allusion to the old railway company that built and ran the railway line from
Paris to Lyon and Marseille) has given each of these arrondissernents its own council.
This consists of municipal councillors and councillors directly elected by the
inhabitants of the arrondissernent, and a mayor, who may not be the mayor of the
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commune (Moniteur, 1983). For planning, these councils have a statutory right to be
consulted, principally on plan-making (Arts. R14l.8 ). According to Hanley, Kerr
and Waites (1984) the intention was to create a socialist enclaves in right wing cities,
a move which backfired badly when the right made sweeping gains in the 1983 local
elections.
Since 1871, the commune of Lyon has always had strong local government, in
the early years of a radical-socialist complexion, dominated by powerful figures who
were pragmatists rather than ideologues like Gailleton, Augagneur and most of all
Herriot and Pradel (Latreille, 1975). The sheer longevity of Herriot'srule ensured
stability in municipal government and a command of local affairs, which the
dictatorial Pradel could develop from 1957 as he promoted the first phase of post-
war development. Significantly, it was under Pradel that Lyon set up its Atelier
municipal d'urbanisme (municipal planning office) with the local architect-planner,
Charles Delfante, in charge. Significantly too, Thoenig (1979) suggests that it was
activities such as Lyon's that led the government to establish the new Ministère de
l'Equipement in 1966 in order to recover some of the initiative in land-use planning,
a sure indication of the real development of power at the local level.
5.142 The central sector: Villeurbanne
Villeurbanne's character is that of working-class suburb that has striven hard
for parity with its larger neighbour. Before 1880, Villeurbanne still had an old
village centre some distance from the boundary with Lyon at Cusset, and some
sporadic development where it abutted the 3rd and 6th arrondissernents and along the
road from Lyon to Meyzieu, but it was still predominantly rural. Between 1880 and
1894 it underwent a "brutal transformation" (Bonneville 1978, p. 14) to become an
industrial and working-class suburb and the efforts of the commune between the
wars were directed towards the amelioration of living and working conditions, a sort
of municipal socialism which Bonneville (1978, p. 72) ascribes to local influences, but
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appears to compare with its British counterpart of the same period. It is in this
period, too, that the desire to establish itself asa municipality in its own right and not
just a suburban adjunct of Lyons, expressed itself in the creation of a new city centre
with its distinctive Gratte-ciel (see above). Since 1945, there has been a further
transformation as Villeurbanne saw the closure of traditional industries or their
dispersal to new industrial areas on the edge of the conurbation, and the increase in
residential development pressure along the main axes of the commune. Moreover its
population which increased rapidly until 1968 when it totalled 120,000, more than
twice the figure in 1936 (Latreille, 1975) thereafter began to decline, although not as
rapidly as that of Lyon (see Table 5.1). Coupled with the decline of the population
has come a profound shift. What was once a working class suburb, by 1968 had a
working population more than half of whom were managerial or professional. In
1977 a socialist council was once again elected with Hernu as mayor and with
planning as a major part of their political platform, based on a political belief in
niaking Villeurbanne fit for Villeurbannais. The point is made clear by Hernu in his
introduction to the revised POS for the commune:
"Until 1977, the previous council did not even choose. It deliberately
adopted the policy of laisser-faire: scores of companies bankrupted,
vacant land subject to speculative pressure, low-cost housing practically
non-existent. Our project contains a different conception of the citizen
in the town: he must of course be able to house himself, but also to
work and to enjoy his leisure. Our project is to give Villeurbanne a
scale compatible with its inhabitants." (Hernu, 1983).
The phrases may be charged with political rhetoric, but they convey the
commitment to planning which now characterises the elected representatives of
Villeurbanne. Specifically, the policy of Hernu and his deputy with responsibility for
planning, Bernard Rivalta, finds expression in the way that the POS is presented, a
point to which we shall return.
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5.143 The inner ring suburbs
The inner ring suburbs which encircle Lyon and Villeurbanne are more
diverse. They share in common their concentration of heavy industry and their larger
scale post-war social housing development. Their councils are in the main
controlled by socialists or communists. Of the eight communes that are considered
part of the inner ring, the best known, and the third largest in COURLY is
Vénissieux. Vénissieux, served originally as a centre for market gardening geared
to the needs of Lyon The creation of the Berliet factory in 1919 on the eastern edge
of the commune which was to become the major producer of heavy goods vehicles in
France (and is now part of the Renault group) was decisive in turning Vénissieux into
an industrial suburb. The development of the ZUP at Les Minguettes to the west
with 9,000 dwellings between 1967 and 1975 set the seal on ambitions for growth
that had taken the commune froni a population of 5,000 in 1911 to 75,000 in 1975;
with the view that it would ultimately reach 100,000. But the racial tensions and the
massive unpopularity of Les Minguettes, together with a declining population in the
conurbation as a whole that has declined, has led to an absolute reduction in numbers
in the commune. Moreover the outer suburbs which provide more attractive
conditions for both living and working that put Yénissieux at a severe disadvantage
(Urbanisnie, 1986).
Vénissieux council, communist controlled since 1935, has had to place
considerable importance on planning because of the problems that it now faces.
Significantly, for example, since 1984 the commune has had its sixth Directorate with
responsibilities for both physical planning and economic development to ensure that
employment growth and land-use planning can be properly coordinated, which
represents a desire to conic to terms with and to control its own destiny (Fischer,
personal communication). The commune's energies are directed very much towards
economic development and projects of which the rehabilitation of Les Minguettes and
the redevelopment of the old town centre (see below p. 2(Q& are critical.
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Other inner ring suburbs share Vénissieux's problems although for none are
as acute as at Vénissieux. At Bron, for example, there is also a desire on the part
of elected representatives to take charge of the commune after a period of very rapid
growth in the mid-1970's (Deschamps, personal communication) which has expressed
itself in taking over the processing of applications for permission to build (see below).
5.144 The outer suburbs
The outer suburban communes are a more diverse group, and divide between
those on the east, which are industrial, working class and more likely to be controlled
by socialists and those on the west whose mayors are more likely to be members of
the controlling Groupe d'action communautaire representing a wealthier electorate.
The communes vary widely in size too. In the north-west are the small communes of
the residential villages in the massif of the Mont d'Or; to the far southwest the
communes are still agricultural and again small in population and poor in resources.
On the east, the communes of the outer suburban ring are larger in population and
can wield more authority. Such is the case at St.-Priest, the largest of the outer ring
suburbs, or to a lesser extent at Décines-Charpieu where the mayor personally takes
responsibility for planning matters (Moutin, personal communication).
There can be nothing surprising about the diversity of the constituent parts
of the Lyon conurbation given its size. What may be observed however is the way in
which these local differences are accentuated by the administrative structure, which
one might well suppose would create a degree of parochialism that would work
against coherent policy and decision-making. There is a clear balance of forces
between the centralising tendency of COURLY with its ability to act strategically and
the centrifugal tendency of the 55 communes each able to reflect the very different
conditions in parts of the conurbation.
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5.2	 The Evolution of Planning Policy
The successive attempts to plan for and control growth in the conurbation
since the war have mirrored the evolution of planning policy at national level. The
cycle has moved from trying to create a coherent planning document using the system
of plans in the 1958 Act, to the grand regional strategies of the late 1960s and early
1970s, to a return to a detailed scrutiny of the urban fabric. It can be no part of this
thesis to attempt a full evaluation of planning policy in the Lyon conu.rbation over
the past twenty-five years, but it is relevant to present the thinking that forms the
cultural background to the participants in the control process and the documents that
now form the policy base for development control decisions.
5.21	 Strateg ic Planning
The earliest strategic document for the conurbation was a PUD published in
1962 but never finally approved. It proposed a restructuring of the town around a
tertiary centre in Les Brotteaux and a series of secondary suburban centres
(Bonneville 1982, p. 93) and encouraged expansion to the east, south-east and south-
west. The plan was never approved, however, and communal plans of the 1960s only
ever had a "tenuous relationship" with it. In 1962 following the model provided by
the Paris region, the Ministry in conjunction with the prefecture of the dépariernent
of RhOne embarked upon a plan d'aniênagernent et d'organisation generale (PADOG;
regional development plan) for an area which covered the whole of the départenient
and extended northwards to ljourg-en-Bresse and southward to Vienne and La Tour-
du-Pin (lsère), and which was extended to include St. Etienne in 1964. The main
provisions of that plan were to control the population of the conurbation to between
1.5 and 1.7 million by concentrating development on specific areas and imposing a
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green belt, and by diverting overspill to a series of new towns.
The PADOG proposals were never formally approved but were to form the
basis of the next planning exercise undertaken by the study group created for the
Lyon and St.- Etienne region in 1966 as one of the six set up by DATAR for the
rnêlropoles d'equilibre (d'Arcy and Jobert, 1975; see also above p. 6'3). The region was
extended in 1968 to include Grenoble. The schema di recleur d'aménagemenl de l'aire
mëtropolitaine (SDAAM; metropolitan area structure plan) incorporated some of the
principles of the PADOG: the insulation of the population, the axes of growth, the
imposition of a green belt and the creation of two new towns. But it also proposed
the development of Lyon as a genuine regional capital through the creation of a new
centre at La Part-Dieu and major infrastructure projects: a new airport, a metro and
motorways. The SDAAM was approved in 1970.
Before the SDAAM was approved work had already started in a SDAU for the
Lyon conurbation itself, covering the whole of the future area of COURLY and
sixteen other communes, but omitting notably the communes in the dépar/emeni of
Am forming the Cotière de Dombes, the commune of Vaugneray to the west and the
urban area of Givors-Grigny to the south. The major principles of SDAU were
outlined in the Livre Blanc produced in 1969 which remained close to the principles
of the previous planning documents (although given that the PADOG and the SDAU
were both realised by the DDE in conjunction with Charles Delfante, this is perhaps
hardly surprising). Now the concept of axes of development was linked to the
creation of a public transport system, green wedges penetrating the built-up areas
were added to the concept of a green belt, and the whole conurbation was to be
stitched together with a system of urban motorways (Bonneville, 1982).
The formulation of the SDAU proceeded slowly during the early 1970s,
perhaps because it was the first strategic plan in which the state had had to act in
partnership with locally elected representatives. It was published in 1976 and not
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formally approved until 1978. By that time, however, the realities of development
in Lyon were moving ever further from the concepts of the Livre Blanc and the
detailed policy of the POS was beginning to reflect the divergence. In part this was
due to the expectations of growth of the 1960's being overtaken by events; in part due
to expedient response to development pressure. If, as Bonneville suggests, the DDE
sought the approval of the SDAU even when it had already been overtaken by events,
in order to control the POS for the conurbation in advance of their revision, the
attempt can hardly be said to have worked. On the one hand, the POS for the ceptral
sector of COURLY (Lyon and Villeurbanne) was approved in the same year as the
SDAU. On the other, numerous inroads were made into the principles contained in the
SDAU. None of the major axes of development achieved their expected potential.
In the Feyzin-Corbas, corridor, for example, the land reserves were reclassified as
green belt. In the Decines-Meyzieu corridor, which was programmed to start first,
the development took the form of low density detached housing (the ZAC de
Bonneveau being a prime example, see below p.T3?). Then the green belt and wedges
were eroded, particularly between Bron and St.-Priest and along the A43 motorway.
The creation of ZAC at the Fort-de-Bron and Sans-Souci in Limonest on the east of
COURLY also raised the principle of how precise the boundaries for future
development should actually be (Bonneville, 1982).
By 1982, Bonneville suggests that a combination of changed economic and
demographic circumstance and non-respect for the provision of SDAU had led to an
undermining of the type of planning that the SDAU stood for. But there is another
factor that is important in the change. The 1977 local elections brought considerable
change to the representation at communal level and in the council of COURLY.
Hernu was elected in that year as mayor of Villeurbanne; Pradel had died in 1976 and
had been replaced by Collomb; and such new leaders brought with them "new teams
who did not feel themselves bound by previous agreements" (Bonneville, 1982, p.
102). Moreover by 1978 elected representatives were thoroughly accustomed to
participating in the planning process (Prud'hon, 1985).
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5.22 The New Planning Documents: The POS for L yon and Villeurbanne
It was not merely the inadequacy of the existing documents that led to the
POS for Lyon and Villeurbanne being revised from the moment they had been
approved in 1978; it was also political will. In Lyon, Frébault (1985) and Prud'hon
(1985) make it clear that the politicians wanted a simpler plan, a plan that was more
attuned to the "realities of the city" (Frébault 1985, p. 42). The idea, too, of the mix
of activities, where the SDAU had looked for a segregation (Bonneville, 1982) is
common to both communes. It was particularly significant at Villeurbanne, where the
POS approved in 1976 had applied "a macro zoning covering some tens of street
blocks" which "denied the values of the urban fabric". The new POS produced a
micro-zoning with the intention of respecting the character of each district both in
terms of form and of use (Villeurbanne, 1983).
The POS for Lyon laid particular stress upon the regulation of the form of
development and the preparation of regulations which did not simply prescribe norms
but took account of the specificities of the urban form to which they would apply.
The traditional model of zoning "with a dominant activity tied to a particular urban
form at a particular density applied systematically and in two-dimensions" is replaced
by block-by-block zoning applying selectively "ad hoc regulations" (Sozzi, 1985; p.
45). Prud'hon (1985) identifies major innovations in the POS.
First, the application of plot ratios (COS) has been limited to the northern
parts of the city where there was a need to contain development. Elsewhere
development would be controlled by maximum height on street frontages and
building envelopes for each block.
Second, the definitions of mixed urban zones (URM) in which there would
be an option for development according to circumstances, as the POS report puts it:
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"These are zones in which residential and commercial and industrial
uses are tangled together in the greater diversity of architectural form:
economic activity at the heart of street-blocks, areas of detached
housing, multi-storey blocks following street lines or set back."
(Agence d'urbanisnie, 1985; p. 114).
A large swathe of the city immediately adjacent to the centre to the east in the third,
sixth, seventh and eighth arrondissements are covered by this zoning.
Third, the classified woodland zoning was replaced by a zoning for green
spaces to be protected (espaces veils a protOge,) to which less stringent regulations
than those contained in the code would apply. We have already noted the discussion
on classified woodland in COURLY as a whole (see above p.4-2.). In Lyon the
problem was one of protecting the fairly extensive developed areas which contain
fruit trees in the fifth and ninth arrondis3emenls, rather than preventing development
in woodland and Paris had already provided a niodel (Barrau and Jamet, 1985) which
had the sanction of ministerial approval (Agence d'urbanisme, 1985).
Fourth, the POS abandoned the concept of the block plan for areas
undergoing redevelopment in favour of creating a UZD zoning in which applications
for development would need to be accompanied by a plan showing how they would
relate to future development in the immediate vicinity.
These four points do indeed suggest the evolution of the POS from the kind
of negative regulatory document deplored by Labetoulle (1983) and Tribillon (1985).
Nevertheless, there are two comments that must be made about the POS for Lyon and
Villeurbanne. The first is that permissive regulations have been introduced in order
to reflect the complexities of the conurbation and to provide a planning instrument
that can be more responsive to change, and architects appear to welcome the freedom
offered by, for example the URM zoning (Ballandras and Manhès, personal
communications). But it is important to recognise that they give power to the authors
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and users of the POS, too. As authors of the POS, the Agence d'urbanisme, we may
argue, has enhanced its ability to influence the outcome of decision-making in
individual applications for development, because interpretation of the zoning depends
on the particular kinds of expertise the Agence offers.
The second comment is that, perhaps particularly in the case of Villeurbanne,
the effect has been to make the revised POS a more elaborate document than its
predecessor. Certainly the number of regulations has decreased, and to that extent
the pattern has been simplified. The complication has been at the cost of a
painstaking study of the city, almost street block by street block, and it is perhaps
remarkable that the two POS were prepared in only five and six years for
Villeurbanne and Lyon respectively. Such a labour of love may give unprecedented
control over the future physical form of the city, but it is arguable that it has lost the
flexibility that the planners sought.
The final chapter in the evolution of planning in Lyon has been the start of
work on a revised SD, to cover the same 71 communes as the original SDAU, which
will reflect the changed economic circumstances of the 1980s and the realities of
development that has taken place. The impetus for the revision was reportedly
created by the ZAC de Sans-Souci at Limonest, which was defined in an area that
the SDAU had allocated as green belt. Because of opposition to the proposal it was
eventually approved by decree of the Conseil d'Etat and therefore could not be
opposed again, but the first grant of a permission to build was attacked on the
grounds that it did not conform to the SDAU (Dellus, personal communication). The
doubtful relationship between the SDAU and the permission to build that we noted
in the previous chapter, appears at least in this case to have been resolved in favour
of upholding strategic policy in the accumulation of individual decisions.
We may infer also that there is a renewed desire to have a strategic plan now
that mayors of communes are free to propose modifications to their POS. The
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requirement that POS must conform to the SD is thus an iniportant means of securing
long-term policy objectives. The revision of the SD was launched by a conference
'The Lyon Conurbation Tomorrow' held in December 1984 (Agence d'urbanisme n.d.)
and work was underway in 1986.
5.3	 The Princi p al Actors on (lie Planning System
So far,	 we have considered the nature of Lyon as a place, the struggle to
find an appropriate administration for what is France's second city, and then the
evolution of its planning policy and policy instruments. We need now turn to the
question of the control of development within the conurbation but to do that requires
a detailed consideration of the principal actors in the system.
5.31	 The Direction De partementale de d'Eciuiement
First of all the state is represented by the DDE of the déparlernent of RhOne
which has still an important role in the processing of applications for development.
Organisationally it differs somewhat from the classic model of the DDE described by
Wilson (1983) and consists of two major sections. Infrastructure, Urbanisme et
Construction deals with both implementation and forward planning while the Service
de l'application du droit des sols is charged with the development control function.
At the headquarters in Lyon there are seven units within this latter section, of which
two deal with the area of COURLY, one has anoverall supervisory function and the
remaining four deal with the rest of the dOpariernent. Outside COURLY there are
then ten subdivisions each with its own divisional engineer and staff from the Service
de l'application du droit des sols. The total number of civil servants in the section
was 65 in 1985.
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The role of the section is inevitably rather different outside COURLY than
it is inside. Of the 257 communes in the départernent outside COURLY only one,
Villefranche-sur-SaOne, had taken up the power available under the act of January
1983 and was processing its own applications for permission to build. For the rest,
the DDE retained its traditional role in processing their applications. Since in 1986
the majority of the communes did not possess a POS, most mayors in RhOne did not
even have the option to process their own applications, even if they had been able to
exercise it (Hugon, personal communication). In COURLY, however, the DDE has
had to modify its role. The DDE has had to recognise the importance of the Agence
d'urbanisme as the provider of a particular professional expertise, even before
decentralisation: as the authors of COURLY's POS, it had a locus willy nilly in
making observations on applications. By October 1983 all the constituent communes
of COURLY had an approved POS in force all were empowered to take the
responsibility for processing and signing permissions to build from 1 April 1984. 54
of the communes elected not to process applications themselves, and though the
formal instruction of applications was left to the DDE, the administration of
COURLY came to acquire a far larger part in the development control process than
it had occupied hitherto (Ide, personal communication). The DDE has been forced
to share its technical power even if the formal parts of the processing are still its
responsibility. Only Bron has cut itself free from the DDE by employing staff at the
town hall to process applications, and though Venissieux has made a formal
declaration that it intends in the fullness of time to process its own applications, and
Villeurbanne and St.-Priest have considered the possibility, no other commune has yet
done so (Fischer; personal communication). Lyon, which had conferred the
processing to COURLY, nevertheless still had its paperwork performed by the DDE
(Ide, personal communication). Staff at the DDE attest, perhaps to their surprise, that
the new arrangements work well, and that it finds a continued role for itself in
providing a legal expertise that the Agence d'urbanisme and COURLY Jack.
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5.32 COURLY
COURLY's role in the control of development has changed considerably since
1983 and its administrative structure has been modified to reflect the change. A
series of smaller service units have now been grouped together into four major
departments. Of these the Département Développement has the major role in
coordinating town planning and development; Equipement builds and manages the
community's infrastructure including roads, sewers and water supply, and refuse
collection and street cleansing; while Planification deals with the management of land
and buildings but also, confusingly, provides some administrative follow-through of
planning documents in its unit, the Service de I'Observatoire urbain. The fourth
department handles COURLY's administration. The Departement Développement
can best be understood as an implementation unit as the departmental brief suggests:
"The decision [to create the Dëpartement DeveloppnientJ is based on
ilie need for COURLY to control urban development in the conurbation
in a vigourous nianne,-. This zeed has been translated by the creation
of Département Développement which constitutes the means by which
decisions concerning the major decisions at the level of the conurbation
may be carried out, after the preliminary studies produced by the
Agence d'urbanisme and before the work is put in hand by the
Départenient Equipement"
(COURLY n.d.).
Within the Départenient Développement the Service de l'Amenagement urbain
has the responsibility for "the management of day-to-day problems" that includes a
coordinating role for permissions to build. In particular, it gathers together
observations on applications from within COURLY and from the Agence d'urbanisme
and acts as a link between the mayors of the communes and the other services. Its
pivotal role has been increased since July 1986 in that applications from all the
communes (except Bron), are sent to the DDE and the Service de l'Amenagement
urbain simultaneously and not as hitherto first to the DDE who then dealt with
onward transmission to COURLY. Important though the role of the Service de
l'Amenagement urbain is in the process, it does not itself carry out the formal
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processing (insiruclion) of the applications that it receives: the vetting of the
development proposal in relation to the regulations, the calculation of TLE and the
preparation of the decision notices is carried out by the DDE. Most confusingly of
all, a special unit within the service does perform these functions for the commune
of Lyon which exercised its right to process applications granted before 1983 to towns
with populations of over 50,000, and confided the task to COURLY. Yet even for
Lyon the DDE is involved in preparing the paperwork.
A final point to note about the Service de l'Amenagement urbain is that in
order to counter the oft quoted objection that only the DDE have th appropriate
expertise to deal with applications, COURLY appointed a civil servant from the DDE
of Am, Michel ide, to head the service (Ide, personal communication).
5.33	 The A gence d'Urbanisme
The third of the three principal agencies in the system is the Agence
d'urbanisme which must be understood as an organisation a little apart from the main
body of administration in COURLY. Its origins are in the Atelier municipal
d'urbanisme (municipal planning office) set up in 1961. When Pradel came to power
as a mayor of Lyon, he undertook a review of the major deficiencies in
infrastructure, whose maintenance had been allowed to slide during the closing years
of Herriot's incumbency. By 1960 a programme of infrastructure development had
been drawn up. At this point, the then director of the DDE suggested to Pradel that
to coordinate this programme of infrastructure development he needed to have a plan,
which in turn would require an office run by a town-planner. Of the potential
candidates for the post, Delfante was the only native of Lyon, which made him an
attractive choice for Pradel (Delfante, personal communication) but although he was
young, he had already had a distinguished career and was familiar with what was
happening abroad, and this perhaps assisted Lyon's European aspirations (Roux,
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personal communication).
The Atelier municipal which Delfante was invited to head, remained a private
organisation whose work was paid for by the commune. It was responsible for
preparing the PUD and also for major development projects, most notably the plan
for La Part-Dieu which was inaugurated in 1967. In 1969 the Atelier was transferred
to COURLY at which point it consisted of the private company of architect-planners
to which was joined a group of professionals who were paid for directly by
COURLY. The work of the Atelier was overseen by a committee of representatives
from COURLY, the DDE and financial organisations which "undertook.to ensure the
successful execution of the work and vetted the accounts" (Danan, 1976, pp 92-93).
The professional staff now included sociologists and geographers as well as architect-
planners (Roux, personal communication).
Delfante maintains he had argued for some time that the Atelier needed to
become an Agence d'urbanisnie of the type described in the previous chapters (see
but Pradel, who remained closely involved with the work of the Atelier, resisted
the suggestion on the grounds that things worked quite well as they were. With the
death of Pradel in 1976, the moment to change at last did seem propitious and
Delfante conducted the necessary negotiations with the Ministry and was involved in
drawing up the contract. The Atelier was thus reconstituted in 1978 as the Agence
d'urbanisme of the type directly comparable with those elsewhere in France and is
now funded by COURLY (57 per cent), the state (33 per cent) and the departernent
of RhOne (10 per cent) (MULT 1985a). Delfante refused to become the director of
the new Agence, however. The new mayor, Francisque Collomb, unlike his
predecessor, has taken little interest in town planning, and the new team of younger
elected representatives were not all favourable to Delfante. There were three
candidates for the post; Lambert, a local architect-planner; Michel Rivoire, who was
eventually appointed to direct COURLY's Département Développement; and Jean
Frébault, the current director, who was appointed to the post having served in
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Toulouse. Delfante was, however, retained as conseiller technique (technical adviser)
and in this capacity attends the monthly preliminary consultations (see below p.2o
(Delfante, personal communication). The agency now has its own council with 20
representatives of COURLY, three representatives from the general council of the
départenient and four cx officio representatives of the State. The president, Jean
Rigaud, is mayor of Ecully and first vice-president of COURLY, who has an inner
cabinet (bureau) of seven members of the council, six of whom are members of
COURLY who have, inevitably, responsibilities for town planning in their own
communes (Agence d'urbanisme n.d.).
The professional team headed by Frébault describes its responsibilities as
sixfold: strategic planning for the whole conurbation, most importantly the
preparation of new SD; preparation and after-care of POS, including the giving of
advice on permissions to build; thematic studies of aspects of the conurbation's social
and economic development and of specific land use; re-development and
rehabilitation projects; research and statistical information and communication with
professionals in the development industry and the public at large. Organisationally
this results in three major groups: the thematic studies teams; the project teams; and
the sector teams with responsibilities for the POS. There are five of these sector
teams, corresponding to each of the five POS, which have been responsible for POS
revisions and development control advice, and each consists of a group leader and a
technical assistant. POS revision however, will entail the drawing in of staff from the
other specialist teams. Most of the work of the Agence is for and within the confines
of COURLY, but most notably in the preparation of the SD, it acts as an agent for
other organisations: the SD for example is being undertaken for a new syndicat
intercomniunal for the 71 communes which the SD will cover (Agence d'urbanisme
n.d.). The final point to note is that, unlike the staff of COURLY who have tenure,
the professionals of the Agence are all contractual. Though there is not the slightest
suggestion that they wish to do so, the council of COURLY could vote to end their
support of the Agence at any time (Prud'hon, personal communication).
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5.34	 Other Partici pants in the Process
If the DDE, the Service d'Amenagement urbain and the Agence d'urbanisme
form the major partners in the development control process in COURLY, other actors
who have a stake, too. The consultant architect of the départen1ent of RhOne is much
involved, and untypically comes to the offices of COURLY rather than waiting to be
consulted at the DDE. About half his time is spent in COURLY (1d, personal
communication). The Directeur départemental de l'Architecture has an important
role, by virtue of the large numbers of historic monuments in the city of Lyon which
confer on him the statutory right to advise on or direct decisions (see above, p.12).
His influence appears to be resented, not least because the present incumbent was
relatively recently appointed and therefore knows Lyon less well than the other
agencies (Buisson, Manhès, personal communications). The potential role of the
Conseil d'Architecture d'Urbanisme et de l'Environnement (CAUE, see above, p.n.
on the other hand, is mainly taken by the Agence d'urbanisme within COURLY,
though it is reportedly helpful to some of the outlying communes (Testut, personal
communication).
5.35	 Relationships between Participants
There are a number of comnients to be made about this administrative and
professional structure for processing applications which are significant for the way
in which decisions are taken. The first is that none of the three principal actors can
act independently of the others and that each sees itself as indispensible to the
process. The organisational structure has indeed been set up to ensure that the
pattern of dependency is maintained and the conclusion that we must draw is that
there is a strong mutual advantage in the arrangement. The DDE can maintain that
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they provide the legal input that is not matched by the other partners (Hugon,
personal communication). The Agence d'urbanisme presents itself up as provider of
technical expertise to a high standard which is able to keep its distance from the
pressures of administration or politics, a stance which is perhaps reinforced
symbolically by being located in an office apart from the main administrative
building of COURLY. The Service de l'Amenagement urbain exists to coordinate
advice and implement decisions. All participants insist that working relationships are
harmonious, even if they agree that the structure is cumbersome.
At its best, then, there is a complementarity in the activities of these three
organisations. But it has its negative aspects. There can be little doubt that the
system is cumbersome, and must be difficult for those unused to dealing with it to
approach. The Agence d'urbanisrne, for example, in spite of its educational mission,
does not appear particularly to welcome the public and provided no reception area.
The Service de l'Amenagement urbain does provide a reception area but cannot
provide the totality of advice an applicant might require. There must be the potential
danger at least of these organisations retreating into areas of specialism, and of a
reluctance of any one of them to take responsibility for the process in its entirety.
The other point to reflect upon is the question of the responsibilities and
accountability of each of these three organisations. Here the pattern is confusing and
complex. The DDE as we have noted in general terms is a largely autonomous body
accountable, but in a fairly attenuated fashion, both to the prefect and the minister
in Paris. The services of COURLY are accountable to the president of the council.
The Agence d'urbanisme is accountable to its president. None of these organisations
is thus accountable to representatives who are directly responsible to the electorate
for services the organisations provide. The pattern is complicated by the fact that
these organisations do not serve the people to whom they are directly accountable.
We noted that the Agence d'urbanisnie acted as agent for the syndicate that is
responsible for the preparations of the SD, but in practice all its work is as an agent
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whether within or without COURLY. The work is undertaken for the communes
whose needs and political background vary considerably, and the same is true of the
DDE and the services of COURLY. The relationship that each has with the
communes is more or less a paternalistic 'on behalf of' not a directly controlled 'for'.
Not only may the three agencies retire into areas of specialism therefore, they may
also distance themselves from decisions taken, because their involvement is at a
remove. The actors would possibly regard this retreat into specialism and the distance
they maintain from the communes they rule as positive rather than negative. The
general mistrust of political power that we noted in the chapter on French local
government, manifests itself in a desire on the part of administrators, both local and
central to retain independence. To be remote from those you serve creates tensions
certainly, but may be interpreted as central to the nature of relationships in French
local planning.
Yet again this is not the whole story. We should note how elected represen-
tatives try to retain control over organisations which could so easily escape it, by
membership of the appropriate councils and governing bodies. Rigauci is president
of the Agence d'urbanisrne, vice-president of COURLY and mayor of EculIy, and
the council of the Agence includes Rivalta (deputy mayor of Villeurbanne),
Moulinier (deputy mayor of Lyon with responsibility for planning, and secretary of
the COURLY planning committee), Deschamps (deputy mayor of Bron with
responsibility for planning and delegate to COURLY) and Fischer (deputy mayor of
Vénissieux with responsibility for planning and delegate to COURLY). Such
involvement does not overcome the potential conflict of responsibility but must help
to minimise the problems it creates. Once again, however, the pattern appears to be
self-reinforcing. Organisations are established to provide independent technical
advice and surmount political factionalism; locally elected representatives seek to
control the activities of these organisations by securing places on their councils; the
organisations attempt to reinforce further their status as independent providers of
advice.
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5.4	 Psyeloping Agencies
Some brief account of the main developing institutions in COURLY must also
be given, Of these it is perhaps most significant to note the public and semi-public
developers which are responsible for much building activity. Perhaps foremost
among these agencies is the Société d'Equipement de Ia Region de Lyon (SERL)
which is a classic example of the mixed economy company. Founded in the 1960's
it was a direct response to the lack of resources that individual communes could build
to develop their area: it was a potent way of creating the means to develop while at
the same time retaining a measure of local control. SERL's remit is to an area wider
than COURLY and its representation is therefore wider, but its board contains some
of the elected representatives who have been mentioned elsewhere. Its president is
Roger Fenech, mayor of Lyon's ninth arrondissement, while Moulinier, Hernu,
Rigaud and Charles Béraudier, another vice-president of COURLY, a deputy mayor
of Lyon and president of the regional, and member of the general, councils, are all
represented. Certainly in the 25 years of existence SERL has built up a formidable
portfolio of completed projects. It was responsible for the ZUP at Caluire-
Montessuy, Vaulx-en-Velin, La Duchère and Venissieux-les-Minguettes in the 1960s,
for the commercial centre at La Part-Dieu and for the new station complex; and for
various urban renewal and rehabilitation projects (SERL, publicity material). Other
SEM also operate in Lyon. In 1986 the Societe d'économic mixte du Metropolitain
de l'agglomeration lyonnaise (SEMALY; the company responsibile for promoting and
building Lyon's metro) was making the most obvious impact with the construction
line D from Gorge-de-Loup to Vénissieux
Another significant group of developers are the Offices publics des
Flabitations a loyer modere OPIILM; (Low-cost housing offices) in the urban
community in Lyon , Villeurbanne and St.-Priest which provide housing for rent and
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for sate. Once again the important point to note is that in organisations which are in
principle outside local authority control, elected representatives nevertheless manage
to obtain some influence by acquiring the presidency. Thus the mayors of
Villeurbanne and St.-Priest, Hernu and Bruno Polga respectively, are presidents of
the two offices of FILM in the communes, and a COURLY delegate, Louis Rigal, is
president of the Lyon office. The activities of these units is not confined to the
communes in which they are located: thus the HLM office at St.-Priest was involved
in the ZAC de Bonneveau at the neighbouring commune of Decines-Charpieu (see
below p.Z3. Yet another public organisation, the Office public d'Amenagement et
de Construction du département du RhOne (OPAC du RhOne; the public development
and construction company of the dëparternent of RhOne) also provides a housing
service as well as undertaking other construction work in 130 communes (OPAC du
RhOne, publicity material).
The continuity that we noted in Chapter 4 between public and private sectors,
and the blurring of the traditional opposition between local authorities and developers
which is common to much British development control analysis, is thus exemplified
by the pattern of development activities. Particularly for the smaller commune in
COURLY, there is little practical difference in kind between COURLY itself, SERL,
the OPHLM and the Agence d'urbanisme or even the DDE: they are all outside
bodies, access to whose decision-making may be through indirect and informal
means, which are presumably more or less effective according to circumstance and
the political affiliation of the actors. It is little wonder that some communes feel
weighted upon heavily by such organisations (Fischer, personal communication). It
is perhaps worth noting, too, that where locally elected representatives are in control
of the developing agencies they may thereby be directly involved in development in
communes other than their own, and the opportunities for political horse-trading on
development are legion. Again this must work in the end to the advantage of the
big communes using the political will and the breadth of representation and create at
least the danger of an implicit tutelage of smaller communes by the larger.
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Table. 5.2 pplica(ions p rocessed for permis de construire, certificats
d'urbanisrne, perinis de dinolir and permis de lotir in France. the
dparteinent of Rhöne and COURLY
Area	 Year Total	 Total	 Total
app lications	 a pp lications	 permissions
received	 processed
	 granted
Permissions
granted as a
percentage of
total applications
processed
Permis de construire
France	 1982 655,583
1983	 640,183
RhOne	 1982	 7,788
1983	 7,291
COURLY	 1986	 -
Certificats d'urbanisme
France	 1982	 -
1983	 -
RhOne	 1982	 -
1983	 -
Permis de démolir
France	 1982	 14,404
1983	 13,953
RhOne	 1982	 371
1983	 440
Permis de lotir (housing only)
France	 1982	 9,091
1983	 8,184
RhOne	 1982	 158
1983	 190
Sources:	 France, RhOne: MULT, 1984; 1985a [Figures are for metropolitan
France only].
COURLY: Region RhOne-Alpes, Direction régionale de l'Equipement
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5.5	 The Coiitrol of Development
Some indication of the scale of work that the administration described in the
previous section handles are to be understood from the official statistics. Published
statistics were available in 1986 only until 1983 and only for the départenient of
RhOne as a whole. The information covers all kinds of authorisations for
development, and includes refusal rates and the processing time for applications for
permission to build and certificais durbanisrne. Unpublished statistics for
permissions to build were obtained for 1986 for each of the communes of COURLY.
The comparisons then that can be drawn between COURLY, RhOne and France as a
whole, must therefore be treated with caution.
5.51 The Scale of (lie Task
Figures for 1982 and 1983 show that the departerneni of RhOne 7,856 and
7,090 applications for permission to build were processed and more or less equate
with the number on applications received (see Table 5.2). To that must be added the
processing of certificais d'urbanisnie which totalled 9,671 and 9,188 in the same
years. Other permissions sought are much less numerically significant. Decisions of
applications for permission to demolish totalled 364 and 440 respectively and
lotissenients destined for housing 162 and 154. Though this form does not exhaust
the total number of decisions taken in those years (there are no details given for other
kinds of lo(jssenic'nl and there will be a small number of authorisations for erecting
walls and for camp sites, for which there were under 3,000 applications in the whole
of France in 1983), some 17,000 decisions on development appear to be taken
annually in RhOne. Of interest is the fact that the proportion of certificats
d'urbanisrne processed was considerably greater than for France as a whole. This may
perhaps be interpreted as both evidence of development pressure and of the
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cornpJications of land use patterns in the deparlenieni's urban areas.
From the statistics available for 1986, it is clear that the Lyon conurbation
accounts for the lion's share of the applications processed in RhOne. Assuming that
the numbers of applications processed have varied little since 1983, the 4,185
applications processed in the 55 communes of COURLY account for just under two-
thirds of the total. Assuming also that the ratio of cerlificats d'urbanisrne to
applications for provisions to build was the same in COURLY in 1986 as it had been
in the dëparienzent as a while, the total number of applications handled in COURLY
would be in the order of 10,000. lIthe hypothesis that the high proportion of
cerlificals d'urbanisrne in the déparlerneni is due to development pressure and the
Table 5.3
	 Decisioiis on applications for perniis de construire in COURLY. 1986,
b y sector
Decisions	 Percentage	 Area of
	
Percentage
taken	 of total	 sector. in	 of total
hectares
Central Sector:
Lyon	 478	 11.4
Yilleurbanne	 187	 4.5
Eastern Sector
	
1,425	 34.1
South-western Sector
	
847
	 20.2
North-western Sector 653	 15.6
Northern Sector
	 595	 14.2
COURLY Total
	
4,185	 100
4,575
1,537
18,919
6,972
9,308
7,108
48,419
9.5
3.2
39.1
14.4
19.2
14.7
100
Source: Region RhOne-Alpes, Direction regionale de I'Equipement
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complexity of urban land uses, then we might expect to find an even higher
proportion in the Lyon conurbation.
Within COURLY, the distribution of applications processed by sector is
roughly proportional to each sector's area, with the exception of the south-west which
had 20 per cent of the total applications processed in 1986 but accounts for only 14
percent of COURLY's area, and might suggest that the sector is an area of
development pressure (see Table 5.3). The relative under-representation of the
north-west sector may reflect the large area of protected land in the Mont d'Or; but
the under representation of the eastern sector is hard to explain, except insofar as it
offers a conspicuously less attractive environment than the west. Maybe, however,
it is unwise to read too much into a single year's statistics. Looking at the breakdown
of figures by commune presents a rather different picture. Lyon inevitably has far
more applications than any other comniune, and more than two-and-a-half times
that of the commune next in rank order, Villeurbanne. Of the ten communes apart
from Lyon and Villeurbanne in which more than 100 applications were processed in
1986, seven were in the eastern sector, and only one, St.-Genis--Laval, in the south-
west. In 25 communes less than one application was processed per week (see Table
5.4). The administrative pressure therefore for the majority communes taken
individually is not great, even if the total administrative burden for COURLY, the
DDE and the Agence d'urbanisme is considerable. The administrative wisdom of
centralising the processing within COURLY is self-evident.
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Table 5.4	 Communes of COURLY b y rank order of numbers of yermis de
construire p rocessed in 1986
Rank order	 Sector	 Commune	 Applications for permis
de construire processed
in 1986
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central
central
eastern
south-western
eastern
eastern
eastern
eastern
northern
eastern
eastern
eastern
eastern
eastern
north-western
eastern
eastern
south - wes tern
south-western
south-western
north - wes tern
south-western
south-western
south-western
north-western
north-western
north-western
south-western
northern
south-western
north - western
northern
south-western
south-western
north-western
north-western
northern
eastern
a or t her n
eastern
northern
north-western
north-western
northern
northern
northern
north-western
north-western
northern
north-western
northern
north-western
northern
south-western
north-western
Lyon
Villeurbanne
Meyzieu
St.-Genis-Laval
St.- Priest
Riilieux-La-Pape
C hass ieu
Vaulx-en-Velin
Caluire-et-Cuire
Vénissieux
Decines-Charpieu
Jonage
Feyzin
B ron
Dardilly
Corbas
Ni ions
Fra nchevi lie
Tassin-La-Demi-Lune
Vernaison
St.-Didier-Au-Mont-D'Or
Craponne
St.-Foy-Lès-Lyon
St.-Genis-Les-011ières
Ecu liy
Collonges-Au-Mont-D'Or
St.-Cyr-Au-Mont--D'Or
Irigny
Montanay
Pierre- Bénite
Charbonnières-Les-Bains
Fontaines-St-Martin
Chariy
Ouliins
La-Tour-De-Salvagny
Marcy-l'Etoiie
Sathonay Village
St. - Fons
Genay
Solaize
Neuville-Sur-SaOne
St.-Germain-Au-Mont-D'Or
Limo nest
Cailloux-Sur-Fontaines
Aibigny-Sur-SaOne
Fontaines-Sur-SaOne
St.-Romain-Au-Mont-D'Or
Champagne-Au-Mont D'Or
Fleurieu-Sur-SaOne
Couzon-Au-Mont-D'Or
Sa tho nay - Camp
Poleymieux-Au-Mont-D'Or
Roche tai ilée-Su r-SaO ne
La Mulatière
Curis-Au-Mont-D'Or
478
187
182
175
156
147
146
140
134
127
123
103
98
96
93
88
86
79
79
78
77
77
76
75
69
65
60
58
55
52
49
48
46
45
45
42
42
41
40
39
37
30
29
29
27
24
20
19
17
12
12
11
10
7
5
Source: Region-RhOne-Alpes, Direction régionale de l'Equipement
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Table 5	 Permis de coiistruire to build b y category in France, the département
of RhOne, COURLY and Lyon
permis granted percentage permis granted percentage
with creation	 without
of new floorspace 	 creation of
new floorspace
France 1982	 388,846	 78.1	 140,382	 26.5
1983	 371,610	 72.2	 143,097	 27.8
RhOne 1982	 4,746	 66.1	 2,430	 33.9
1983	 4,446	 68.1	 2,081	 31.9
COURLY 1986 2,788	 75.1	 922	 24.9
total permis1
granted.
529,228
514,707
7,176
6,527
3,710
Lyon 1986	 289	 64.5	 159	 35.5	 448
1	 Totals for France in 1982 and 1983 relate only to those depariernents that
recorded the breakdown given in this table.
Sources:	 France, RhOne: MULT, 1984, 1985a
COURLY, Lyon: Region RhOne-Alpes, Direction regionale de
l'Equipement
Permissions to build are also divided into major and minor categories. In
France as a whole, a little more than one quarter of all permissions granted did not
lead to the creation of new floor space. In RhOne, the figure was higher at about a
third of all permissions granted in the densely developed communes of Lyon and
Villeurbanne, the proportion in 1986 was, hardly surprisingly, even higher, at 37 per
cent (see Table 5.5). If permissions not creating floorspace are added to other minor
permissions just over a half of all applications are of minor significance. We may
note in passing that declarations prCalables identified for the first time as part of
minor permissions accounted for no more than six per cent of permissions granted.
The bureaucratic hurdle is lifted for a very small proportion of applicants (if indeed
the declaration piCa/able really does represent a lifting of the hurdle) and the
administrative burden for the authorities only slightly lightened (see Appendix 4).
Central sector: Lyon
Villeurbanne
Eastern Sector
South-western Sector
North-western Sector
Northern Sector
Total COURLY
478
187
1,425
847
653
595
4,185
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Table 5.6
	 Approval rate for yermis de construire in COURLY, 1986. b y sector
total decisions total permissions
g ran
448
176
1,228
757
575
526
3,710
permissions as
a percentage of
all decisions
93.7
94.1
86.2
89.4
88.1
88.4
88.6
Source: Region RhOne-Alpes, Direction regionale de l'Equipement
Table 5.7	 l'iine taken to process applications for yermis de construire and
certificats d'urbanisrne in France and the départenient of RhOne
Total applications	 of which applicatior lod ged corrected
determined in	 after 30 Noveniber in the	 percentage of
Februar y	preceding year	 applications
determined in
3 months1
FRANCE
perniis de const,'uire
RFIONE
perniis de construire
FRANCE
certificats d'urbanisn?e
number
1983	 50,224
1984	 46,332
1983	 578
1984	 1,030
1983	 31,433
1984 29,676
flu m be r
38,180
37,301
346
522
23,957
23,900
percentag
76	 82
81	 85
60
	
72
51
	
60
76
	
83
81
	
86
RHONE
certificats d'urbanisnie	 1983	 2,5 10	 1,596	 64	 80
1984 N.A.
	
N.A.	 N.A.	 NA.
1 This percentage is calculated on the basis that half the applications lodged in
November and determined in February would nevertheless be determined in three
months or less.
[Figures for France are for metropolitan France only].
Source: MULT, 1984, 1985a
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We noted in the previous chapter that 95 per cent of all applications for
permissions to build were granted in 1982 and1983 in France as a whole. In the same
years, the approval rate in the dëparienieni of RhOne was rather lower at 91 per cent
and nearly 93 per cent respectively. In COURLY in 1986 the approval rate was even
lower at 89 per cent of all decisions taken. Yet the spread is not even. In Lyon and
Villeurbanne the approval rate is little lower than the national figure in the earlier
years, but in the other four sectors, the average rate is under 58 per cent (Tables 5.2
and 56). It is not easy to know how to interpret these results. There appears to be
some correlation between the type of application and the decision, in that the higher
proportion of minor applications might be said to lead to a lower refusal rate in the
centre. The figures for 1982 and 1983 both for the dëpariemeni of RhOne and France
as a whole do not in any way give credence to such an interpretation; the refusal rates
are identical for both applications creating and not creating floorspace. The newly
prepared and, so their authors would cJaim, more flexibJe POS for Lyon and
Villeurbanne may have increased the certainty of decision-making. Again the
consultation arrangements in Lyon may account for the higher rate of permissions
granted. But none of these interpretations is wholly satisfactory.
The final observations must relate to the question of delay. Here, the only
available statistics are those published by the Ministry for the déparlernenis. The
figures for RhOne are well below the national average, but even if allowance is made
for under-estimation, then only 72 per cent of applications determined in February
1983 and 60 per cent of applications determined in February 1984 were determined
in three months or less. The national figures were 82 per cent and 85 per cent
respectively (Table 5.7). On the other hand, there were dëparlenients that performed
significantly worse than RhOne, like Paris, or the neighbouring départerneni of Airi,
and where delays were not obviously a function of the numbers of applications
processed or of the character of the départemeni.
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The pattern is repeated for certi/icals d'urbanisn?e, although statistics are only
available for 1983. The percentage of applications determined in February that had
been lodged after November is only a little higher than that for permissions to build.
The fact, however, that the corrected percentage for applications processed in three
months approaches more closely the national figure (80 per cent and 83 per cent)
suggests that with the certificals at least the delays are only slightly longer than the
national average. On the other hand, the maximum delay fixed by the code de
I'urbanisnze is two months without possibility of extension (Art. R410-9) although
there is no sanction of the deemed permission as with the permission to build. In
of
principal therefore, the cerlifical is thoughas an easier type of application to handle,
although this is not at all borne out by practice as expressed by statistics.
Searching for explanations for the relatively poor performance in RhOne must
at best be tentative, and for COURLY remarks can only be based on the supposition
that what happens in RhOne will be in large measure due to what happens in the Lyon
conurbation. One explanation might be that the proportion of 'difficult' cases -
meaning those for which decision-making is not clear-cut - will be higher in a major
city, although we have already noted that the proportion of minor applications is
higher than the average for France in Lyon and Villeurbanne where the applications
might be expected to be most complex. Another possible explanation is that the
involvement of three organisations in the development control process adds a time
penalty which is reflected in the statistics. And it is pertinent to note that throughout
COtJRLY the time limit for permissions to build is raised to three months by virtue
of Art. R421-19 which allows for consultations with other public bodies.
Within COURLY, then, there is an administrative burden in the number of
individual decisions that must be taken that exceeds that of any English planning
authority. The processing rate appears to be slower, and the refusal rate higher, than
the average for France as a whole. We must now turn to the process that unites the
actors in the system in the administrative task we have just identified.
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5.52	 The General Procedure
In Chapter 4 the process by which applications for a provision to build are
determined was described in general terms and the changes brought about by
decentralisation noted. Figure 5.4 on p.2O4 translates the general process into the
specific flow diagram for 53 of the 55 communes of COURLY as it obtained after I
July 1986. The two communes to whom the diagram does not fully apply are Broil,
which as was noted above, undertakes all its own processing of applications and has
no recourse to the DDE, and Lyon, the processing of whose applications is undertaken
by COURLY, with the DDE involved only in producing the paperwork.
For applicants the process is relatively straightforward. All applications are
now lodged at the maine (town hail) whether in person or by post, and at least in the
larger town halls applicants will find technical help in filling Out an application form
if needs be. If the application is complete, the applicants will receive a formal
acknowledgment within three weeks and the three month processing period begins,
the period being automatically extended by one month because of the need for
consultations with COURLY. And in principle the applicant may receive a tacit
permission if no further news is received from the authorities in the three month
period, even if in practice few if any applications are allowed to go by default.
The maine exists primarily as a sorting office in the process, forwarding three
copies of the application to the DDE, two copies to the administration of COURLY
and one to the prefecture for the eventual coni,ôle de légalilé. One copy is retained
by the mayor. Thus all mayors now receive an early warning of development in their
communes, though some are better placed to act upon the information than others.
In the larger communes, even though they do not themselves process the applications,
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Figure 5.4
	 The development control process in COURLY
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there will be the staff to consider the implications of an application for local policy
and advise the elected representatives accordingly. Such is the case at Villeurbanne,
or at Vénissieux, whose sixth Directorate, as we have noted, combines economic
development and physical planning functions. Yet the numbers of staff handling
applications even in larger communes may be quite small: four at Yénissieux; three
at Bron. Paradoxically, there may be a greater degree of local autonomy in
development control in a commune such as Vénissieux where the development control
staff are backed by policy makers than in Broii where there is heavy reliance on
COURLY for policy back-up, even though Bron has complete control over processing
and Vénissieux does not.
Until 1 July 1986, five of the seven copies of the application were sent to the
DDE who were then resonsibJe for onward transmission to COURLY. The procedure
whereby COURLY and the DDE now receive copies of applications simultaneously,
was introduced in the interests of efficiency, to allow the consultation process to be
initiated earlier and to reduce the number of occasions on which an application is
transferred between offices. There is also perhaps a symbolic aspect to the change
in that it suggests that there is a parity of status between the DDE and COURLY as
co-partners in the process of control, or that ultimately COURLY will take over the
DDE's role in its entirety, as it would appear well placed to do. The question of
mutual convenience in the status quo has already been raised, however. The fact that
the DDE is there to undertake the paperwork, to ensure that the niceties of the formal
procedure are observed, and to guarantee the legal probity of decisions taken, leaves
COURLY free to coordinate its service departments and the Agence d'urbanisme.
The DDE is also available to fulfil its traditional role as scapegoat or as the
convenient protection from the consequences of an unpopular decision.
The DDE, in undertaking the formal aspects of the processing also consults
as the case may be, with other ministries' field sources including the Architecte des
Bâtiments de France, and issues the formal acknowledgement of receipt of the
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application or returns the application to the applicant if, for whatever reason, it is
incomplete. COURLY simultaneously consults its own services and the Agence
d'urbanisme, and the results of the consultations are brought together on a summary
sheet, which is transmitted to the DDE. On the basis of the consultations, which may
be translated into conditions to be imposed on the permission if it is to be granted,
the DDE then prepares a draft ariêlë for the permission which is then returned with
the application form to the niairie for the mayor's signature.
When described in these terms, decentralised development control in
COURLY still appears to be a process undertaken well away from the comniune to
which the control function has nominally been transferred. In the formal process, the
mayor receives and transmits an application and ratifies the decision that has been
prepared for him or her to sign, but is not significantly involved in the stages in
between. At the same time, the Agence d'urbanisme described earlier (see pi9 as one
of the three major partners in the development control process appears in the diagram
to be relegated to the role of consultee on a par with a number of internal services
whose advice is sought. In the case of the Agence, the problem is in part related to
the nature of the advice sought and given which is evidently a rather different order
from that on roads, water or sewerage. Yet for both the diagram obscures the
presence of the informal networks that exist. Mayors do not wait passively for an
arrêté to be presented to them, if a development proposal impinges on local policy,
and by virtue of being the first to see the application when it is received are well
placed to make representations in advance of any other consultations. The Agence's
role is also in practice more important than its position within the diagram would
suggest for perhaps three reasons. First, as author of the planning documents in force
or in preparation in COURLY it has a privileged position in interpreting those
documents in relation to any specific development proposal. Second, its long history,
albeit in somewhat different guises, have given it standing and a position of trust in
the eyes of elected representatives. Third, its independence of the DDE and of
COURLY are an additional attraction, for a commune wishing to circumvent other
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parts of the power structure.
Thus within the formal process there will be a network of informal contacts
which is likely to affect most of the actors at some time or other. So much is scarcely
surprising; the necessary oiling of the machinery of any system. What becomes
abundantly clear from the case studies in the following chapter (see below, p.2i3) is
that the informal contacts may begin well before an application is lodged and that the
informal negotiations are of paramount importance in the processing of development
proposals. Applicants of larger schemes at least routinely attempt to mitigate
problems, whether political, by talking to the mayor, or technical, by talking to
COURLY or the Agence cl'urbanisme. The pre-application meeting with
representatives of as many different services as may be appropriate to the case thus
occupies a significant place within the process, even though it has no formal status,
and the presence of the mayor or his appropriate deputy is habitual. After such
meetings, assuming that problems identified can be resolved easily, the formal
processing of an application may be relatively rapid.
5.53	 The Consultation Prêalable
In the commune of Lyon the informal, that is to say non-statutory, process
of consultation is taken a stage further in the use of the consultation préalable
(preliminary consultation) procedure in which development proposals are discussed
by the arclziiecte-conseil of the départernent of RhOne and the deputy mayor with
responsibility for planning, Moulinier. These consultations take place once a month
and were devised as a way of simplifying the giving of advice to applicants and
ensuring there is proper feedback on the advice given. Since 1978, however, these
consultations have attracted the interest of elected representatives and the regular
presence of Moulinier ensures that there is a political input in the process. The
preliminary consultations have thus come to acquire considerable significance in the
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determination of planning pernhissions, and are particularly revealing of the power
structure of the control process and COURLY.
Cases for discussion at these meetings, which are held monthly, are selected
by COURLY in consultation with the Agence d'urbanisme or may be included on the
agenda at the specific request of the applicant. Not all the cases have necessarily been
lodged as applications, and some agenda items will be projects that have been
modified in the light of comments made at earlier meetings. A typical agenda both
in length and content is shown in Figure 5.5. The sessions are chaired by the
archilecte-conseil with deputy mayor at his side. Members of the three partners in
the control process, COURLY, the Agence d'urbanisme and the DDE are all present
and will from time to time offer observations. The group within the Service de
l'Aménagement urbain responsible for processing applications in Lyon is responsible
for presenting schemes to the architecie-conseil and the DDE's representative acts
as secretary by drafting the comments of the architecie-conseil in a form that can be
incorporated on file and transmitted to the applicant, even though the DDE now has
no locus in the processing of Lyon's applications, except in the preparation of the
paperwork. Delfante also regularly attends the meetings even though he no longer has
a formal appointment.
Unlike a British planning committee meeting with which indeed no direct
comparison can be made, these meetings do not rely upon a mediation of schemes by
the technical officers. For their prime purpose is to give applicants and their
architects direct acccess to the decision-makers by allowing them to describe their
schemes and to receive direct feedback. Their character is much more that of a royal
audience than of a round-table discussion: if the technical officers can and do
circulate with a degree of informality alien to British committees the better to see
what is being proposed, the applicants are kept firmly on the opposite side of the
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Figure 5.5	 An agenda for the consultation préalable
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table from the two principals. The discussions that take place are almost entirely
about the architectural aspects of the schemes proposed, although at one meeting an
applicant was criticised for providing two-roomed flats in an area that was already
said to have too many small units. For the rest, massing, location, silhouette,
treatment of elevations, detailing, use of materials, planting and car parking are the
major topics of concern.
There is a real question about how these meetings should be interpreted. For
applicants, they are a both welcome means of being able to enter into a dialogue with
the system and, at least for one respondent, a source of resentment as an expression
of a growing and sometimes arbitrary power (Manhès, personal communication).
They do at least however, provide a degree of openness in a procedure which often
seems to lack it, and the sanie respondent regretted that a proposal for a major
psychiatric hospital in the commune of Bron had not be subjected to the same
procedure.
The presence of the arcliiiecie-conseil is at first sight harder to explain, given
the range of expertise available in the three participating agencies. Firstly, this must
be a matter of history (and of current practice in many parts of France). The
architectes-conseil were appointed to provide independent advice to the DDEs who
did not have architects on their own staff, in considering applications for permissions
to build. That role did not cease to be important even in areas which did have
specialised planning agencies because the agencies' main activity was in forward
planning not in development control. But part of the explanation must be to do with
the balance of power between elected representatives and technical officers.
Moulinier does not take a leading role in the consultation process, but by virtue of
being co-signatory of the advice notes, he thereby allies himself with the authority
of an independent expert and ensures that he is not wholly reliant upon the other
agencies none of which is under the direct control of the mayor of Lyon. We can
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argue that this is an important expression of local political power and gives the
consultations prdalables a symbolic as much as a practical function.
5.6	 Conclusions
The picture of the Lyon conurbation that emerges then is one in which some
at least of the problems of administration and a regulatory planning system which
were identifed in Chapters 3 and 4 have been overcome. After unpromising
beginnings as a town which had lost its status as a European capital (albeit trying hard
to recapture that past glory) and had never had a dependent hinterland of its own, it
now has an effective administration to cope with at least the greater part of the built-
up area and much at least of the service needs of its population. It has moreover
acquired a team of experts of high standing for physical planning whose ability to use
statutory powers for plan-making and control creatively is demonstrated in the quality
of the planning documents it produces and the confidence that it appears to inspire
in the people it serves; one might perhaps add, in the quality of the new development
taking place in the city. There is, too, the political will to take command of local
development at least in the larger communes, that confirms the view that the Defferre
Act and the Act of 7 January 1983 did no more than give statutory force to what was
already an established fact.
What, however, of the negative balance? A heavy administrative structure
must surely be one criticism of the system for controlling development. As new ones
have been created to cope with newly identified needs, there has been no atrophy of
older organisms which have clung tenaciously to life by modifying their activities but
not abandoning them. A palinipsest of structures has thus grown up which even its
own officials sometimes find difficult . to penetrate, let alone outsiders. And the
mutual advantages that major development control agencies appear to have in
maintaining the status quo cannot be entirely healthy. A second criticism must be
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that even within COURLY the power of communes to exercise their new
responsibilities diverges widely. In Lyon local autonomy has been a fact of life for
two decades, perhaps for far longer, while the inner ring suburbs are already
beginning to realise their strength even if they remain at one removed from the power
wielded by Lyon itself. On the other hand, the smallest communes, though they may
benefit from the availability of the expertise and savings offered by COURLY do not
appear to have gained significant freedoms since 1983 and are as dependent on the
activities of others as their rural counterparts. The pattern and disttribution of power
is thus, we can argue, not an even one across COURLY.
The context is thus set for a detailed examination of the way in which
development control decisions are taken in the Lyon conurbation in the case studies
that follow. These studies offer the possibility of glimpsing how the intricate
structure of organisations in fact operates; they offer, too, a chance to explore how
the participants in that structure use, and are bound by, a national framework of law
and administration. And finally they allow us to explore how together a local system
and a national framework effect the content of decisions taken on the development
of Lyon.
213
6.	 CASE STUDIES OF DEVELOPMENT
IN THE URBAN COMMUNITY OF LYON
6.1	 Introduction
The cases reported in this section represent examples of development control
decision making in COURLY in the period 1984-1986. Five of the cases had been
decided at the time of the empirical study but were sufficiently fresh in the
participants' minds for it to be possible to recreate the pattern of events with relative
ease. Three of the cases were still being processed at the time of the study and thus
final decisions had not been taken: these are treated together in section 6.7. Of these,
two are in Lyon itself and were the subject of a consultation préalable on 5 June
1986; the third, in Rillieux-la--Pape, was the subject of a meeting with officers of
COURLY and the Agence d'urbanisme on 19 June 1986.
Each of the five determined cases is presented in the same form. A general
description of the development is followed by an introduction to the conimune, a
description of the site, the planning policy context for the development and the
principal participants. There follows a detailed description of the stages in the control
process and an analysis of the process in terms of the procedures and their effect on
the nature of the decision taken and the interests of the participants in that procedure.
The cases in the main concern housing developments. Four deal with schemes
for detached or semi-detached housing on green field sites, one with terraced housing
in a redevelopment area, and one with flatted housing over ground floor shops, again
on a redevelopment site. Of the other two, one is an extension to existing commercial
premises, and the other the conversion of a 19th century villa with extensions to form
an old people's home. Two of the cases deal with an application for a lotissernent and
not a permission to build. Schemes have been taken from each of the sectors apart
from the north-west and represent a diversity of locations and communes in
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COURLY. The case studies cannot therefore be fully representative of development
control in COURLY but are indicative of the kind of problems that may occur and
the capacity of the system and the actors to resolve them.
6.2	 Lotissemesit Ic Solcil levait - Yernaison
6.21	 Introduction
This case deals with the development of two sites at Yernaison, formerly
owned by M. Isaac and the Institut français de Gestion (IFG; the French Institute of
Management), that collectively have become the housing estate known as Le Soleil
levant. The case may be seen in various lights: as the paradigm of change on the
fringe of a major conurbation; as part of the social transforniation of a rural village
to a suburban commune; as an example of the system of land ownership and
development. For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is particularly significant
as an example of the way in which zoning regulations are used in the control of
development and as an illustration of the way in which actors with a stake in the
decision relate to each other, It reveals the exercise of the newly acquired
responsibilities by the mayor of a small commune and is a clear indication of how the
contrOle de legalite is used. It allows some assessment of the impact of zoning and the
process of the modification of the POS.
The case starts in April 1984 when the heirs of the estate of M. Isaac sought
to sell the land for development. At first they tried to find the highest bidder, but
were advised by one of the aménageurs, Décines-lmnmobilier, who refused to
participate in the bidding, of the likely price ceiling in relation to the maximum
density that would be permitted. Décines-Immobilier took an option to purchase the
site. The IFG became involved when they heard of the proposal and part of their
property, a strip of land at the rear of the Isaac site was incorporated into the
proposal. By early 1985, Décines-Immobilier had prepared a scheme for a lolisserneni
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which was discussed formally before an application was submitted at the end of
February. Permission was granted in May, but the permission was withdrawn in
August, a new but modified permission granted the same day. Work was well in hand
on site by May 1986.
6.211	 Vernaison
The commune of Vernaison is at the very southern end of COURLY and is
the classic case of a village undergoing rapid suburbanisation. By the.standards of
COURLY its population at 3,373 is relatively small, although this is still considerably
larger than the average population of all communes in France. Between 1968 and
1975 its population increased by 75 per cent, mainly as the result of the building of
an HLM estate at the north end of the village next to the boundary with Irigny. The
population is presumably set to grow rapidly again in the 1980s as a result of building
to the south and west of the village core. For all that, Vernaison retains much of its
rural character. The village is plain but quiet, clustered round a village square which
is dominated by the 19th century parish church. Running through the village is the
CDI5, a minor through road linking Pierre-Bénite to the north with the town of
Givors, outside COURLY, nine kilonietres to the south, along which is sporadic
development. A bridge crosses the RhOne from Vernaison village to Solaize, but is
of minor significance as a transport link. The countryside around is attractive though
not dramatic and is intensively cultivated with cherry orchards and vineyards.
Running parallel with the river just behind the village is an escarpment which rises
steeply to a height of some 35 metres above the valley floor and provides an attractive
band of uncultivated woodland and scrub. The traditional rural character of
Vernaison is reflected in the fact that the deputy mayor with responsibility for
planning (one of three deputies) is a farmer.
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6.212	 The Sites
The sites are to the south of the village and share in the general character of
the area. The Isaac site was partly cultivated and contains a section of the escarpment
rising from the river valley. The old house fronted the CDI5, but the main entrance
to the future development was to be from a side road, the chemin de Ia Rossignole,
which had recently been realigned close to the junction with the CDI5 to provide a
turning bay for buses from Lyon. The 1FG site is at the top of the escarpment and
appears from map evidence not to have been cultivated. Its frontage is on a lane
running north from the chemin de Ia Rossignole, the chemin des Ferr.atiéres. The
wedge-shaped plot lies alongside the main part of the IFG's ownership which consists
of a large 19th century house and wooded grounds. The sites combined have a total
area of 67.7 hectares.
6,213	 Participants in the Process
The participants in the process are readily identified. On the one hand are
those with the property interest; the original landowners and the developer who would
lay out the sites for resale to individuals to build or have built, houses for themselves.
By far the most significant of three sets of actors is the aménageur, Décines-
Immobilier, whose partner-in-charge, Brignais, is supported by a firm of surveyors
in the preparation of the layout. The landowners appear rather as responding to
events than as initiating charge. The ultimate purchaser, and builders of the houses
themselves, are unimportant to major stages in the control process although one
question at least relating to the zoning regulations is likely to be resolved only when
the individual permissions to build are processed.
The ranks of the decision-makers present a more formidable array. First of
all there are the mayor of Vernaison, Dorée, elected in 1983, assisted by his deputy
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with responsibility for planning, M. Dupre-Latour, who by virtue of having an
approved POS is responsible for approving planning applications in the name of the
commune. Then there are the officers of COURLY who include representatives from
the Service d l'Aménagernent urbain and Operations d'urbanisme in the Département
Développement and representatives of groups responsible for water, sewerage and
roads. There is the group leader for the south-west sector from the Agence
d'urbanisme with a specific technical interest in the POS and the zoning. The DDE
is present in a fairly minor role, and the Commissaire de Ia Republique exercises an
important influence on events, but as it were off-stage. Other state bodies are also
consulted but have no impact on the major outline of the case or its interest for this
thesis except perhaps to emphasise the weight of administration that may be brought
to bear on a relatively unimportant development.
6.214	 The planning context
The planning context for the development is set by the POS for the south-
west sector of COURLY approved in March 1982, modified in June 1984, and revised
in March 1985. The plan, in its report identifies the existence of a natural
environment of considerable richness in the south of the sector in the communes of
Charly, Irigny, St.-Genis-Laval and Vernaison. These include the orchard and
agricultural land of all (lie communes and the wooded edges of the RhOne; the
conclusion of an addendum to the report suggests the natural environment "merits
exceptional protective measures" (Agence d'urbanisme, 1982). Approximately 33 per
cent of the whole area was thus identified as coupure verle (green wedges) and zoned
NC or ND, not least a band about 500 metres wide running from the industrial area
at the south end of the commune of Irigny to the southern boundary of Veraison.
This includes the escarpment which receives special mention in the report for offering
"magnificent views" and being "extremely visible from a very large number of points"
(p.7). The plan also identified a reserve of 528 hectares of land in zones NA (for
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future development) of which 67 hectares were located in Yernaison above the
escarpment.
Thus at the time that the plan was approved the whole of the Isaac site was
zoned NC although the IFG land was already classified as part of a zone NA. The
effect of the revision of the POS in 1985 was to reclassify the Isaac site as NA with
the exception of the escarpment itself between the 190 metre and 220 metre contours.
In addition parts of both sites were from the outset classified as espaces boisés
and are therefore subject to Arts. RI 30-1 onwards of the code de l'urbanisme and not
by independent regulations in the POS. On the Isaac site these statutory wooded
spaces fall within the zone NC, but on the IFG site part of the zone NA nearest the
road and to the southern edge are so classified. The further modification in 1985
involved the redefinition of the zone NC by shifting its boundary from the 190
metre to the 195 metre contour lines, across the width of the Isaac site.
6.22	 Stages in Development
6.221	 Informal lego1ia1ions April 1984 - Januar y 1985
From the case history as it is presented by the various participants it is hard
to decide whether the death of M. Isaac precipitated the rezoning of the land or not.
Though it would be reasonable to assume that the inheritors of the Isaac estate were
anxious to realise the maximum value of their inheritance and therefore sought a
rezoning, both Dupré-Latour and Brignais insist that the principle had already been
established in the development of an estate immediately to the south of the Isaac site,
Ia Rossignole. This estate, completed at the time of the research, was already
sufficiently well advanced in 1982 to be classified as a zone U in the POS, and
incorporated the scarp slope most of which, as classified woodland, has been retained
as an amenity area. Moreover, Dupré-Latour insisted that the commune of Vernaison
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had wanted a larger area of land identified for future development than was
eventually incorporated in the POS as approved in 1982. The presence of demand and
demographic pressure and the desire of the mayor to proceed with a modification
allowed the Agence d'urbanisnie to produce a reasoned justification for allocating the
land for future development.
It is entirely plausible therefore that the Isaac estate acted in the knowledge
that their land would soon be designated for future development rather than
themselves initiating the change. In April 1984 they organised a competition to
tender for their site on which Décines-Immobilier refused to participate, offering
instead advice on the maximum price the owners could hope to expect in light of the
maximum zoning density. For whatever reasons, the owners heeOeà t'ue aOvice ol
Décines-Immobilier, and it was they who acquired an option to purchase the land.
From then onwards, they were engaged in a fairly extensive round of discussions,
with the maine of Vernaison and with the Agence d'urbanisme. None of these
discussions is recorded formally, but by early 1985 a layout had been prepared which
was at an advanced stage. The form which the application should take also apparently
had been decided. Déciiies-Immobilier were anxious to have a ZAC declared, even
though the process would have taken longer than a lolissement. They argued that the
site was large for a lotissement; but perhaps more importantly the question of the
regulations particularly in respect of the espaces boisés classes could be cleared up
formally. The mayor, however, demurred, and the developer was advised to seek a
permis de lotir.
6.222	 Formal negotiations - February 1985
By the time the first records appear on the file, the principle and the method
of proceeding had been decided, but there was still much detail to be resolved. The
scheme that Décines-Immobilier had prepared proposed 49 plots with one road access
from chemin de la Rossignole, and another on the IFG land from the chemin des
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Ferratières. The two roads were not joined but a footpath descended the steep part
of the slope to link each part of the development. 3.2 hectares of the NC land were
to be left as open space, and the Residents' Association would be charged with its
upkeep. In February 1985 two niajor meetings were held in which all the participants
were represented. Several problems emerge.
a) Widening of the chenzin des Ferraiières. The mayor was opposed to the
approval of the scheme without the widening of the road from the junction of chemin
de Ia Rossignole to the access to the IFG site. Décines-Immobilier had, it appeared,
reached agreement with adjoining owners and was prepared to purchase and use the
land necessary for the widening. This could not proceed without the building of a new
wall to the rest of the land in the IFG's ownership. COURLY officials appear to have
been reticent about the time scale and Décines-Emmobilier agreed to build the wall
at their own expense.
b) Tue Zone NC laud. The DDE objected that some plots actually infringed the
NC land, even though niost was to be retained as open space. Décines-Immobilier
assured the DDE that though the plots would overlap the boundary, there would be
no buildings on the zone.
c) The problems of plot size. The POS made it clear that land classified NAD
would become subject to regulations for zoned UDC on development. The regula-
tions for zone UDC stipulated a minimum plot size of 1000 square metres for
individual houses, but the layout as prepared showed plots as small as 700 square
metres. The DDE propose that some of the plots could be for semi-detached houses,
but Décines-Irnmobilier are not prepared for commercial reasons to include more than
five or six. The proposal as it stood therefore ran the risk of being referred to the
administrative tribunal either by the prefect or by third parties if the mayor granted
permission. The issue was resolved by the developers agreeing to delay the start of
the work until after the end of the four month period in which decisions may be
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contested.
d) The levying and collection of the taxe locale d'equipenient. Décines-
Immobilier argued that given the cession of land and the building of the wall along
the chemin des Ferratières, they should be exempted from paying TLE and in this
they were supported by the mayor. COURLY argued that the work would only be
worth 30% of an estimated 360,000F payable in tax. At the second meeting, Décines-
Immobilier asked instead for a deferral of the payment of TLE until the eventual sale
of each plot. Given that TLE is based upon the floorspace of' the buildings and the
type of loan finance used for their construction, there is the risk of overpayment if
the estimates are incorrect.
e) The espace boise clas. Though this was to prove the major stumbling block
after the decision was taken, at the stage of negotiation it was not perceived as a
major issue, even though it was recognised that three plots on the IFG land infringed
the classified wood land. The view appears to have been that the zoning was
inaccurate because the 'woodland' was in fact scrub.
6.223	 Determining the application - March - May 1985
The application was formally lodged with the maine at Vernaison eight days
after the second meeting, 28 February. At this stage, the revision of the POS was not
yet approved, but the application was nonetheless processed in anticipation of the
approval, and by the time the permission to develop was granted exactly three months
later, the POS modifications had indeed been approved. The interest of this phase is
mainly concentrated in the compilation of observations made by the Service de
l'Aménagement urbain for forwarding to the mayor. The major points refer to the
problems of plot size and the espace hoisC classC and the deferral of TLE to the
moment of the sale by eventual purchasers of the lots.
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Two other consultations were also undertaken. The Architecte des Bãtiments
de France was consulted because the site lay in the field of visibility of a historic
monument (monument historique inscrit). The comment, advisory rather than
mandatory, was to the effect that a landscape study was a prerequisite of giving a
formal opinion and that the drawings as presented were inadequate. The advice
appears to have been ignored. The other consultation was with the architecte-conseil
whose main recommendation was that the assistance of a coordinating architect should
be a requirement in the charges on eventual purchasers. The application was duly
approved on 28 May, and thus well within the five months laid down by Art. R315-
19 for estates of more than five plots.
6.224	 The withdrawal of permission and the issue of a new permission -
August 1985
Given that there were three infringements of the POS regulations in force it
is perhaps hardly surprising that the prefect should have exercised his powers of
con/rOle de lOgalité. According to Dupré-Latouz. what was surprising was the issues
on which the prefect chose to contest the decision. The question of plot-size was
ignored; the focus instead was on the infringement of the NC land and the espace
boise classé, perhaps significantly, issues which entailed national rather than local
regulations. The decision was not referred to the administrative tribunal: the threat
to do so was sufficient to persuade the mayor to withdraw the permission, on 16
August. This was followed on the same day, however, by a new permission which
rectified the errors.
Indeed the problems were hard1y awkward to resolve. Décines-Immobilier in
their new application simply omitted plots 5,6 and 7 on the I FG land which infringed
the espace boise classC. There was also a minor modification to the limits of the same
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NC in which the boundary was shifted from 190 metre to the 195 metre contour line
thus narrowing slightly the allocation of the NA zone on the Isaac site and ensuring
that all the plots were clear of the zone NC. The permission as received then
specifically excluded the 8.4 hectares covered by the woodland and the zones NC,
such a modification should in principle have been subject to a deliberation by the
municipal council and a public inquiry, but neither appears to have occurred. Dupré-
Latour insisted that in the revision approved in March 1985 the planners had made
an "error" in the drawing of the boundary of the zone. The logic of the boundary
as it appears on plan does not support such a hypothesis, and the modification was
presumably drawn up before full details of the lolisserneni had been prepared.
All the parties in this case favour that the question of the espace boise classé
will be resolved in the fullness of time by a revision of the POS (the simplified
modification procedure cannot apply to espaces boisés classOs by virtue of Art. R123-
34 of the code) and once complete, the three plots on the land can be reinstated. The
total period for the decision to be taken was thus five-and-a-half months from the
receipt of the application with a further month of formal negotiation immediately
before the lodging of the application.
6.23	 Analysis
The case may best be analysed in two ways: in terms of the use of procedures
laid down by law and in terms of the particular interests and responsibilities of the
major actors. The case is not less interesting for the fact that the principle of
development in this site and in the form proposed by the developer was readily
acceptable to everyone with a stake in the decision.
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6.23 I	 Procedures
The importance and the length of the formal and informal negotiations that
preceded the making and the processing of the application is perhaps the most
striking feature of this case. All the main issues connected with the case had been
resolved before 28 February when the application was lodged, and the ultimate
decision-maker, the mayor, had been fully involved in the discussions and party to
the agreements reached. The period between 28 February and 28 May by contrast
appears as no more than a bureaucratic and formal exercise in which the appropriate
paperwork is completed. The operation appears largely covert therefore. That
impression is confirmed by the mayor's preference for the lotissement procedure
rather than a ZAC. With a ZAC, two of the three problems which caused difficulties
for this case, the infringement of the zone NC and the size of plots, would have been
dealt with in the PAZ which would have been subject to a public inquiry, and would
thus have ensured a measure of accountability in the process. Certainly by requiring
the developer to seek a permission to subdivide, the mayor could ensure that the
discussions could be subject to less scrutiny by the public at large. It may also be that
the image of the ZAC, as the vehicle for creating the high density modernistic estates
of the 1960s was another factor in the decision.
To say there was no kind of accountability in the decision-making process in
this case would of course be incorrect. Firstly, the reclassification of the Soleil levant
sites as an NA zone required the full formal procedure of deliberation by the
municipal council, enquêle publique and formal adoption. Secondly, the mayor was
accountable to the law for the detailed decision, and as we have seen, the prefect did
indeed call him to account for the illegalities of the decision as issued on 28 May. Yet
the fact that the prefect chose to attack only two of the three illegalities is clear
indication of the discretion that he uses.in the exercise of the contrOle de lëgaliié, a
discretion which is exercised with virtually no real accountability. And because he
exercises it in this way,mayors are encouraged, as in this case, to gamble on whether
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the prefect will turn a blind eye or not.
Another feature of the procedures is the extent to which the zoning and the
regulations, which had in large neasure been determined and agreed by those
involved in this case were such to be a hindrance to the proper realisation of the
project. The classified woodland was seen to be an incorrect designation, because on
inspection the zone was really only scrub; the infringement of the NC zone was
acceptable because the developer agreed that all future building would be kept clear
of its limits. But the illegalities of the decision of 28 May reveal the classic dilemma
of a system that tries to express policy in terms of legally defined limits and
standards. Sooner or later, the standards are found in a particular instance to be too
restrictive, and creative interpretations of the law are attempted. The response is
then to denounce the illegality and seek a tightening of the law. In such a process it
is easy for the principle that the regulations are supposed to embody to be lost from 	 '
view, and coherent planning policy to disintegrate in a series of ad hoc adjustments.
The final feature of the procedure is the total absence of public involvement
in the decision. At no stage do members of the public appear to have commented on
the scheme and the decision, which could have been contested by third parties, was
of course attacked by the prefect. All the consultations during both the pre-
application stage and the determining of the application were with the various levels
of local and central administration.
6.232	 Inerests of the principal qctors
The interest of the mayor in wishing to see the development go ahead is clear
enough. An increased population adds to the prestige of the commune, even if it soon
brings problems of social integration; but there must be at least the suggestion that a
lotissenient of houses on large plots was more acceptable than an FILM estate. More
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importantly, however, an increase in development leads to an increase in the tax base
which is of vital importance to a small commune without much employment.
The interest of COURLY was also to see the development go ahead, and once
again the fiscal advantage is a consideration since the laxe locale d'équipernenl comes
to COURLY and not the commune. That of course led to a minor conflict with the
mayor who was quite prepared to see TLE waived iii return for the widening of the
cheniin des Ferratières and the sewer connections for the properties on that land, in
order to get the development to go ahead. The COURLY agents probably regarded
it as more important not to antagonise the mayor and deferring the payment of TLE
proved to be a mutually acceptable compromise. Moreover COURLY stood to gain
from the work to the wall along chernin des Ferratières which they either could not,
or as a matter of principle did not intend to, do in the near future.
The Agence d'urbanisme also had an interest in keeping in with the mayor.
Whatever leverage the technical expertise they exercised gave them over the mayor's
decisions, they and indeed the officials of COVRLY nevertheless had to recognise the
extent to which they were dependent on the mayor's goodwill to be able to operate
at all. All the authorities therefore needed to see the development proceed, and were
therefore prepared to acquiesce in the illegality of under-sized plots, which Décines-
Immobilier regarded as necessary for commercial reasons.
The interest of Decines-Ininiobilier was certainly to be compliant on the
question of minor work in order to protect the commercial viability of the scheme as
presented. By the stage of the formal negotiations, they would have been well aware
of the mayor's support for their scheme which no doubt encouraged them to insist on
the deferral of the TLE payment, an apparently unusual procedure. They were also
clearly prepared to do a deal with the authorities on the question of plot size; they
were prepared to delay existing development for four months after the grant of
permission, to ensure that if the prefect exercised his power of control, the mayor
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would not become liable for compensation to the developer. In this scheme,
therefore, there was a strong degree of mutual interest in seeing the development
proceed and thus a willing connivance to bend the rules.
Two final points must be noted. The first is that those actors who were
involved in the discussions before the beginning of 1985 were those who carried most
weight in the final decision. Those consultations undertaken after the application had
been lodged appear to have been mere formality: either the advice offered was
disregarded or it added nothing to the debate. Secondly, there were of course no
consultations with the public, and a striking feature of the case is that .there was no
public involvement at all; the case was contested by the prefect and not as might have
been possible by a third party.
6.233	 Conclusions
There are two aspects of this case which deserve final comment: the
modification to the POS and the application of the regulations to the proposed
development itself.
Relatively little has been said so far about the modification to the POS which
was an essential prerequisite of the development of Le Soleil levant. Nevertheless the
mayor's desire to increase developable land in his commune clearly has potentially
grave consequences for the maintenance of policy. The POS, as we have seen, laid
some stress on the environmental quality of the whole of the sector's rural areas, but
particularly the banks of the RhOne and the escarpment. The concept of the 'green
wedge' therefore strongly advocated in the POS and is a direct elaboration of a
principle contained in the SDAU. It must be questionable whether the sole retention
of the scarp slope as amenity open space and the development of the rest of the land
answered either the desire to protect the banks of the RhOne or to ensure that the
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conurbation was contained by open country. And the retention of the classification
NC - land to be protected primarily for its agricultural value - was a nonsense given
the poor quality of the land on the slope itself and its use as part of the housing
estate.
It must be stressed that there can be no suggestion of impropriety in this
modification to the POS. Yet the lack of heart-searching is striking. The mayor, we
have already noted, had every reason to request an extension of land of development,
and was evidently not faced with local opposition. Perhaps more surprising was the
willingness of the other authorities to acquiesce in this desire, unless one is prepared
to examine the dynamics of the power relationship between elected representatives
and technicians. There would appear to be frequent temptation 'to give the mayor
what he wants', to maintain the rapport that will already have existed, and to ensure
the availability of technical services in their role of servants of the consumers, and
thereby their ultimate ascendancy in the decision-making process. The cost of this
relationship is the nibbling away at apparently committed policy.
As far as the application of the regulations is concerned, the question may
reasonably be asked whether the bending of the rules was really such an iniportant
matter. The classified woodland was after all scrub; the plot sizes proposed still
allowed for a very low density scheme and the developer was prepared to ensure there
was no building in the NC land, even if the plots did slightly infringe it. There are,
however, several observations to be made. Firstly, insofar as the principal actors
appear accountable to anyone for the decisions they took, it appears to be to the
prefect, who as we have seen, has in practice wide discretion to act or not to act. The
accountability for his exercise of discretion must be fairly attenuated. Secondly, as
with all standards, there must be doubt as to what the limits were designed to achieve,
and therefore whether it mattered that in the event they were bent. What, if any,
were the acceptable parameters of tolerance? Did the proposal stay within such
parameters? These questions are impossible to answer because the system, the
229
procedure and regulations, are not couched in such a way as to make the debate
possible in these terms. Either a proposal follows the rules or it does not: there is no
intermediate position. Thirdly, the existence of regulations which potentially
hindered the development appears to divert discussion from questions of overall
layout and the relationship of buildings to site; we may note that the request by the
Architecte des l3ãtiments de France fw a full landscape appraisal appears to have
been ignored. Fourthly, the manipulation of the regulations, be the intentions with
which it is done never so honourable, must undermine the legitimacy of the whole
system.
Perhaps in the end it is the last observation that is the most important in this
case. The estate, after all is likely to be unexceptionable, if unimaginative, in its
form and layout, and at no point does its location appear to have been queried. The
decision is justified by the existence of a POS approved and carried out according to
a procedure which allowed a measure of citizen involvement. Yet the decision in this
particular case was not taken in accordance with the regulations that in principle
provide the safeguard of everyone affected by the proposal to develop and the
departure from the regulations was done in a highly covert manner. And it is clear
that the decentralisation of powers to mayors did nothing to reduce that covertness
in the process of this particular case.
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Figure 6.21
	 Commune of Vernaison: location map
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Figure 6.22	 Lotissernent Le Soleil levant: location map
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Figure 6.23	 POS for the South-Western sector of COURLY as approved in 1982
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Figure 6.24 POS for the south-western sector of COURLY as finally amended to
show the NA zoning for the Isaac site
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Figure 6.25	 Lotissement Le Soleil levant
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Figure 6.26
	 The Isaac site looking west to the scarp slope zoned NC
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Figure 6.27
	
Cheinin des Ferratiêres showing Construction of new wall
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Figure 6.28	 The IFG site: the espace boise classé is to the right
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6.3	 Le Ilameau des Ci gales - Dêciiies-Charpieu
6.31	 Introduction
This case concerns the development of part of a zone d'arnénagernent concerté
(ZAC) in the commune of Décines-Charpieu to the east of Lyon and represents the
relative difficulty of making changes to plans as approved when the original proposals
are overtaken by events. It also reveals, however, an undercurrent of turmoil between
the commune and the technical officers of COURLY and the DDE, which exemplifies
the general problems of relationships between officials and elected representatives,
and between central and local government.
The case starts in 1984 when the developers Groupe Maison Familiale (GMF)
replaced the original developers of the site France-Constructeurs, who were to have
built flats on the site. The GMF scheme, however, proposed detached, semi-detached
and terraced houses, formed by linked garages, to a density that was substantially
lower than those proposed in the regulations of the plan d'arnënagernent de zone
(PAZ). An application was lodged in February 1985 and was approved in April. Just
before the expiry of the period in which the controle de legalité might be exercised,
the prefect announced his intention to refer the case to the tribunal administratif. In
the end, however, the prefect was persuaded that strict adherence to the letter of the
regulations was inappropriate.
6.311	 Décines-Chaipieu
Décines-Charpieu is one of the 'second ring' communes of Lyon, and has been
an industrial suburb since before the war when an artificial silk mill attracted many
immigrant workers (Moutin, personal communication). Since the war its population
has grown steadily, and has seen an increase in the latest census period 1975-82 to a
population of 22,832. The commune is continuously built up along the main road
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from Lyon to Crémieu (D5 17) and up to the Canal de Jonage. The old village centre
and that of the hamlet of Charpieu lie on by-roads to the south of the D5l7 and there
is agricultural land to the south between Décines and the commune of Chassieu. The
town is suburban and has few attractions; the mayor is concerned at the influx of
North Africans, and the fact that those with the means are more likely to move
further out than Décines should they decide to leave the centre of the conurbation.
There has, however, been new development, not least in the ZAC de Bonneveau in
which the case study is located. Much of this new development appears to be low cost
housing for sale and for rent. Décines does not at the moment undertake its own
processing of planning applications and has no immediate intention of doing so.
6.312	 The Site
The site of the ZAC de l3onneveau is immediately south and a little west of
the old village core and is essentially an infill between existing developments on rue
Emile-Zola and rue Raspail. Two residential feeder roads have been created in the
ZAC: avenue Louise-Michel running north-south and rue Simonetti linking avenue
Louise-Michel and rue Emile-Zola in an arc. The case study site for the development
to be known as Le Hameau des cigales consists of 1.07 hectares to the east of avenue
Louise-Michel and at the eastern boundary of the ZAC. By December 1985 half the
total of 245 individual houses had been completed and a group of 135 flats over shops
(Les Jardins de Bonneveau) were underway at the corner of avenue Louise-Michel
and the Emile -Zola (Decines-Charpieu 1985). By June 1986 these latter were
complete and occupied, by the same date there had presumably been further
completions in the low density areas of the ZAC. Work had not however started on
Le Hameau des cigales which remained derelict agricultural land.
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6.313	 The participants in the process
The main participants in the process include the developer of the case study
site itself GMF and the anlénageur, Décines-Immobilier whose activities have been
described fully in case study 6.2. GMF has existed since 1949 and has always been
a builder of individual houses: it was founded to undertake the reconstruction of
Cambrai after the war. Its activities now have diversified, and in addition to
housebuilding has subsidiaries that deal in building materials, insurance, house
improvement, housing finance, it also manages several hotels and holiday
acconiniodation. In 1985 it was ranked as the first property developer in France. Its
housebuilding activities are equally divided between the estate layouts, mainly built
by its low-cost subsidiary SA IILM CARPI, and its one-off houses destined in the
main for lolissernenis built by its subsidiary Maison Familiale constructeur. The
combined total housing completions were 7,575 in 1984, to which must be added small
numbers of flats, housing for rent, second homes, and buildings completed abroad.
In France, much of their estate development is classified as 'Residences villages'
designed for low-income owner-occupiers and 'Residences hameaux' which are
designed to offer greater choice to a slightly more moneyed clientele. (GMF 1984,
1985).
On the side of the public authorities M. Moutin, mayor of Décines also takes
particular responsibility for planning and has thus been closely involved in the
designation of the ZAC and its subsequent implementation. He is socialist and has
been mayor for 24 years. The Agence d'urbanisme were involved both in the
preparation of the ZAC and in the negotiations over the case study itself. The prefect
plays an important role once again in the exercise of the contrOle a'e légalilé, a role
which is essentially off-stage.
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6.3 14	 The planning context
The planning context for the site is created by the PAZ of the ZAG approved
in July 1981 by prefectoral decree and specifically by the regulations for zone HG!
which covers the site. The zone was intended for multi-storey housing to a maximum
of 8,600 square metres of floorspace or 70 dwellings. The regulations specified that
"buildings must be laid out round a central square at the edge of the principal feeder
road [avenue Louise-Michel] and opposite the secondary road [Simonetti]", with the
possibility of shops at ground floor level. The southern strip of the site,
unidentifiable from the case file layout drawings, but known from the documentation
to cover plots 1 to 8, was outside the ZAG on land zoned NA within the eastern sector
POS.
6.32	 Stages in Development
6.321	 informal negotiations to October 1984
Décines-Immobilier had tried to achieve the objectives of the PAZ by the
development of flats. The original developers, France-Constructeurs, withdraw
during 1984, perhaps because of the start made in December in Les Jardins de
Bonneveau with its mxfure of flats over shops. Whatever the reason may have been,
the development of Les Jardins de Bonneveau negated the intention for zone HG!.
Again it is not clear whether Décines-Immobilier specifically sought out a builder
of houses rather than of flats, or whether GMF made the first move, but the result
was the same. A low density scheme of houses, not flats, without a commercial
component was the basis for discussion at a meeting on 10 October 1984 that appears
to have been acceptable, indeed welcomed, by all parties.
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6.322	 The submission of the planning application - October 1984 - February
1985
GMF produced a detailed layout which showed an L-shaped estate road
serving 24 out of a total of 38 houses. The remainder fronted rue Louise-Mjchel or
rue Francois-Jego to the north, but three faced south into a square which was
presumably intended to evoke the 'central square' of the regulations. Houses are
shown detached, in pairs, linked by garages in full terraces; and according to the note
accompanying the application, are standard house types. The file note also makes
play of the fact that the houses are grouped and that the polychromy of the rendering
was intended to reinforce the diversity of the scheme. The application was lodged on
18 February.
6.33	 The processing of ihe application February - April 1985
The formal processing of the application appears to have followed largely
predictable lines, with the mayor confirming his support for the scheme in a letter of
24 April to COURLY. Only two problems emerged.
a) The calculation of the (axe local d'equipement (TLE). TLE was not payable
on the bulk of the site within the ZAC, but did apply to the part of the site zoned
NA. In practice this covered plots I to 8 and the calculation, based on the type of
loan finance and the floor area was thus readily agreed.
b) The infringement of the regulations. The Service de l'Amenagement urbain
of COURLY in the synthesis of comments were bound to incorporate the DDE's
observation that the development did not conform to the regulation in terms of
density or form. COURLY were evidently prepared to disregard the infringement,
however, by giving a favourable opinion on the scheme, subject to minor details of
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the road layout and turning spaces.
The scheme was approved by the mayor in the name of the commune in early
May 1985. The prefect threatened to exercise his powers of contrdle de legalite in
July but was persuaded that the effective modification of the original regulations was
appropriate, and the case was not therefore referred to the tribunal administratif.
6.33	 Analysis
In terms of the procedure, this case is interesting for the way in which the
major decision, to depart from the original concept of the development for the site,
was agreed during the period before the lodging of the application. It is equally
interesting for the reflection it casts on how the regulations were to be understood,
and the kind of interests that lay behind the interpretations.
6.331	 Procedures
In the case study of Le Soleil levant at Yernaison (case study 6.2), we noted
that the mayor had preferred to adopt the lotissement proceOvw to the creation of a
ZAC because, it was suggested, there would be less public scrutiny of the decisions.
It is reasonable to enquire, therefore, whether in this case the decision-making
process was any more accountable. The ZAC de Bonneveau was of course different
in scale to the lotissenient at Vernaison, in that each of the sites was large and
required further infrastructure; the regulations were therefore likely of necessity to
be less precise than those relating to a lotissenient of individual parcels. Yet the
process by which changes were made to regulations in force is essentially similar in
each case, with the decision being taken effectively before the formal procedure had
begun and the accountability of the decision making being achieved only through the
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challenge of the prefect. We should note particularly that the accountability to the
public that is achieved through the formal procedure in approving the ZAC was
entirely negated for this site by the subsequent changes.
The second issue must relate to the interpretation of the regulations. For the
planners in the Agence d'urbanisme they expressed an urban design concept, a policy
for the eventual form of the development. For the DDE and the prefect they were
rules to be applied, and at the least according t3 the planners, were interpreted as
presenting an envelope for the development (composition en gabarit). For them, the
argument then hinged on whether the regulations specified a minimum density or not.
There is a clear mismatch in the understanding of what purpose the regulations are
designed to serve.
It has to be said, however, that the regulation for zone HC1 was not
particularly effective as policy. There was no sense whatsoever in which Le Hameau
des cigales represented a realisation of the spirit if not the letter of the PAZ; the small
green area has nothing to do with the original concept of a market place. The
judgernent of the appropriate design form of the development appears to have been
taken without adequate reference to developer's intentions either on this site or
elsewhere. Pragmatically, the decision was of course likely to have been the right one
in the circumstances, but the changes quite apart from being taken in unaccountable
fashion, invalidated the urban design basis on which, it could be argued, the ZAC as
a whole had been based. Regulations did not prevent a pragmatic response to changed
circumstances, but equally did not appear in this case to exert the kind of control over
the ultimate form and character of development that the planning officials at least
were seeking. But that in itself raises questions about the interests of the participants
in this case that must be explored in more depth.
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6.332	 Interests of the Participants
The mayor of Décines clearly had an interest in development in the ZAC for
the usual reasons of increasing the tax base of his commune. The form of such
development was at least in retrospect an issue for him. A number of themes emerged
at interview. Firstly there appears to have been concern that Decines-Charpieu was
out
losing in popularity to communes further out as a place for younger households to live
in. the mayor believed that they would only be attracted to Décines if the
development had consisted of detached houses on 800 square metre plots (i.e.
conside ably larger than those of the houses at Le Ilameau des cigales). Secondly, by
extension, there was considerable disappointment with the flats which the mayor
said, were selling badly. Finally, this concern for the form of development appeared
to be closely bound up with attitudes to race and class which cannot be overlooked.
All the inner suburbs of COURLY have large proportions of immigrant populations.
Of these, the North Africans are perceived as creating social and economic pressures
which the communes are left to their own devices to resolve. Creating houses on
large plots appears thus to have been seen as the way of ensuring that the growth of
the commune was not achieved simply through the continuing influx of immigrants
(Moutin, personal communication).
Whether the strategy would have been successful must be open to doubt.
Décines-Immobilier may have found it difficult to secure a developer willing to build
flats, but the developers who did take options on sites in the ZAG de Bonneveau
evidently perceived the market as being for small houses in the lowest price range.
Whether too, this attitude of the mayor was merely the wisdom of hindsight must also
be open to question; after all the ZAC as proposed, was very far from being a low
density lotissenient. But if it was not merely hindsight (and the fact that Décines-
Immobilier had originally looked for a lotissenient solution suggests that it was not)
some explanation must be given as to why the mayor accepted the proposals of the
Agence d'urbanisrne. By the same token we must examine how the officials of the
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Agence d'urbanisnie perceived their role in this development.
The scheme that the Agence d'urbanisme proposed was a classic architectural
solution to the problem of creating identity in new development by using high density
housing and evoking traditional urban form with the use of such terms as 'market
place'. At one level it appears a naive approach to new development in the 1980s
which failed to recognise the general nature of the market and the ambitions of
aspiring home owners and took no account of the structure of the development
industry. In part this can be explained by the architectural training that all the sector
group leaders have. In part also it can be related to the fact that the Agence exists
as a separate entity somewhat apart from the general administration of COURLY.
The planners therefore see themselves as offering a particular specialist expertise,
untainted perhaps one could say, by considerations which might properly be left to
others. Mayors of communes accept this expertise because, firstly, there is not an
alternative source of advice available and secondly, perhaps because the vision of the
Agence d'urbanisme is a seductive one which helps to bolster a commune's self-image
even when there are doubts, as in this case. The doubts are only fully vented when
the development, as in this case, fails to go entirely to plan.
Décines-Immobilier had proposed a lolissenieni originally and would no
doubt have had fewer problems if they had not been required to find a developer
willing to put up flats in the first instance. Though the regulations certainly delayed
the process, in practice the company had relatively little difficulty in persuading both
the mayor and the Agence d'urbanisme that the GMF solution was the only one
practicable. The mayor's response was favourable because whatever initial doubts he
had had, by that stage had been boosted by the delay to the development, and the
subsequent loss of taxes. The Agence d'urbanisme's response, apart from being a
sensible adjustment of a concept in the face of reality was perhaps also a desire not
to lose face with the commune, as present and future client. They were clearly not
initiators of the process of change and could do no more to respond to events.
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6.333	 Conclusions
Few people would doubt that to accept the GMF proposals for Le Hameau des
cigales site was in the event sensible; few would argue that the change was really very
significant. Nevertheless the case does cast doubt on both the policy making process
and the capacity of the system to respond to change in an accountable fashion. On
the first point the failure to outline a sustainable policy might simply be regarded as
a temporary lapse which has little significance in more general terms. Yet it could
be seen in terms of the Agence d'urbanisme's desire to make a distinctive, urban
design contribution, even when it was not tenable in the face of development
pressures, and with the multiplicity of organisations involved in the process the
decision becomes understandable. On the second point enough has been said already:
it reinforces the fact that the French development control system cannot apparently
deal with change in an accountable fashion if the regulations are circumvented.
	
6.4	 Les Loii gs des Feullius - St. Priest
	
6.42	 Introduction
This case deals with a housing development being prepared by a national
speculative developer for a site zoned NA on the outskirts of St.-Priest. It is of
interest in the way that it illustrates the kind of agreements that may be reached
between elected representatives and developers and in the difficulties that regulations
within the POS may create for the successful implementation of a project. In this
case, it was the maximum length of the cul-de-sac that caused problems, and the case
is as revealing about the attitude of technical officers to the regulations as of the
effect of the regulations themselves.
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Figure 6.31	 Commune of Décines-Charpieu: location map
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Figure 6.32	 ZAC de Bonneveau and Le Hameau des cigales: location map
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Figure 6.34
	 The site for Le Hameau des cigales looking east from avenue Louise-
Michel
Figure 6.35	 The commercial development of Les Jardins de Bonneveau
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The case begins sometime during 1984 when the developer STOK-France
acquired an option to purchase a strip of land in rue des Etats-Unis with the intention
of developing it for housing. An initial approach was made to the mayor whose
response was that no development was acceptable without incorporating an adjoining
strip which was even narrower. Together the sites formed the last ienhaining open
frontage on the east side of rue des Etats-Unis. The mayor then required that part
of the land be ceded to the commune for the building of low-cost rental housing
(HLM). Applications for the development were lodged during 1985 but required
ameldment on two occasions, with the major problem being the length of the site,
and thus the length of the cul-de-sac that would serve it, exceeding the 150 metre
maximum laid down by the regulations. A solution was to create the potential for a
link at the east end of the site through to rue Laënnec to the north, which entailed
working land owned by COURLY. Because the link could not be realised
immediately the prefect exercised his power of controle de legalité and the application
was withdrawn. A new application was lodged in March 1986 which reduced the
length of the road, and therefore the number of houses on the site, and was approved
in the same month.
6.411	 St.- Priest
St.-Priest is an industrial commune Co the east o( COURLY in its outer
fringes. The Berliet factory lies just across the boundary with Vénissieux and smaller
scale industry extends south-eastwards between the CD518 route de Lyon and the
railway. The population of the commune has grown rapidly, from just over 20,000
in 1968 to 42,677 in 1982. It has few obvious attractions: its character is typically
suburban. Older areas of villas are interspersed with high-rise blocks, of the 1960's
and later, and the landscape is flat and without distinguishing features. There is
evidence of civic pride, however, in the newly completed town hail and the adjoining
sports complex still under construction. There also appears to be the political will to
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process applications at St.-Priest although the means and the expertise are not yet
sufficiently developed to do so
6.4 12	 The Site
The site lies to the west and slightly to the north of the centre of St. Priest.
Rue des Etats-Unis runs parallel to the main dual carriageway through the commune,
the route de Lyon, the CD518. On either side of the site is prewar and postwar villa
development served by minor roads running eastwards from the rue des Etats-Unis,
which serves as the local distributor and bus route. At the rear of the site are open
fields, but the locality is essentially unattractively suburban. The area of the site is
1.64 hectares, the length 240 metres and the width at 71 metres inadequate to take a
service road and plots on either side.
6.413	 Participants in the process
The principal actors on this case are the developers STOK-France, represented
by their Lyons agent, M. 1-lenri Payet, STOK-France is one of the newer generation
of developer-builders whose activities closely relate to British speculative activities
in that they acquire land and build directly in the form of individual houses. STOK-
France is in fact the creation of a Dutch developer who believed there was more
fertile ground for his profession in France than in the Netherlands. The company's
headquarters are at Lille; there are offices in Paris, where the company's activities are
most intense and Marseille. In 1986 the Lyon office had schemes underway in five
communes in COURLY with house sale prices ranging from 390,000FF to 515,000FF.
The other actors included the mayor of St.-Priest supported by a small
technical service unit at the town halt, and the technical officers of COURLY and the
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Agence d'urbanisme. The landowners play little role in the case, except insofar as the
owner of the narrower strip of land felt able to increase the asking price in the light
of the development proposed. The prefect is present in the exercise of the conirôle
de lëgalite. The planning context of the development is set by the POS for the eastern
sector of COURLY. The site was zoned NAD, but because the dveiDpers were
proposing to build the houses themselves, the lotissement procedure was not
appropriate for this site and the development dealt with by a normal permission to
build.
6.42	 Stages in Development
6.421	 Informal negotiations 1984 - June 1985
During this part of the process the main form of the development was agreed,
and it was clear that the agreement of the mayor was the critical element. He insisted
first of all that the plot that STOK-lrance originally had an option to purchase had
to be amalgamated with the adjoining Strip before he would countenance
development. He also sought the cession of part of the combined plots for low-cost
rental housing to be built by the local offices of the HLM. STOK-France complied
with these requirements. The adjoining strip was acquired and an agreement to offer
part of the site to the commune at an undisclosed price. The exact location of the
rental housing land was the subject of discussion. An original proposal on the file,
date 28 February 1985, located land for perhaps six units at the
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rear of the site, a solution that did not commend itself to the mayor who insisted on the
frontage to rue des Etats-Unis and sufficient pace for nine dwellings (increased later to
twelve on the same site area).
The early scheme also apparently ran into difficulties on the density of the proposal:
52 houses on the site (excluding the land to be ceded to the commune) exceeded the zone
density of 25 dwellings per hectare. The developer argued that for semi-detached houses the
regulations permitted a higher density than for detached, but was warned that he stood little
chance of receiving permission unless the density was lowered. These discussions evidently
involved members of COURLY and the Agence d'urbanisme. By 15 May 1985 the mayor was
able to write that he could give a favourable opinion on the proposal as it then stood and in
effect encouraged STOK-France to lodge an application for permission to develop which
they did a month later.
6.422	 The first application 18 June - September
The first application was in fact presented in two parts, but since this was reportedly
done for tax reasons and has no bearing on the planning case history, they may be considered
together. The allocation of the HLM housing land is shown along the frontage of rue des
Etats-Unis w4h nine plots identified (though these did not form part of any of the
applications made by STOK-France). A single cul-de-sac is shown running the length of the
site with a chicane at the boundary of the HLM site and the STOK-France site. 39 houses
are on the STOK-France site, all of which are linked, some as fully semi-detached houses,
some linked only by garages. Most line the cul-de-sac but a group is formed around a
pedestrian access at right-angles to the road, at the end of site nearest rue des Etats-Unis.
The question of the cul-de-sac length had obviously already arisen, for where the pre-
application sketch showed a turning-head in the first application drawings the road is
continued to the eastern boundary and then turrlthrough 90 degrees to form a potential link
to rue Laënnec to the north. To complete such a link, the road would have to be continued
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across undeveloped land owned by COURLY. A four metre wide pedestrian 'mall' runs along
one side of the cul-de-sac.
By 1 August, the Agence d'urbanisme had commented on the scheme and suggested
that a formal meeting with all the technical sources which was duly held a fortnight later.
Several problems emerge.
a) Problems of non-conformity with the regulations: open space. The regulations
specified that 20 per cent of the site should be devoted to green space. No recommendation
about how this allocation should be achieved appears to have been given at the meeting, and
the breach may have been considered relatively unimportant.
b) Problems of non-conformity with the regulations: the cul-de-sac. The developer's
attention was once again drawn to the fact that the cul-de-sac exceeded the maximum of 1c
metres permitted by the regulations in the POS. The Agence d'urbanisme suggested that
given the link to rue Laënnec could not be completed concurrently with the development by
STOK-France, a turning point should be provided at !O metres from rue des Etats-Unis.
The combination was deemed to be a satisfactory approximation to the regulations.
c) Urban design problems. The representative of the Agence d'urbanisme asked for the
houses to be brought closer together in order to "reinforce the character of the street" and to
leave more space at the rear of the houses.
d) The pedestrian way. The reservation of the pedestrian way was to be six metres, and
to contain a footpath and cycle way as well as a strip for car parking.
On the 23 August COURLY wrote to the DDE to request an extension of time for
processing the application in order to allow STOK-France time to submit new drawings: a
decision should have been delivered by 18 September. Revised drawings for consultative
purposes appear to have been produced by the end of September.
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6.423	 The second application 29 October 1985 - February 1986
A new application rather than a revision to the earlier ones was lodged at the
end of October, and instead of two separate stages the scheme was now presented as
a whole. One reason for the new application appears to have been the revision to the
HLM scheme which necessitated very minor revisions to the STOK-France layout.
For the rest, however, the new layout incorporates all the suggestions proposed in the
August meeting. The turning circle is provided as agreed and forms the focus of a
grouping of houses at that point rather than at the west of the site. The only
observation on the scheme from the technical services was that two car parking spaces
per dwelling were to be provided. The scheme was duly granted permission.
However at the last possible moment, the prefect declared the scheme illegal on the
ground that the link to rue Laënnec would cross land zoned NA for which no scheme
had yet been prepared. The permission had, therefore, to be withdrawn.
6.244	 The third application - 7 March 1986
STOK-France produced their last scheme shortly after the second application
had been withdrawn. This limited the cul-de-sac to the 150 metre point and provided
for an extension at a later date from a conventional circular, turning-head. 0.4
hectares of land was left undeveloped and the scheme limited to 28 houses. The third
application scheme thus removed the only remaining obstacle and permission was
granted on 12 March. Site work had just started in May 1986, and site sales office
had been set up.
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6.43	 Analysis
6.43 1	 Procedure
As with the case of the controversial Le Soleil levant at Vernaison the Les
Longs des feuillus case demonstrates the importance of the informal negotiation
process, particularly where developnient is proposed for land zoned NA. There was
never of course any doubt that housing development was suitable for the site, and
though the land was classed as unserviced in fact existing water mains and sewerage
in rue des Etats-Unis were quite capable of supporting the extra development, and
therefore in British terms, servicing was scarcely a problem. The two main issues for
discussion in the informal stages of negotiation were thus the density of development
and the quid pro quo that the mayor would look for if permission were granted. The
developer's argument that they thought a higher density was permissible for grouped
housing sounds distinctly disingenuous and could indeed be interpreted as a classic
'try-on'. On the other hand, the mayor's request for part of the land for rental
housing was well within the rules of the game as it is normally played, and the
negotiation there centred not on whether the land should be ceded, but in which part
of the site the rental housing should be located. The third issue settled in the
informal period appears hardly to have been a matter for debate at all: the mayor
made it plain that no development could take place if both strips of vacant land were
not acquired by the developer.
The negotiations that took place during the formal applications stages were of
a rather different calibre. The questions of the open space regulation and of the
urban form of the estate are of nhinor significance, part of the small change of
development control negotiation. The issue of the cul-de-sac length is on the other
hand critical. Here we see all the actors in the process working hard to find a solution
which would accommodate the regulation. The resolution of the difficulty may of
course be interpreted in different ways, either as the sincere attempts by the planners
to find a solution which respected the spirit of the regulations while allowing the
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development to go ahead, or as a concerted attempt by technical officers to subvert
the regulations in order to gain a political advantage. By the same token the contrôle
de lëgalite can either be seen as drawing out the process considerably, because
literalistic interpretations prevent the acceptance of sensible compromises, or as the
entirely necessary prevention ('in the nick of time'?) of abuses of a system
guaranteeing proper administration of the country's land uses. At all events, the
length of time that it took to resolve the difficulties with this site appears inordinate,
with nine months taken over the formal processing and a considerable period of
negotiation preceding the lodging of the first application. The developer's complaint
that the period was unnecessarily protracted looks justified. Nevertheless we need to
examine the actors' interests in the case to determine whether such a view is tenable.
6.432	 Interests of the participants
Land that is zoned NA is in principle less expensive than fully serviced land
in zones U. The lower cost will reflect the relative lack of servicing, and perhaps also
the conditions that may be placed on development proposals before they become
acceptable. This case exemplifies the search for mutual advantage primarily between
the mayor of St.-Priest and STOK-France. On the one hand the mayor seeking land
for rental housing; on the other, the developers proposing a relatively high density
solution and leaving the rental housing to be located at the far end of the site as an
unattractive residual, and then being forced to concede the frontage to rue des Etats-
Unis and a lower density. The mayor's interest in the case is clear: good development
for his commune together with a site for rented housing. He was able to realise that
interest by virtue of the power to approve or refuse permission for development on
NA land. At this stage the regulations were relatively unimportant in determining the
form of development.
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STOK-France appears beleaguered by the degree of power that the mayor was
able to exercise in this case; and forced to make concessions at each turn. Yet it was
in their interests to do so. Of course they looked for the maximum return from the
site; they may have grumbled at the price of acquiring the extra strip of land, but
they did not withdraw from the process and we may note that the selling price of the
houses to be built is less than similarly sized houses built by the company at St.- Fons
and Francheville, in the south and west of COURLY. respectively. They also
evidently believed it to be in their interests not to prepare a revised version of the
scheme which limited the cul-de-sac to 150 metres in October 1985, even though in
the event it would have speeded the start of the development. In taking the calculated
risk, however, they were aided and abetted by the technical officers in the case, and
therefore must have reasonably supposed that they would stand to gain by not leaving
the future of part of the site unresolved.
The interests of the officers of COURLY and the Agence d'urbanisme are
perhaps harder to gauge. They presented the case as an example of the way that
regulations could hinder sensible development; they presented themselves as
reasonable men finding acceptable compromises that fulfilled the Spirit, if not the
letter, of the law in the face of unexceptionable development proposals. The irony,
however, is that the regulation limiting the length of the cul-de-sac is contained in
the POS prepared by the very officers who were dealing with the application for Les
Longs des feuillus. An altogether less attractive construction could therefore be put
on the events described, that there was collusion between the controllers and the
controlled to outwit the system. Yet there is no foundation for inferring a conspiracy
between the parties in the case - indeed the developer's complaints against the system
would give the lie to that - but the way in which the technical services reacted
represents the delicate balance of power between the authorities. There was good
reason for the officers to prepare a liberal interpretation of the regulations, in that
to maintain their credibility with the mayor of St.-Priest, they had to be seen to be
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smoothing the passage of development which brought a clear advantage to the
commune.
6.433	 Conclusions
The case illustrates well two features of the French development control
system which have worrying consequences for the way in which decisions are taken.
The way in which the national regulations for the POS are drawn up in the Code de
l'urbanisme give considerable possibilities for mayors to dictate the terms on which
land zoned NA is brought forward for development. The extent to which they are
then accountable for the negotiations that take place must be open to doubt, except
insofar as the prefect is prepared to intervene when regulations are infringed, as he
did in this case. The other striking feature of the case in illustrating the power that
mayors may wield in the negotiation over NA land is the extent to which the technical
officers do not evidently see themselves as having a role in the negotiation. Their
concern was to make sure that the development took place in the light of a clear
political will to proceed.
The second feature is the rigidity of a system that is made accountable by the
imposition of legally binding rules. The rule emanated originally from the Agence
d'urbanisme, and if it was valid as an expression of policy the attitude of the officers
were indefensible. In truth it is much more likely that the 150 metre limit to cul-
de-sacs was the inappropriate expression of a general view about a performance
criterion. It is worth noting, too, that the proposal was unacceptable because the link
to rue Laënnec would have crossed NA land for which no plan had been prepared.
A wise precaution, perhaps, to prevent decisions being taken in a legally
unaccountable fashion, and development occurring without proper consideration. But
the system allows no mechanism for decisions to be taken in the light of exceptional
circumstances, except by bending the rules; and as soon as the rules are bent, the
accountability of decision-making vanishes.
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Figure 6.41
	 Commune of St.-Priest: location map
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Figure 6.42
	 Le Long des feuillus: location map
262
1
'N
//
//,	 I
//,I1
//
®L .\
@
)UIA
r
cfii%	 ç
1?S;
c
0	 coo	 0c
.c\
\\	
__v
1
e
Figure 6.43
	 POS for the eastern sector of COURLY
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Figure 6.45	 Rue des Etats-Unis looking south-east. The Le Long des feuillus site
is to the left
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Figure 6.46	 The site for Le Long des feuillus looking north-east
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6.5	 Rue du Château Yéiiissieux
	
6.51	 Introduction
This case deals with the implementation of part of a zone d'arnEnagernent
concertE (ZAC) in the centre of the industrial suburb of Vénissieux. Its interest lies
in the way the regulations are used in the control of projects and the extent to which
they can provide an adequate framework for negotiation. It is also illustrative of how
complex in the organisation for implementing projects may be. The ZAC had been
prepared by the Agence d'urbanisme for the mayor of Yénissieux. Vénissieux turned
to the mixed economy company (sociëté decononiié ,nixte) SERL as the arnénageur
for the whole zone, but individual parts of the ZAC were then built by a variety of
companies. For the case studied the builder-developer was STOK-France. The
difficulties with the scheme were blamed variously on the regulations, the differing
interpretation of the zoning of the ZAC by the different sectors and the obstinacy of
the developers.
The ZAC du Vieux Bourg in Vénissieux represents a concerted attempt to
revivify the centre of Venissieux which had become neglected since the war. The
area around the church and rue du Château itself represents the oldest part of the
town, the remnant of a mecieval fortified settlement. None of the buildings are of
any great age, however, and much of the area has been cleared for development. The
case starts with the informal negotiations that took place after STOK-France had
successfully tendered for the site which surrounded the southern flank of the church.
An early scheme was evidently unsatisfactory, and a change of architects produced
a new scheme which met STOK-France's desire for indvidua1 houses and was
presemte for planning approval in June 1985. A modified scheme was finally
approved in November, but work had not started on the site in May 1986.
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6.51 1	 Vënissieux
Vénissieux is COURLY's third largest commune after Lyon aid Villeurbanne
which experienced a very big population increase between 1968 and 1975 but has
since declined to 64,000. Its statu3 as an industrial suburb was established well before
(lie war. The Berliet factories were established in 1919 and the railway depot and
marshalling yards started the year after. Berliet has since been taken over by Renault,
but despite the firm's financial difficulties, Vénissieux remains France's centre of
production of heavy goods vehicles. More recently the commune has gained notoriety
from the Minguettes estate built on a hill to the south-west of the old . town centre
between 1967 and 1975, a veritable high rise new town comprising 9,000 dwellings
in slab and tower blocks. Its social and physical problems have become the cause of
concern at national level and action is being taken to improve the estate, not least by
demolishing some of the tower blocks. The old centre meanwhile languished,
although it was always intended that the central area should be redeveloped as a
counterpart to the Minguettes development.
Vénissieux has recently completed for itself an imposing new town hail as an
expression of civic pride and has a staff of some I ,000 technical and administrative
officers. Its Sixth Directorate is a department that combines both economic
development activities with town planning and its stated objective is to expedite the
increase of the commune's employment and tax base (Fischer, personal
communication). In spite of strong political will and a commitment in principle to
undertake its own processing of planning applications, the lack of computerisation
and the lack of staff (the commune has committed itself also to not increasing staff
abovo 1,800) have so far prevented them doing so.
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6.512	 The Site
The site of the development which forms this case study lies to the south of
the church and forms the inner side of the semi-circular rue du Château which marks
the line of the ancient fortifications of the old town of Vénissieux. The church is late
19th century and the northern half of the line of fortifications was presumably lost
when place Leon-Sublet was created, presumably again, at the end of the last century.
The aerial photograph taken before the site was cleared shows tight terraces of houses
in a simple rural style with shallow pitched roofs clad in Roman pantiles. A few of
these on the south side of the rue du Château are to be retained in the redevelopment,
but the site between the church and the street has been entirely cleared. Immediately
adjoining the case study site to the west is an area destined for car parking with
access from place Leon-Sublet in front of the west end of the church.
6.5 13	 The planning context
The planning context for the site is created by the PAZ of the ZAC approved
formally in 1982. The area of the ZAC extends from the south side of the church to
rue Jean-Mace which is being realigned, and westwards from the rue du Château
beyond rue Gambetta to the line of a new road which would divert through traffic
from the narrow rue Gambetta and its northward continuation avenue Jean-Jaurès.
The ZAC proposes that rue du Château becomes pedestrianised with car access and
a parking space at its west end, and that a new pedestrian way should be created
southwards from rue du Château to join Jean-Mace and provide a pedestrian link
between place Leon-Sublet and the new town hall in avenue Oschatz.
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6.5 14	 The participants in the process
The actors in the case include STOK-France, the developer, whose major
interests are in building individual houses at the lower end of the market. Their
operations are described in more detail in case study 6.4 The anzénageur, SERL, is
also a key actor. In terms of their role in providing the infrastructure for the ZAC
they may be compared with the private firm Décines-Immobilier laying out the
l&tissement at Vernaison (case study 6.2) or the ZAC de Bonneveau at Décines-
Charpieu (case study 6.3), but their scale of operations and their method of control
i rather different. SERL is a mixed economy company which means that it contains
both private and public sector elements elected representatives are members of its
board, but it is independent of local authorities. SERL acts however on behalf of
local authorities and since the 1960s when it was founded has been responsible for
many major building projects in COURLY, not least the construction of Les
Minguettes at Vénissieux itself (SERL, publicity material).
On the side of the public authorities are the mayor of Vénissieux, M. Germ,
and his deputy with responsibility for planning, M. Fischer; the commune has been
communist controlled since 1935 (Fischer, personal communication) and its leaders
have a declared policy of public involvement in decision making. Officers of
COURLY and of the Agence d'urbanisme provided the technical expertise; the PAZ
was of course prepared by the Agence and their conception of how it was to be
implemented in detail was important in the process.
6.52	 Stages in Development
6.521	 Defining the ZAC 1970 - 1980
The strategy for the Lyon region contained in the SDAU projected among
other things "a strong axis of growth' comprising 15,000-20,000 dwellings to be built
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in Vénissieux and in the communes immediately to the south, Corbas, Feyzin and
Mions. This in turn was seen as creating the need for a major intermediate centre at
Yenissieux served by high speed roads and a metro. During the 1970's it became
clear that the ambitions of the SDAU were unlikely to be realised. The Minguettes
estate, destined to be only the first place of the urbanisation, was the only part of the
strategy implemented. The road network envisaged in the SDAU has been
substantially reduced. The metro line D linking Gorge de Loup and Vénissieux was
only started in 1985 and will stop short of the town centre at the gare de Yénissieux
in the north of the commune. The restructuring of the town centre went into
abeyance. By 1979 COURLY and the commune of Vénissieux recognised the need
for a new set of objectives for the town centre. The Agence d'urbanisme undertook
preliminary studies and a boundary for a ZAC was defined and approved by
COURLY in 1980 and SERL appointed as the developing agency (SERL, 1986).
6.522	 The preparation of the PAZ and tile implementation of the plan 1980-
1985
The objectives of the PAZ lay heavy emphasis on the continuity of the past
and present. Thus the line of the rue du Chiteau is retained and some of the older
buildings are identified for rehabilitation. The PAZ identifies both old and new
buildings in a relatively schematic way. A second objective was to provide public
facilities that would enliven the centre and as a result encourage private sector
development elsewhere in the town (SERL, 1986). The general desire on the part of
the commune for the involvement of the public took the form of a well-attended
public meeting in 1982 (Fischer, personal communication).
In spite of tile new optimism and the relatively modest scale of operation,
progress appears to have been slow. The first development of 25 dwellings, was not
started until 1985, and one interviewee contrasted tile progress made on the
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Minguettes estate in the 1960s where 9,000 dwellings were completed in 10 years
with the ZAC due Vieux Bourg where SERL would be lucky to complete 50 a year
(Kobialka, personal communication). The 25 dwellings consisted of eight flats for
rent above shops, seven rehabilitated houses and ten houses for sale that are the
subject of this case study, all on rue du Château. At the same time an old peoples'
home and an administrative block comprising the post office, local tax office, and
offices and workshops was started fronting the new pedestrian way being created
from rue du Château to rue Jean-Mace.
6.523	 The STOK-France development in rue du Chñteau: initiation of the
scheme in early 1985
For the site to the north of rue du Château SERL turned to STOK-France as
a developer with experience of low-cost housing for sale: the houses were to be sold
under the subsidised préts a l'accession a Ia propriëlé loan scheme (prêts PAP). A
first project was produced to designs by an architect proposed by SERL that clearly
pieaseu no one very much. STOK-France described the scheme as 'rather strange"
(Payet, personal communication) and its apparently modernistic appearance was
presumably not seen to be in sympathy with general design objectives of the PAZ.
The major reason for rethinking the project, however, was STOK-France's insistence
that the houses should have clearly identified and separate front doors and gardens
to the rear, neither of which featured in the first scheme. A new scheme was the
subject of a meeting in the town hail in May and was submitted for planning approval
on 26 June 1985 by the architectural firm SUD.
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6.524	 Determining the Application June-November 1985
The submitted scheme consisted of ten terraced houses of two and three
storeys with pitched roofs, separate doors and gardens to the rear, the whole thus
appearing more traditional than its predecessor and more in accord with STOK-
France's own design preferences as a builder developer of small houses. Various
problems emerged when the scheme was presented.
a) The form and appearance of the scheme. Interviews revealed that the scheme
still did not conform to the conceptions that the actors had for the area. For the
commune of Yénissieux it was evidently more important that the development took
place than that it should be precisely right (Fischer, personal communication) and that
too lavish an attention to detail was inappropriate in an area which, for all that its
street patterns were ancient, had few old buildings and was largely destined to be
redeveloped (Kobialka, personal communication). For the planners, it appeared to
be a less than sensible use of the site given its orientation. They had envisaged a
scheme with front gardens and small cours anglaises at the rear; rear gardens will
largely be in the shadow of the church (Bonacorsi, personal communication). Yet
none of these objections appear to have surfaced in the formal record of negotiations.
b) The relationship of the proposal to the zoning of the PAZ. COURLY's
examination of the scheme suggested that it infringed the limits of open space and car
parking area by 30 per cent. The regulations of the PAZ allowed, however, a certain
flexibility in the extent of the open spaces, and a compromise was reached whereby
STOK-France incorporated an eleventh garage into the scheme to compensate for the
loss of parking space.
c) The relationship of the scheme to the pedestrianised rue du Château. The
scheme would limit the street to five metres at its narrowest point and to six metres
in front of the houses to be rehabilitated, which was regarded as too little. The town
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hall staff at Vénissieux recommended the moving of plots one to four to meet this
objection.
d)	 A right of access to the walls of the church. The commune agreed that plots
nine and ten would have to be modified to allow the right of access (droit d'échelle).
This could be done without any modification to the scheme.
All three problems were resolved at a meeting in late August and a revised
scheme submitted by 6 September. Approval was granted by the mayor on 19
November 1985. The fact that by June 1986 work had not started on site apart from
clearance is no reflection on the planning process. STOK-France maintain that SERL
had implied they owned all the land affected by the proposal, only for it to become
clear later that ownership was divided between SERL, COURLY and two other
owners (Payet, personal communication).
6.53	 Analysis
The significant factor of this case is the role of the PAZ in helping to define
the conditions under which development would be acceptable. Within a ZAG the
PAZ replaces the POS, and therefore like the POS is a legally enforceable document,
carrying with it its own regulations. The focus of the analysis must therefore be on
the application of those regulations and the interest of the actors in the way in which
they were applied.
6.53 1	 Procedure
For a document whose zonings and boundaries have a legal force, the PAZ for
Vieux Bourg is curiously imprecise and is quite clearly intended to be diagrammatic.
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The impression is yet further reinforced by the fact that the regulations allow a
"certain flexibility" in the definition of the open spaces. The impression is reinforced
by the assertion by STOK-France that SERL had suggested they do a project and the
limits of the block would be defined afterwards (Payet, personal communication).
The PAZ was thus being made to operate at two levels; as a document in the
hierarchy of statutory machinery set up by the code de l'u,banisnie and as informal
guidance to the developers being used in negotiations both by the authorities (the
Agence d'urbanisme, the commune of Vénissieux, and COURLY) and by the
arnënagcur, SERL.
The evidence of this case suggests that it operated badly on both counts. It
was manifestly absurd to use the PAZ as a precise definition of boundaries, when the
zonal boundary lines represented several metres width on the plan. At least, however,
the regulations expressed the diagrammatic nature of the plan, and there was no
attempt by the prefect to challenge the legitimacy of the decision, even though the
scheme as approved still exceeded the limits of the zone defined for it in the PAZ.
On the other hand as a diagram, the PAZ did not contain all the constraints that a
future development on the site would have to accommodate. The width of the rue du
Château for example, emerged as a controlling factor as did the right of access to the
rear of the gardens around the church only after the application had been lodged.
Nor was there much guidance on the form of the building except insofar as the PAZ
specified the maximum height of three storeys, though continuity of the urban fabric
was clearly implied in the way in which the plans had been prepared.
Compared with some of the other case studies in this thesis the timescale of
the informal and formal procedure was relatively short; the delays after the
application was granted approval have to do with land ownership and not with
planning control. Yet the five months which it took to process the application could
conceivably have been reduced if the guidance offered at the outset had been clearer.
It is necessary to look at the interests of participants in the process to understand both
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wh y the process took the form that it did.
6.532	 Interests of Participants
The commune of Yénissieux, COURLY and the Agence d'urbanisme were
united in their desire to see development take place in the Vieux Bourg. For
Vénissleux the anxiety over the 'failure' of Les Minguettes and the increasing
rundown appearance of the dreary town centre, made it necessary for there to be
action to restore morale. Vénissieux needed a new image and one that respected
human scale. For the Agence d'urbanisme, a real concern for the quality of the
environment coupled with, perhaps one might infer, a need to maintain face with the
commune, also made the development a necessity. SERL as developers of Les
Minguettes, had perhaps also to win back the commune's confidence by showing they
could carry out attractive development. Moreover to have lured STOK-France away
from its habitual green field sites was considered something of an achievement, for
which a development of houses with gardens was a relatively small price to pay. The
open-endedness of the brief to the developers may reflect a desire not to hamper the
course of development.
There is another possible interpretation of the open-endedness, however.
Given the large number of participants in the process the vagueness of the
information offered to the developer at the outset may reflect a desire on the part of
the technical experts to keep control over the form of the development, through
negotiation. One of the problems of the French system appears to be the way in
which the intentions expressed in the regulations are interpreted in their application.
Permissive regulations which convey discretionary powers give, particularly to
members of the Agence d'urbanisme, a greater control over the process. The zone in
the PAZ was to be interpreted as "espace préférentiel" (the preferred area) and the
important thing was to be a "rapport d'échelle' (a relationship of scale) and not a
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"rapport géometrique' (a geometric relationship) between the scheme and the
buildings opposite (Bonacorsi, personal communication) which was to be determined
during discussions with the developer.
STOK-France were clearly well placed to insist on a scheme of the type with
which they were familiar. Presumably locating in the centre of Vénissieux was a
sufficient act of faith on their part for them not to wish to try an innovative house
form or layout that they could not be sure of selling. They were in a stronger position
to reject the first scheme prepared by the architect suggested by SERL because none
of the other participants appeared to be attracted to it either. They would
naturally wish to push the flexibility of the zoning to its utmost to achieve the kind
of layout that was closest to the type they were most used to building.
6.533	 Conclusions
This case illustrates the kind of fetters that a regulatory system of planning
appears to impose on those who are concerned with the promotion and control of
development. The PAZ clearly recognises the inadequacy of legal precision in coping
with a complex programme of reconstruction and rehabilitation. Yet in the absence
of formal rules, there seems to be a hesitation in preparing policy guidance in terms
of performance criteria in isolation from specific design solutions. The appointment
of a consultant architect for the ZAC is perhaps a measure of the uncertainty,
although his existence did not appear to have been significant in resolving the
difficulties in this case.
If the departure from strict zoning and legally enforceable regulations leaves
a vacuum in the planners' armoury of policy documents it creates a problem, too, in
the accountability of decision-making. With the POS and PAZ expressed in clear
terms, the decision-makers are accountable before the law for the development
'1
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control decisions they take. Where the regulations permit discretion, the pattern of
accountability is immediately lost; power rests with whoever has control over
negotiation with the developer, and there is little redress against the exercise of that
power. The appointment of an independent expert in the form of the consultant
architect may of course be interpreted as a recognition of that fact. The planner
concerned specifically alluded to the need to share responsibility as a reason for his
appointment (Bonacorsi, personal communication).
The effect of appointing outside experts may indeed be to help individuals
within (lie system being subjected to all the odium in the event of difficulty, but it
can hardly be said to have increased accountability, and it certainly did increase the
number of participants in the process. Indeed the case also demonstrates how the
numbers of different organisations involved in such development may make the
process unnecessarily complex for a developer. The complexity in its turn is a
reflection of the relative weakness of the communes, and their need to turn to outside
organisations for professional and technical advice The commune of Yénissieux may
feel that in the past they have been too dominated by COURLY and SERL (Fischer,
personal communication), but practically they have had little option but to seek such
help to carry out their policies for the town. This multiplicity of organisations must
be yet another brake on the effectiveness of the system.
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Figure 6.51	 Commune of Vénissieux: location map
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Figure 6.52	 Rue du Château: location map
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6.6	 Transports Griset Vernaisoii
	
6.61	 Introduction
This case concerns the extension to an existing road hau'age depot in the
commune of Vernaison in the south-west of COURLY. The firm :ad been set up
shortly after the end of the war 1: ,,' 986 was a thrivIng business run by the son
of the founder with a second de.t i: - :.'th--western France. The particular interest
that this case presents is that th depot lies in a semi-residential, semi-
agricultural part of Vernaison where there is no intention to allow further commercial
or industrial development; in British terms the case is one of a non-conforming user
with established use rights. The questions of whether to allow the extension, whether
the extension would increase the impact of the company on its surroundings, and of
what the balance of advantage for the public interest might be make this case a classic
one, heightened by the vigorous opposition of local residents. The underlying issues
are, therefore, how the zoning regulations cope with the exception to the general rule
and how the French development control system deals with objectors.
The facts of the case in detail have been the subject of some squabbling
among the participants, although in essence the history is simple enough. M. Griset
père had set up the bi'siness ii 1948, since when it had expanded oi t:iee occasions:
in 1953 with adciic z a v rkiop; in 1978 with an office building and ipot with
trading bays and IY5 wit!' oubli:ig of the 1978 depot by the additicn cf 1,959
square metres and he creation of a parking area for lorries for which further land
had been bought. The local residents claimed there were six, not three, extensions.
They regarded the early development of the site in the early 1950s as comprising two
phases; they took the office and the depot of 1978 as two separate stages, and the
most recent expansion as likewise consisting of separate parts. Certainly the
application for the extension to the depot in 1985 was followed by a separate
application in January 1986 for the laying out of an extensive parking area. However
the stages of development are recorded, there is no disagreement that whereas in 1948
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the business was a little family enterprise run by the older M. Griset with two lorries,
by 1986 it was a major employer in the commune with a staff of some 200 and 150
heavy goods vehicles The two most recent applications were those that were studied
for this thesis. By June 1986 work had been completed on the buildings, the parking
area and the boundary work was still incomplete.
6.611	 Vernaison - Le Pellet
The commune of Vernaison has been described in the case study of Le Soleil
levant in section 6.2
The hamlet of Le Pellet lies west and slightly north of Vernaison centre and
is an area ol scattered housing that extends into Charly. The chemin du Pellet on
which the Onset premises are situated form the boundary between the two
communes. Behind the frontage developnient cherry orchards clad the pleasant
rolling hills. All the roads in the area are narrow, and houses are all individually built
and of various ages.
6.612	 Participa'is in the process
The principal actors in the case are limited. There is M. Griset , son of the
founder of the firm; there is the mayor of Vernaison, Dupré-Latour. COURLY and
the Agence d'urbanisme play virtually no role in the decision. Then there is the
Association pour le respect de l'environnement et des residents du Pellet, the local
residents' and amenity association, whose role is of particular interest in this case.
Finally, the Service des contentieux at the Prefecture plays a long-stop role as
mediator in the dispute that ensued between Griset and the residents. In May 1986
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the dispute had not been resolved, although there was by then no longer any
possibility of the permission being revoked or annulled.
6.6 13	 The planning context
The planning context of the case is defined for the POS for the south-west
sector of COURLY approved in 1982, which defined the whole of Le Pellet as a zone
UDC: "a zone of detached housing in which low density collective housing may
nevertheless be permitted in certain sectors". The general presumption is against other
types of development. Article 2, however, allows for certain exceptions to the general
presumption against non-residential use of which the following is relevant:
"tile extension, or transformation or reconstruction of industrial or
craft enterprises may be permitted on the following conditions
-	 that the y are accompanied by a reduction of the danger,
the inconvenience or the unhealthiness of an enterprise;
-	 that they do not exacerbate tile general conditions of
tile location of tile enterprise in tile environment.
(Agence d'urbanisme, 1982: Reglenient p. 121)
A regulation of this kind clearly leaves room for different interpretations. It is also
singularly devoid of criteria by which the level of nuisance might be measured.
6.62	 Stages in Development
6.621	 Determining the application: February - May 1985: the official
process
There was no evidence on file of preliminary discussions between the
applicant and his agent and COURLY and the Agence d'urbanisme. If such
discussions took place, as is likely, they have little bearing on the course of the case.
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The more important part of the process starts after the submission of the application
on 11 March 1985. The processing initially appears to have been rapid: comments
from the official committees were received by the beginning of May. Four minor
problems were identified:
a)	 Article 7 of the regulations for zones UDC. The building exceeded the
maximum height of 3.5 metres allowed by the regulations, because of the fall of the
ground away from the front of the site. In the permission as granted, the
infringement appears to have been regarded as a necessary 'minor adaptation' caused
by the topography and acceptable by virtue of Art. L 123-1 which whjle forbidding
major departures allows for some flexibility in specific cases.
b) The planting and landscaping of the site. The Agence d'urbanisme and
COURLY clearly agreed on the need for the laying out of the green space and the
planting of a boundary screen of trees. These were translated into conditions on the
permission requiring the banks and parking areas to be planted and trees of
"minimum height of 1.2 metres to be planted at 80 centimetre intervals around the
boundary.
c) The la yout of the parking areas. The applicant was required to submit further
details of the parking layout.
d) The treatment of waste water. A condition was imposed on the permission
requiring the separation of oil wastes from the waste water from the working bay.
The applicant was forced to accept these conditions, but did so unwillingly
and had not, by May 1986, implemented the condition on tree planting, arguing that
80 centimetres was too close for planting.
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6.622	 Determining the applicalion. May - July 1985: the intervention of the
residents
Given that the official processing of the application was complete by mid-
May, there was no good reason for the application not to have been determined
within three months of receipt. However the first signs of organised opposition
emerge in May also, with the sending of a partition signed by 96 people (of whom
several were members of the same family) to the mayor. But it seems fairly clear
that conflict between the Griset firm and local residents is longstanding and the
clashes as much at the level of personality as of genuine environmental concern. The
deputy mayor talked of vieilles hisloires; the residents themselves complained that
night working had disturbed their peace for three or possibly five years. Perhaps on
the advice of others, the residents formed themselves into an amenity society to be
known as the Association pour le respect de l'environnement et des residents du
Pellet (ARERP), depositing the statutes of association at the prefecture on 12 June
1985 with a membership of 35. By virtue of being formally registered, ARERP had
gained the legal right to make representations against the eventual decision on the
application.
Presumably the delay in determining the application results from the
determined lobbying of ARERP, who besides the petition to the mayor, according to
their own evidence, had approached the President of the Republic, the Minister of
the Environment, and the prefect. There is no evidence as to the nature of the
discussions that may have taken place during the period, except through the oblique
references at interviews. The only written record of this period is contained in
letters sent by ARERP to the mayor and councillors of Yernaison on 17 January
1986, and the Service de l'Amenagement urbain on 10 March 1986. The factors that
appear to have been decisive in this period were; the long establishment of the firm
on its present site; Griset's need to expand to ensure there was no fall in his receipts;
the cost to Griset of moving his enterprise elsewhere; and the lack of available
287
alternative sites within the commune of Vernaison. The application was granted
permission on 9 July 1985, and therefore still within the four month period which is
allowed for processing of applications for commercial and industrial development by
Art. R421-18.
6.623	 implementing the permission: July 1985 - May 1986: the conflict
continued
Between the grant of permission and the date of research, action appears to
have been pursued by ARERP on three fronts. Firstly, they appealed to the tribunal
adniinistratif for an annulment of the permission. Secondly, they sought a
prefectural decree to limit the nuisance caused by the 24 hour working, the bright
lighting of the site and the noise. Thirdly, they complained that the work had not
been carried in accordance with the permission and that therefore a certificate of
conformity should not be issued.
a) Appeal to the tribunal adniinistratif. The history of the appeal is short. It
was not allowed to proceed because of faulty drafting (vice de forme): ARERP had
not it seems made reference to a deliberation of the council of the association which
was necessary for the appeal to be legally valid.
b) The prefectoral decree. ARERP claim that their first approach to the prefect
went without response and that it was only after writing to the Minister of the
Environment that the prefect did finally respond. The action, it should be noted,
was not carried out within the framework of the code de l'urbanisme, but under the
law of nuisance and resulted in decree being issued on 10 April 1986. ARERP
claimed that the decree had not been respected by Griset in the two months
following.
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c) The non-conformity of the scheme with the permission. As well as arguing for
a formal review of the activities of the company the residents were also concerned
that the development did not conform to the application drawings. There were two
particular areas of non-compliance: that some of the loading bays and parking places
to the rear of the building had been suppressed and that the vehicule washing bay
was incorrectly located. Of the two, even ARERP accepted that the first was no
more than minor infringement which had little impact on the acceptability of the
project'. The second was more serious: the washing bay had been placed close to the
boundary of the Griset site backing onto the garden of the secretary of ARERP,
Mme. Desbos. She complained of the spray and of the noise when the machine was
in Operation.
At the time of the investigation the case was far from closed, although Griset
had received his permissions for the extensions which were effectively beyond
challenge. In early June a conciliation meeting was held at the prefecture to try and
sort out the differences between the various parties.
6.63	 Analysis
There are several points of interest to emerge from this case history. In terms
of procedure, the value of the zoning regulations in determining the exception to the
general rule must be considered. We need also to look at the extent to which the
residents found it easy to make their views known and influence the decision-making
process. In terms of interest groups, there are several issues that must be addressed.
Apart from the general question of what interest each of the actors had in the
outcome, the relationship of the technical officers to the mayor of Vernaison and his
deputy is one such issue. Another is the perceptions that the principal actors had of
ARERP and ARERP had of the system with which they were obliged to treat.
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6.631	 Procedure
Procedurally this case is straight forward. Its most striking feature is the fact
the POS and its regulations offered little guidance for the decision that had to be
taken, and in the absence of such clear guidance, the application appears to have
been seen as hard to resist. Nevertheless it is surprising that there was no apparent
discussion of whether the new extension and the car park would in fact adversely
affect the environment for residents. ARERP for example considered it very strange
that the road engineers had not objected, given the narrowness of the chemin du
Pellet, with the implication that money had changed hands. Nothing, çf course, was
present in the evidence to confirm such an assertion. This case would suggest,
however, that in the lack of firm legal guidance, decisions are left prey to
expediency; the concept of policy beyond the regulations appears to be absent.
It must be added that it was no part of the investigation to consider whether
conditions really were worse in 1986 after the development was complete, than they
had been in 1985. Indeed the more significant extension of activity may have
occurred in 1978 with the creation of the offices and the first stage of modern
loading bays. Moreover, part of the problem appears to have been one of increased
intensity of use of the existing buildings: the continuous working, with the resulting
noise and disturbance from bright lights predates the latest extension.
ARERP's intervention in the process can be seen as occurring in two stages.
There is first of all the informal lobbying that occurred before the permission was
granted, which started before the association was formally constituted. The residents
were alerted to the application for the extension by the large display panel that Griset
erected at the front of his site. From Griset's point of view this might be said to
have been tactically unwise, given that the only other way that residents would have
known about the application would have been if they had regularly consulted the
applications lodged at the town hail. The effect of the petition was not to alter the
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decision taken, but at least, so it would appear, to delay the grant of permission.
The second stage was only possible after the granting of permission when the
decision could be challenged in the tribunal adnzinistratif. But, as we have seen, the
technicalities of the appeal procedure defeated ARERP, in spite of the help they
received from the Service des contentieux. Nevertheless, as a result of considerable
persistence on their part, they did finally persuade the prefect to issue a decree
limiting the nuisance that the depot caused. Possibly the challenge under the law of
nuisance was bound to be more fruitful than opposing the planning permission.
Nevertheless on each count they were forced into responding to a fait accompli.
A final point to note is that whereas in comparison to some of the other cases
studied for this thesis, the procedure in this case appears relatively 'light' and
relatively swift. Yet for M. Griset, it was neither. He complained of the
bureaucracy and of the inappropriate conditions imposed on his permission, all of
which, he argued, conspired to make his task of staying in business even more
difficult.
6.632	 Interests of par1icipai1s
The mayor's balance of interest in this case is clear. Certainly an approval of
the extension led to the vociferous opposition of the residents, and therefore to an
electoral disadvantage, but the increased tax base was clearl y of greater value and
conversely the loss of a commercial establishment in a commune which has little
other industry, should Griset have chosen to move, would have been disastrous.
Griset was therefore in a strong position to propose what in effect were conflicting
arguments: that on the one hand moving from the present site was too costly to
countenance, and on the other, that if he was not granted permission to extend he
would have to move. The threat to move was too serious to be taken lightly.
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More problematic was the role of GOURLY and the Agence d'urbanisme,
whose response to the proposal appears muted. Several interpretations are possible.
The first might be that the proposal did not fall neatly into any given category of
uniformity or infringement of the regulations. Whatever decision was taken
therefore did not threaten the substance of the POS, and the POS had little bearing
on the decision. Neither COURLY nor the Agence needed to feel too concerned
about the outcome. Another might be that because the case had little urban design
significance the Agence took less interest in the case's outcome. A third
interpretation could be that both COURLY and the Agence have an interest in
retaining the mayor's goodwill without which the ability to propose policy which is
acceptable is severely hampered. The technical officers, therefore, distanced
themselves from the decision-making, perhaps because of their lack of interest in the
matter to be decided, or perhaps because of their interest in not interfering in the
process when the issues at stake were purely local to the commune.
The residents were not able to rely on the mayor in his traditional role of
protector of his people. They perhaps correctly perceived their interest in
circumventing the local network by appealing ever higher up the hierarchy, and
ludicrous though writing to the President of the Republic may appear to have been,
they claim that only when they had written to Paris did they get action from the
prefect to resolve the question of nuisance. They also correctly perceived that it was
to their advantage to form themselves into an amenity society, and thereby give
themselves legal status in the opposition to Griset.
6.633	 Conclusions
The elements of this particular case are curiously familiar: a determined
operator who needs to expand to stay in business; elected representatives determined
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not to lose an important commercial asset; residents adversely affected and
vociferously promoting a campaign against the development. Several significant
points emerge, however.
Firstly, the POS appears to offer no security in this case: the decision was
taken primarily in terms of expediency; the freedom to interpret the regulations that
the articles of the regulation permitted does not appear to have been used to make an
assessment of the environmental impact of the scheme. Secondly, because the
regulations were not materially infringed by the decision, or the POS undermined,
technical guidance did not focus on whether the scheme was acceptable or not, but
on how the outcome should be implemented and the conditions that would be
necessary to impose on the eventual permission. Thirdly, the residents found the
cards stacked very heavily against them in trying to oppose the development on
planning grounds, and their recourse to the law was foiled on technical grounds that
might prove to be a pitfall for any group in ARERP's position. Indeed, they were
only able to make any headway under the law of nuisance and that only with
difficulty. Finally, in spite of ARERP's forming itself into a properly constituted
body, the opposition could nevertheless be presented by the elected representatives
and the technical officers alike, as no more than a neighbourhood dispute which
carried no important point of principle. It was in the interests of the mayor and the
officers of COURLY to do so, of course; but the case does highlight the way in
which French planning law deals with objectors solely in terms of private property
interests.
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Figure 6.62
	 POS for the south-western sector of COURLY showing Transports
Griset
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Those who argue that decentralisation is the first step towards total anarchy
might wish to cite this case in evidence. For the mayor was able to exercise wide
discretion in the decision, and the accountability for that decision was far from clear.
It is perhaps more to the point to note that in the absence of clear guidance in the
POS, the system appears to afford little redress for those who feel threatened by the
decision taken. Even if ARERP's appeal to the tribunal adminisiratif had not been
faulted on a technicality, it is doubtful whether they would. have been able to oppose
Griset successfully given the open-ended nature of the regulation. Thirdly, the fact
that the technical services act as agents for, and are not directly employed by the
commune, appears to make it possible for them to withdraw, for whatever reasons,
from the responsibility for the ultimate decision. Yet it could be argued, that
technical advice is needed precisely when, in such cases, a mayor is faced by a
problem that is inevitably clouded by his own direct involvement in the affairs of
the commune.
6.7	 Current Cases
6.71	 Introduction
The three case studies incorporated in this section were all in the process of
being determined at the time of' the empirical survey undertaken for this thesis.
They are presented together because they are significant primarily in terms of the
pre-application negotiations that appear to be an essential feature of the French
development control system. They are also revealing of the extent of the power of
elected representatives in the process, in one case by the references made to the
mayor in absentia. Unlike the previous case studies, none of these development
proposals contained a major difficulty, although there was some discussion about the
interpretation of the regulations in one of them. Two of the cases are revealing of
the use that is made of the consultation prëalable in the commune of Lyon itself,
which seems to formalise the informal procedure and bring together technical advice
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and political input from the deputy mayor responsible for planning, Moulinier. It
also allows applicants direct access to the decision-makers.
6.72	 Place de Ia Reconnaissance: L yon 3ème Montchat
The development proposal consisted of a block of 20 flats over shops at the
corner of rue Bonnand and cours Richard-Vitton very close to the boundary of Lyon
and Villeurbanne at Maisons-Neuves. The developer was the small firm SOGERIM
(Société générale des Etudes et Réalisations inimobilières) whose main activity is in
the field of social housing for sale under the préts PAP loan scheme. The architects
for the scheme were the local firm, Sagnard, Ballandras, Mirabeau. The development
fell within part of the zone URM of the POS for Lyon where a continuous street
frontage is required. It is perhaps interesting to note that the architects were not
simply acting as agents for the developers, but took a key role in the development
process. The architects had themselves found the site and had interested SOGERIM
with whom they had already undertaken three previous projects. The architects
claim that the decision to develop is often taken in the light of urban design
considerations. They had, for example, considered buying three more parcels in
cours Richard-Vitton, but the unwillingness of one of the owners to sell would have
resulted in that plot being sandwiched between the proposed development and an
existing building. The architects had therefore not proceeded to purchase the other
two, and preferred to wait to see the three plots developed together.
M. Ballandras, the partner in charge of the project had asked for the meeting
with the consultation préalable because of a desire to ensure that all difficulties were
resolved before the application was lodged. The scheme had not been seen before,
and the architects came with two alternative design solutions. The first of these
proposed a frontage simply onto rue Bonnand and left an empty corner above the
ground floor shops. The second proposed a frontage that returned around the corner
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to provide an elevation to cours Richard-Vitton. Unsurprisingly the consultant-
architect and the deputy mayor favoured the second solution, but this had been the
intention: the architects also favoured the solution, which would be somewhat more
costly to build, and needed the decision of the consultation advice to exert leverage
on SOGERIM.
Only two other points retained the attention of those present at the
consultation: the provision of adequate car parking at one or two places for dwellings
(Art. URM 12), not indicated on the plan and the small open space at the rear
optimistically labelled 'terrasse' (terrace) on the plans but as the note of the meeting
recorded could only properly be considered as a "courette" (liitle court). The
architects were, however, encouraged to proceed with the formal submission.
6.73	 23-27 Boulevard de Ia Croix-Rousse: L yon 4ème Croix-Rousse
This case consisted of a proposal to develop the site of a large 19th century
villa in Croix-Rousse as a residential home for the elderly, providing medical and
residential care. The proposal was a sophisticated solution in that it retained the
existing villa as a day centre and installed a new block at right-angles to the street
which gradually increased in height away from the street. This not only allowed the
surroundings of the existing building to be retained, but also created a relationship
with a development proposal for the adjoining site, 2 1-23 boulevard de Ia Croix-
Rousse, which had been approved but not iriiplemented at the time of the study.
The developer was a charitable, religious organisation, the Association des
Antis des Ouvres protestantes (AOP) who had already developed ote such centre in
Lyon. The architects for the scheme Mortamet, Vidal, Manhès are a Lyon-based
practice whose working area covers the RhOne-Alpes region and are specialists in
hospital design. The development proposal fell within a zone URM of the POS of
11
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Lyon where no indication is given of continuous or discontinuous frontages in new
development. The block in which 23-27 boulevard de Ia Croix-Rousse is situated is
indeed already mixed. Along the boulevard with its double row of chestnuts are the
large villas of the 19th century, but to the rear is rather more modest terraced
housing. Though much work had still to be done on the financing of the prOject, in
seeking the Ministry of Health approval and in reaching agreement on a contract to
sell with the two owners of the site, the architect was seeking preliminary approval
from the consultation prëalable to smooth the path to the eventual submission of an
application for permission to build.
The scheme was sophisticated not only in its handling of a constrained site
but in its approach to tactics. M. Manhès, the partner in charge of the project,
believed that retaining the existing villa would provide a good environment for the
elderly residents, and was a sensible use of resources given the villa was still in good
condition. But there was a tactical advantage in that next door to the site lived the
president of the local residents' association who had objected vociferously to the
proposal to demolish no. 21 boulevard de Ia Croix-Rousse. The scheme was therefore
likely to satisfy residents' objections which might weigh with elected representatives.
A further tactical advantage was sought by offering an option on the use of flat or
pitched roofs on the scheme: and a model was presented with detachable roofs. It
was perhaps hardly surprising in these circumstances that those present at the
consultation gave their blessing to the scheme subject only to the planting of trees to
replace those that would be lost in the development, and the making of a clear
distinction between old and new in the connecting block.
300
6.74	 Lotissement Avenue Victor Hu go/Chemin des Contamines Rillieux-
Ia- Pa
The development proposed in this case was for a lotisserneni on NA zoned
land in the northern suburb of Rillieux, consisting of lots for grouped and semi-
detached houses and was therefore in general accord with the POS regulations which
permitted grouped, semi-detached or detached houses in that zone. The scheme was
being discussed at an informal meeting with officers of COURLY and the Agence
d'urbanisme on 19 June before the submission of an application for permission to
develop. Though the scheme was broadly acceptable, a number of problems were
identified.
a) The provision of open space. The POS regulations required 15 per cent of the
area to be devoted to green space and there was argument as to whether that had
been achieved. The architect argued that including the little cul-de-sac turning
heads ("placettes) and a strip of land in the ownership of COURLY which was
agreed to be essential to the successful development of the site the total was 18 per
cent. The officers of COURLY argued that the COURLY land could not formally
be part of the application for permission to develop and that turning heads were not
what was intended as open space by the regulations.
b) Pedestrian routes. The representative of the Agence d'urbanisme asked for
a proper consideration of pedestrian ways through the site.
c) The cession of the COURLY land. As noted above, the strip of land to the
north of the site was considered essential to the scheme, and much discussion centred
on how the cession was to be achieved. No one at the meeting objected to the
principle, but the process was not made clear until near the end. Officers of
COURLY's Service foncier, responsible for COURLY's landholdings, suggested that
it would require a decision of council backed by ministerial approval, both of which
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would depend on the agreement in principle of the mayor of Rillieux to the scheme.
d) Problems with semi-detached houses. Some considerable time was spent
discussing whether the implementation of the block plan would be possible,
particularly for houses drawn as being linked by garages. The officers expressed
concern that it would be difficult to prevent abuses of the scheme when individual
purchasers built houses. The possibility of co-ownership was voiced as a means of
solving the problem, but no resolution was reached.
e) The altitude of the mayor. Throughout the discussions, the attitude of the
mayor was evoked as an important criterion in the decision-making process, although
no one present was able to say what his attitude would be. A DDE representative
suggested by analogy with a scheme outside COURLY, that the overall appearance
of a scheme and its relationship to its surroundings was likely to be more important
to the mayor than a strict adherence to the letter of the regulations. The architect
proposed a site visit to a scheme at Marcy l'Etoile on the western edge of COURLY
which might help convince the elected representatives of the appropriateness of the
scheme.
By the end of the meeting a procedure had been established for the follow-
ing stages. First of all the architect was to discuss with the representative of the
Agence d'urbanisme the question of pedestrian routes and open space. This would
then lead to preliminary discussions with the mayor of Rillieux. Assuming that the
mayor was in favour of the proposal, the question of the land in the ownership of
COURLY would be resolved.
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6.75	 Discussion
The three cases make explicit the role of informal negotiations in the French
development control process, but also highlight differences in procedure and the
exercise of authority in different communes. The consuliation prOalable offered clear
advantages to the architects of the Croix-Rousse and Montchat schemes because they
were able to tap both technical expertise and an expression of political will at the
same time. It was therefore shortcutting the lengthier process that faced the architect
of the lotissenient at Rillleux, who evidently feared that he would spend much time
being shunted between officers and elected representatives. The consultation also
served an important role in giving th officers a clear political lead. Yet it says
much, both about the nature of the system and the desire of the elected
representatives of Lyon to keep control over decisions on developments that the
consultation took place with the architecte-conseil. It appears to suggest a desire on
the part of the commune's representatives to remain aloof from the traditional
bureaucracy by seeking outside independent advice to temper the recommendations
provided internally.
The commune of Lyon may feel that they exercise control more decisively if
the process is formalized by a monthly session in this way. The power of the mayor
of Rillieux was apparently as important to the process of approving the lot issernent,
however, and the constant references to the mayor at the meeting of 19 June cannot
be understood in the same light as a planning officer's reference to the planning
committee in Great Britain, as an appeal to higher authority to boost the advice being
offered. The uncertainty as to the likely reaction appears genuine. The absence of
knowledge, however, gave the officers of COURLY and the Agence d'urbanisme an
important power: they could be seen to be mediating the proposal to the mayor,
important as both a means of maintaining their standing with the commune and as a
means of keeping control of the process. The control over the informal process that
these meetings represent therefore also represents the key to the decision-making
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power within the system. Indeed it might be argued that a powerful commune like
Lyon has much to gain by using a formally constituted consultatioiz than a smaller
commune where power is more effectively wielded in the traditional manner,which
nevertheless leaves the officers more scope to control the outcome.
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	 Boulevard de Ia Croix-Rousse: location map
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Figure 6.75
	 Boulevard de la Croix-Rousse looking east entry to no. 25
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Figure 6.76
	 Boulevard de la Croix-Rousse looking west entry to no. 27
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Figure 6.77	 Commune of Rillieux-la-Pape: location map
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7.	 CONCLUSIONS
	
7.1	 French Plannin g Machiner y : The Effects of a Codified Plannin g System
At the beginning of this thesis there appeared to be four principal questions
to be asked about the French development control system and its relationship with
the system of forward planning. Three of these concerned the direct capability to
plan within the given framework of the system, and the impact of the system on its
users; the fourth had to do with the impact of the decentralisation of powers on the
operation of the system. Within these four questions, however, was to be found a
broader series of issues that had to do principally with the nature and availability of
discretion, the accountability of those with the power to take decisions and the
concept of certainty. The analysis that follows attempts to draw together the findings
of the empirical research in a way which cuts across these distinctions. Firstly, it
concentrates on the mechanics of the system itself: the effect of the procedures on
the ability to formulate and implement policy and the impact of the procedures on
those who treat with the system. Secondly, it looks at the location of the power to
take decisions, the relative importance of the different actors, and the degree to
which they can be held accountable for their decisions. Within the context of these
two broad areas it is possible to draw some conclusions about the impact of a
regulatory system of law on the practice of town planning and about the effects of
decent ra lisa t ion.
	
7.11	 The Regulations: Certaint y , S peed and Flexibility
Perhaps the most striking point to emerge from this study is that zoning and
regulations contained in a POS do not appear to confer a greater degree of certainty
on an inherently uncertain process than does a system of indicative plans and wide
discretionary powers.	 Everywhere there was a general question of how the
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regulations might be interpreted in a given instance. Leaving aside the wider issues
of discretionary power and the exercise of judgement, the drafting of the regulations
was itself such as to leave doubt, not simply room for manoeuvre as to how they
should be applied in specific circumstances. Such was the argument put forward in
part in relation to the espaces boisés classes (classified woodland), although there was
possibly a measure of special pleading here. Such, too, nationally, has been the
problem with the rule of construclahilité limitée (contained development).
The complexity and opacity of the regulations in the national code is one
thing; it might be thought reasonable to expect locally determined regulations to be
freer of confusion. The essence of this study suggests otherwise, however. Five
specific problems arise in the case studies that manage to undermine the certainty of
the plans.
a) The problem of zone boundaries: Vénissieux (case 6.5). The problem with
STOK-France's development was whether or not it fell within the zone defined in
the PAZ of the ZAC du Vieux Bourg. The planner involved with the case pointed
out the absurdity of using the zonal boundaries shown as strict limits given that the
line itself was several metres thick. In the absence of precise guidelines, the
developer was unsure as to how best to proceed and the scheme was delayed.
b) The problem of 1/ic non-conforming use: Transports Onset (case 6.6). This
case reveals the weakness of exclusive zonings if exceptions have to be made. The
regulations for residential areas in the POS had perforce to make an exception for
existing commercial users, and used impact criteria, couched in the most general
terms, as the basis in which decisions would be taken. There were no firm guidelines
which the objectors to the scheme could declare had been infringed. There was no
checklist that would have allowed the professionals to have advised against the
proposal, had they wished to do so. But we should also note that M. Griset felt that
he had not been given that degree of certainty that was necessary for running a
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business.
c) The problem of laud zoned NA, for future development. The uncertainty here
does not specifically relate to the regulations which in the case of both Le Soleil
levant (case 6.2) and Le llameau des cigales (case 6.3) specified the regulations that
would apply if the land were brought forward for development. The uncertainty is
rather a question of what infrastructure would be required to make the development
acceptable; what in other words, the negotiating stakes were likely to be.
d) The problem of regulations overtaken hi' eveuits. At Le Hameau des cigales
(case 6.3), a decision to locate commercial development elsewhere had effectively
undermined the logic of part of the regulations for the site. An insistence on the
letter of the regulations, so it was said, effectively delayed the preliminary
discussions on the development proposal. The uncertainty was generated by the
mismatch between the dogmatism of the rules and the fluidity of the economic
context.
e) The attempt in all the five major cases to trim the rules to fit the exigencies
of 1/ic development b y in effect pleading 1/ic clause in article L123-1 of the code
which allows "minor adaptations". Thus in every case some part of the rules cease to
be absolute limits and become instead the basis for negotiation. This may be
beneficial to the developer and sometimes to the other participants; in the case of
Transports Griset (case 6.6) it undermined residents' confidence in the system.
To these five problem areas must be added a sixth; the ease with which
regulations may be changed by modifications to the plan, as considered by the case
of Le Soleil levant. Certainly the process is less arbitrary and subject of a greater
degree of surveillance than the practice of dErogations which it replaced, but the risk
of minor changes accumulating into a major shift in POS policy must be present.
Worse, it must also erode the confidence which third parties might place in a plan.
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how soon will it be before a mayor seeks, literally, to change the rules?
These six problem areas may also be generalised in another way. Firstly,
there is the question of regulations that do not quite fit the circumstances, the
inevitable and obvious mismatch between the ideal and the real. This is the problem
that we suggested we would be bound to encounter in French development control,
on the basis of a common sense application of experience. There can be no dispute
that both cases at Vernaison could be said to display this problem, as did Les Longs
des feuillus at St.-Priest. But this begs the larger question of the appropriateness of
rule-making to define specific policy which is raised by all the cases studied, and
which brings the argument back to Jowell's analysis of legal control (Jowell, 1973).
We noted earlier that French legal commentators fear the particularisation of
planning. This is in effect the obverse of Jowell's view that rules cope well with
generalised recurrent problems, but were not suited for action that is unique.
Particularism challenges the rules. Making rules for some of the substance of the
decisions that needed to be taken was inappropriate, one might argue, because the
substance did not lend itself to rule-making. There are too many reasons for wanting
to protect woodland, and too many types of woodland to protect, to make the
application of a single set of rules as detailed, and as categorical, easy to apply across
the whole country. The problem of Transports Griset and its impact on the locality
was too specific for rules to help, and the POS could not have specified a
classification.
Secondly, when the certainty of rules becomes a yoke to be shaken off, the
system is bereft of alternative ways of articulating policy. Here the problem is
twofold. The failure to distinguish between policy and law leads to a conceptual
difficulty in framing policy documents. Planners were quite clear, both in the ZAC
du Yieux bourg at Vénissieux and the ZAC de Bonneveau at Décines, that their
proposals in the respective PAZ were to be thought of as a concept, not a
prescription. Yet at Vénissieux the PAZ did not appear to be able to express, and
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certainly did not achieve, the urban design intentions of its creators, while at Décines
a change in the rationale of the original intentions for Le Hameau des cigales
rendered the regulations more or less worthless. The reasons for this conceptual
problem is not that the code constrains the authors of plans to prepare detailed
regulations for a highly articulated series of zones, because it does not: the POS for
example only has to show the distinction between urban and natural zones. Rather
it is a question of a legalistic system generating legalistic thinking. The possibilities
available in the French planning system are demonstrated by the zoning URM in the
POS for Lyon which, as we noted, specifically offers alternatives to be assessed in
relation to particular sites.
The other facet of the absence of alternatives to rules in the French system
is that a departure from a rule-based approach leaves no means of testing policy.
Regulations not meiely create certainty for applicants and third parties, they are the
touchstone, if not the guarantee, for administrative action, even if officials choose to
depart from them. The open-ended policy is productive, we might argue, of an
insecurity in those who operate the system. Significantly, Lyon, with its POS that
does confer discretionary powers, has developed a sort of forum to test policy in the
consultation prëalablc and has thus to some extent gone beyond the problem. The
Lyon experience perhaps suggests an important way forward. As we noted,
architects appear to welcome the freedoni that some of the Lyon zonings offer, even
if they may resent the way in which all the participants like to offer their two-
pennyworths of comment. At least there could be discussion about the
appropriateness of pitched roofs (Boulevard de la Croix-Rousse, case 6.73) or
whether the corner of a building should be open or closed (Place de Ia
Reconnaissance, cases 6.72).
Thirdly, the ability to hold a land-use strategy whether in the large-scale as
defined in an SD or in the smaller scale as defined in the POS appears to be weak.
At Vernaison it looked as though a major policy change had taken place without a
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full consideration of the impact on the commune or its neighbours as a whole. La
Rossignole estate had established a principle for development on the scarp; Le Soleil
levant was thus 'no more' than a logical mopping up of the intervening space. Yet
together they appear to undermine an important point of principle in the POS, to
protect the scarp slope and river banks south of Vernaison. The relationship between
the SD and the eventual decisions on applications for permissions to build has long
been recognised as a problem by French commentators, but there also appears to be
a problem in maintaining a policy in a POS. The shifts and adjustments that take
place do not entail a full rehearsal of the original ground on which the policy was
based.
In the same vein, a more specific problem arises with land for future
development. Where large tracts are zoned NA and then become subject of a ZAC,
the detailed implementation of a general policy to permit development can be
properly coordinated. The piecemeal permissions for loiissenients is another matter.
In Vernaison there did not appear to be a coherent pattern of urbanisation, whether
or not the allocation of land in itself was justifiable. The problem is that
development anywhere on NA land will be accepted if the infrastructure is provided
by the developer, and that the provision that a developer is proposed to make for
infrastructure, off as well as on the site, as in the case of Le Soleil levant is liable to
colour the decision. To that must be added the general advantage of development in
bolstering a commune's tax base.
The question of certainty is not simply expressed in the relationship between
the plan, the decisions or individual applications. The likelihood of receiving of
approval for development and the time it takes to process the decision is equally a
measure of certainty. Unfortunately the evidence is equivocal. We saw that the
approval rate for applications was higher than in Britain in 1982 and 1983, and we
raised the question of whether in fact unsuccessful schemes often never reached the
stage of application. The case studies neither confirm nor deny that hypothesis, but
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they do reveal how important decision-making before an application was lodged was
to the process. The impression for example in the case of Le Soleil levant was that
all the important issues were resolved by the time of the application and that the
formal processing was indeed a formality. Similarly, the informal process at Décines
was considerably longer than the fornial period of processing.
On the other hand at Les Longs des feuihlus at St-Priest negotiation appears
to be spread equally between the period before the first application and the
subsequent modifications to the first submission. Two points are worth commenting
on. The first is that the negotiation that took place in the two periods was essentially
of a different order. In the first instance the negotiations were primarily about
ceding the land for HLM housing (and thereby gaining the mayor's approval for the
release of the site for development). The later negotiations were devoted primarily
to how the regulations might be met. There was, therefore a fundamental shift in the
type of negotiation and the line-up of participants. The second point is that the time
taken to process the various applications was well within the periods defined in the
code de /'urbanisrne. A case that was inordinately protracted, therefore, would not
appear from official statistics to have been delayed, and by virtue of the first
applications being in effect withdrawn, only one application, the second, was actually
refused permission, after the prefect's contrOle de légaldé.
Thus the other potential benefit of a regulatory system, that of the speed of
decision-making, also does not appear to have been realised in the case studies and
once again the official figures give little idea of the real time involved in getting the
development started. Though Le Soleil levant did involve a change of zoning, all the
other residential cases involved land on which development had been foreseen in the
POS at the time it was prepared. The fact that all, except perhaps Transports Griset,
were much delayed in the process, may of course have been no more than an accident
of selection. The most that can be said on the experience of the case studies
themselves, is that a regulatory system does not preclude lengthy processing. But
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even with the official statistics we noted that if perhaps maximum processing time
appeared to be less, the proportion of decisions taken within three months in France
was less than the proportion of applications determined within thirteen weeks in
England and Wales.
The final point to make about regulations concerns third parties. We have
suggested that a legalistic system casts the objector to a proposal in the role of
someone whose proprietorial interests have been, or are likely to be, affected by
development. That tendency is present in the way that the enquête entertains
objections; it is equally present in the right to challenge a decision once taken, but
not to enter into the decision-making process. The challenge possible through courts
emphasises legal correctness at the expense of civic involvement. To some extent this
is a reflection of a cultural life in France that lays less stress on group social activities
than in Britain, something that expresses Peyrefitte's mal français, and only two of
the eight cases (Transports Griset and Boulevard de Ia Croix-Rousse) elicited any
public involvement.
Where there is objection, the Transports Griset case demonstrates the
difficulties a group may have to make its voice heard. Residents of Le Pellet had
only one real possibility of redress, by challenging the decision before the tribunal
adnzinistratif. Not only might the challenge have been difficult to sustain, they
appear to have bungled it through a pardonable ineptitude. The only real attempt at
redress was through the conciliation being attempted by the prefecture, which cast
the objection in terms of a neighbour dispute and not a sensitive environmental issue.
Moreover the attenipt at conciliation was only initiated after the residents had
indulged in some determined lobbying.
The conclusion that has to be drawn from this exploration of cases is that a
legalised planning system does not of itself ensure a greater degree of certainty for
any of the participants. It may be that the rules have no obvious application to the
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site in question, it may be that the mayor seeks a modification to the POS to
accommodate a proposal. Or it may be that the major issues connected with a
proposal are not susceptible to the process of rule-making; or yet again that the
bargaining over the release of land may effectively be beyond the scope of the
regulations. The system is not particularly swift. And when policy can no longer be
expressed in rules and the adjudication of legality is no longer a possibility, the
system appears to offer no alternative means of formulating policy and no way of
testing it thereafter. The certainties that do exist are, firstly, the high likelihood of
receiving a favourable decision once an application has been lodged, and, secondly,
the right of challenge for third parties, but on the basis of their proprietorial rights
only. It begins to look as though the legalised system breeds uncertainty and limits
rights.
7.12	 Rules and Discretion
If the conclusion that emerges from the case studies is that a regulatory
system of planning does not confer certainty, one interpretation could be that the
system in practice offered too much discretion to decision-makers, a view which
would sit oddly with the perception that the system is slow, cumbersome and
inflexible. The resolution of this apparent paradox requires us to consider yet again
the operation of discretion within the French planning system. Here Bull's (1980)
analysis is helpful.
Agency discretion is, we have already noted, clearly available within the
system. Within the code de l'urbanisnze many clauses confer specific discretionary
freedoms, of which, as the case Le Soleil levant, demonstrates, one of the most
significant since decentralisation is the power of the mayor to initiate or modify a
POS. In practice we have argued that this discretionary power is modified
substantially by the willingness of the technical services to embark on the work, but
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Le Soleil levant shows that it is by no means an empty power. The use of
discretionary clauses in the POS also conforms to Bull's definition of agency
discretion, although in effect it is the agency which confers discretion on itself.
Thus the Agence d'urbanisme in preparing the URM zoning of the Lyon POS was
leaving the ground clear for later action in determining applications for permission
to build. There is at least a measure of transparency in that use of discretion,
although it looks rather as though it legitimates the technical services' ability to
dictate outcomes.
The evidence of officer discretion, in Bull's terms, is rather •more prolific
than formally conferred discretion, however. We have already commented on the
exercise of discretion tactically to interpret and depart from the rules in force and
indeed to act in the absence of rules. We saw, too, how the question of interpretation
regularly led to conflict between the participants. Indeed, where the participants
were prepared to collude in their interpretation of the rules, as at Le Soleil levant, the
system did appear responsive to the needs of the developer and of the particular site.
Where there was no such agreement, as a Vénissieux or St.-Priest, the process became
horrifyingly bogged down. The element of caprice in the judgements made, of
exactly the kind that appeared worrying to British critics of discretion in social
welfare provision, is thus conspicuous. The temptation to impose the rigour of the
law in such circumstances is understandable, but we have already argued such an
insistence does not correspond to the nature of the planning process.
The real answer to the problem lies in the nature of the discretion available,
not that there are discretionary powers. The discretion conferred by statute is a
A
circumscribed one particularly in relation to specific regulations for development
which tend to be couched in terms of clear cut distinctions. By so doing they push
the necessary exercise of discretion underground, to become a matter for the
individual participants to determine. Particularly where the actors choose to collude
in the interpretation of, or departure from, a rule, the control of this kind of officer
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discretion becomes harder because there is no established basis for a reasoned
justification for its use. More discretion accQrded to agencies as a formal part of the
system coupled with a requirement to express reasoned justifications would help to
eliminate some of the more questionable dealing that the case studies reveal.
This nevertheless raises the question of how the actors account for their
exercise of discretion. Adjudication in the tribunaux adminissratifs is clearly a
limited option because the accent on legality makes it hard for these courts to deal
with formally accorded discretion or indeed the exercise of judgement in the
interpretation of rules. And even where he or she must confront such problems, the
juge adniinistratif is not perhaps best qualified to pronounce on matters of urban
policy. Moreover the front line defence against arbitrary and illegal decisions, the
contrOle de legalise, is highly selective and dependent on the prefect, who as the case
of Le Soleil levant demonstrates so clearly, is also effectively a discretionary actor.
Whereas the courts ensure justice by virtue of the openness of their proceedings and
the independence of their adjudicators, the selectivity of prefects is neither fully
detached from local pressure nor subject to scrutiny. The need to formalise
discretion in the system and to ensure its exercise can be properly accounted for
looks as though it is critical to the evolution of the French development control
system.
The final reflection must be on whether the kind of certainty that is though
to be offered by a rule-bound system is in fact a desirable goal. There is every
evidence from the case studies that developers prefer to argue their way round the
rules than be bound by the limitations if they conflict with the optimum use of site.
The evidence suggests that the administrators prefer to negotiate, too, where it suits
particular ends. Certainty of outcome is one thing; certainty over timing may be a
more desirable goal since inordinate delays serve few interests. But there is nothing
to suggest that greater formal discretion would slow the control process, even though
it is unlikely to speed it. We have also noted that timing probably has as much to do
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with the administration than with the rules themselves. In the end, a more fruitful
approach is likely to be one that focuses on the parameters of uncertainty rather than
trying to define every eventuality. A less detailed document than the POS may offer
a greater degree of control by defining which issues cannot be resolved in advance.
The emphasis upon transparency and accountability of subsequent decision-making
would then overcome potential abuses of the power conferred.
Such a conclusion does not necessarily presuppose a complete overhaul of
French planning law. There is some suggestion that the regulations are not alone in
carrying the blame for the difficulties; perhaps as much as anything, else it is the
ethos of a legalistic approach to administration that creates the tensions. One
interviewee argued that the POS did not have to be the kind of complicated
document that it so often was and that the regulations in the code de l'urbanisnie
permit a simplified POS. In another way, we noted how undogmatic the POS of
Lyon is, principally in its zoning URM. Though the two are not quite the same -
the former presupposes a limited level of control over development while the latter
proposes options for very detailed control - both beg the question as to how decisions
taken on the basis of open-ended documents are to be legitimated. To some extent
Lyon has begun to develop the answer to that problem, too. The consultation
ptéalable does provide the occasion, albeit not a public one, for the basis for
decisions to be exposed to the scrutiny of both officers and elected representatives.
Some of the grumbling about the stranglehold of the regulations thus appears
to be misplaced. The least charitable view would be that those who complain about
the regulations are caught in traps of their own devising. A greater imagination in
the form of the POS might usefully extend its scope, provided over-elaboration can
be avoided. On the other hand, there is the danger in reaching such a conclusion of
taking a mechanistic view of planning of precisely the kind that was rejected at the
outset. To talk of an ethos is to presume a body of people who share in it, and while
in general terms it characterises much of French public life, in planning the beliefs
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are held particularly by the various actors within local government and local
administration. It is to these that we much now turn.
7.2	 The Power to Decide
If planning in France is an uncertain process, the question about how power
to take decisions is distributed in the administrative system becomes rather more
acute. We dismissed at the outset the idea of the 'real power' being located in single,
identifiable point, in favour of a model of an equilibrium of forces in.which each
participant in the process is involved with at least two others and that the network
may well cut across the formal chains of command. But there is clearly more to be
said about the nature of the involvement of participants in this network, and about
how and when they influence events.
7.21	 Decision-making and democratic control
The first task is to find some kind of explanation for the byzantine
coniplexity of administration and control in Lyon. Many of those interviewed agreed
that the administration was unacceptably 'heavy', but we argued earlier that there
appeared to be a mutual advantage to the participants maintaining the status quo.
Two features of French government seem paramount in this explanation. The first is
the mistrust of political power. The second is the passionate attachment to the
commune as the seat of democracy and the bulwark against central power.
The question of the mutual mistrust of politicians and technical officers is
perhaps a direct reflection of the continuities in French government between the
state and the local authorities and between political and technical power. Mayors are
to be mistrusted because of the dangers of local bias distorting the planning process,
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and therefore centrally controlled agencies independent of local politicians (the
DDEs) are vital to ensure the proper respect of national priorities. DDEs fear mayors
particularly when they have achieved the power through the accumulation of office
to circumvent the DDE by appealing direct to higher authority. Mayors fear the
DDE and this, we could argue, leads to a search for independent sources of advice:
hence the setting up of the Atelier municipal d'urbanisme or the recourse to the
archilecies-conseils. These independent agents quickly. cease to maintain their
independent purity. They appear to become compromised by the alliances they are
bound to form and to create in turn a demand for further independent agencies. The
progress of the Agence d'urbanisme at Lyon is instructive. From being a creature
of the commune of Lyon it has become successively the planning service of
COURLY and then an independent agency albeit one funded from a mixture of local
and central sources. And we noted in chapter 5 how now it appears to distance itself
from the other actors in the system, by its slightly separate location and by its
definition of a special sphere of competence into which, we suggested, it tended to
withdraw. This same search for independent advice may be one reason why
politicians tolerate the multiplicity of organisations that make an input to the
development control process. It allows them to balance the possibly tainted advice of
one set of actors against that of another set whose allegiances are likely to be
different.
Mistrust of others may in turn lead to self-doubt. One explanation for the
apparently surprising fact that two years after it was possible for the communes of
COURLY to undertake their own processing of applications in hand, only one had
chosen to do so, must be the doubt about their own competence. If in a commune
like Yernaison, the mayor and his deputies can imagine no other arrangement, in
Vénissieux and Villeurbanne, both of which have long traditions of municipal
independence and have the finance and the staff to deal with their own processing,
there is a marked reluctance to go it alone. Even Bron, which has ceased to use the
services of the DDE, nevertheless relies on the other actors for advice, and thus has
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not fully seceded from the network. The administration may be cumbersome but a
relationship of mutual mistrust seems preferable to isolation. Mistrust generates a
system of dependencies.
There is an apparent paradox in the idea that a profound commitment to local
democracy should lead to a system in which democratic control appears to be
attenuated. But the commitment to the commune is such that France clearly cannot
tolerate any local authority unit which deprives the lowest level in the hierarchy of
government of control over its own destiny. Hence where effective government
requires the establishment of units of authority that are larger than communes, the
preferred form is of syndicates with delegated representation from the communes
rather than a directly elected body. Maybe such a system does not affect the
principle of local democracy where syndicates manage one or two services. The
effect of an urban community with its wide range of responsibilities, acting to all
intents and purposes like a local authority, seriously threatens the concept of local
democratic control in favour of control by local elites.
There is, however, a less savoury interpretation of the facts that demonstrates
that the paradox is only a paradox because of the terms used. The genuine
democratic concern of many French commentators cannot be doubted and the
genuine democratic advantages of small units of authority, as against British districts
for example, are real enough. Yet the commitment to the commune also represents
a jealous clinging to limited powers, and the powerful leverage that collectively the
36,433 mayors of France exert is as much about power-mongering as about
democracy. The ultimate losers in this game are of course, invariably, the electorate.
What they may gain from closeness to one set of elected representatives they lose by
being unable to exert electoral control over the organisations that take many of the
decisions that effect them directly. One distinct possibility is that as the need for
decisions to be taken above the level of the commune as a result of decentralisation
of power, the system risks becoming less, not more, democratic unless the problem
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of the appropriate size of local authority unit is faced.
7.22	 The Real Powers offered b y the French Plannin g System
The pattern of prefect, communes, COURLY, the Agence d'urbanisme and
the DDE, who all have a stake in the control of development is thus a result of
laudable and not so laudable tendencies within French political philosophy. Before
we can determine what power these participants actually do wield in development
control, we need analyse what power they have at their disposal. . These are
identifiable as follows:
1) The power to initiate the preparation of a POS;
2) The power to undertake the technical work for a POS;
3) The power to seek the modification of a POS;
4) The power to nominate an appropriate technical service for plan preparation
and application processing;
5) The power to determine the conditions under which land may be brought
forward for development;
6) The power to sign the decision notice for permissions to build;
7) The power to annul or seek the annulment of decisions.
Two general comments on this list need to be made first of all. One is that all but 5)
have been directly affected by the laws on decentralisation. The other is that it is
necessary to include the first three because of the close relationship between plans
and development control decisions although the empirical research only allows us to
make general observations about the powers. Indeed the power to initiate plan
preparation is hardly an issue in Lyon where there is recent plan coverage for each
of the communes of COURLY.
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The power to seek the revision or modification of a POS is clearly of
considerable significance in Lyon. It was critical in the development of Le Soleil
levant at Yernaison. The fact that from 1 April 1984 this was a power that was
devolved on mayors of communes niay have been particularly significant in ensuring
that development went ahead on the site. One can, however, only say 'may'. The
ability to seek a revision was hitherto dependent on an order from the prefect, and
effectively, on the willingness of the DDE, the Agence and COURLY to undertake
the technical studies necessary. Thus there was a double constraint on a wayward
mayor. On the other hand much circumstantial evidence exists to suggest that
prefects did, and do, not exercise control heavy-handedly, that mayors were listened,
if not pandered, to, and the possibility of the mayor circumventing prefectural power
always existed. Since decentralisation the prefect has no longer had a bearing in the
matter and the mayor in principle has the right to look elsewhere for technical
assistance. In practice it will be hard for him to do so. The mayor of a commune
like Vernaison may simply not envisage alternatives to the existing services as was
suggested by the study of Alpes-Maritimes (Popesco and Zalma, 1986) and it would
in any case be hard in practice to avoid COURLY in plan revision, even if the
resources were available. But the fact that a commune like Vernaison could look
elsewhere must lend a certain edge to the relationships between communes and the
technical agencies. They are bound to work slightly harder to ensure their credibility
as expert technical assistance is retained. The power to initiate a plan revision is thus
essentially a factor of the power to choose the technical agency to do the work.
What is true for the revision of POS applies with even greater force to the
signing of decision notices, which under the decentralisation acts is done by the
mayor in the name of the commune throughout COURLY. As we argued at the end
of chapter four, the signature is not more than an act of confirmation that the
development is consistent with the regulations. The fact that before decentralisation
the mayor signed most of such decisions, albeit in the name of the state, underlines
the symbolic rather than the real value of the power. Far more significant is the
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power to choose to whom to entrust the processing of applications for in exactly the
same way as with POS preparation and revision, there is the possibility of exerting
leverage on the process. Most communes in COURLY are not processing applications
themselves, but they could, and therein lies the power.
The power to prepare plans and process applications is significant because of
the nature of the discretion available in making the decisions. If the mayor is lacking
in technical expertise, he or she is bound to accept the advice that the processing
agency offers. This remains true whether it concerns the judgement used in
interpreting a rule or choosing between the options available in a permissive clause
in the code or a POS. An organisation that prepares a POS with permissive clauses
and then subsequently processes applications for permission to build is in a position
of particular power with respect to the communes it serves.
If the power to initiate and prepare POS and process and determine
applications suggests that power is concentrated rather more heavily on ad-
ministrative agencies than on political representatives, the power to negotiate the
conditions under which and zoned NA may be developed appears to accrue to
politicians and administrators alike. Thus at Vernaison and St.-Priest mayors
achieved a planning gain as the prize for permitting development, as did, in the case
of Le Soleil levant, COURLY. The reason for this power being shared is precisely
because it is not in the same sense as the others, a statutory power. Art R123-18
which defines the zones into which a POS must or may be divided leaves entirely
open what may be required in the way of infrastructure to satisfy the objective of
"coherent development" (an?ënagenlenl coherent) of the zone. Much may evidently be
justified under this clause, not least the ceding of land as in the case of Les Long des
feuillus at St.-Priest.
Finally, the power to annul or seek the annulment of decisions is a
discretionary power which is available to various of the actors. Only the Conseil
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d'Etat, administrative judge and the mayor can cancel the decision of the mayor, and
the power in each case is of its very nature, discretionary. The power to seek the
annulment by referring the decision to tribunal administratif is considerably more
significant, because of the leverage it exerts over the mayor's decision-making. The
power available to third parties appears to be less significant in general terms than
that exercised by the prefects, partly because it is limited to those who can
demonstrate a direct involvement in the case. The prefect on the other hand has the
duty to inspect all decisions and may refer those to the courts that are illegal. The
power is in effect discretionary, partly because the prefect may choose not so to refer
a case, partly because a telephone call may be sufficient to persuade the mayor to
annul a decision and partly because there are more decisions than can be properly
inspected in any given time period. The cozirOle de lëgalitE is thus frankly a lottery,
as was demonstrated by the deputy mayor of Vernaison's surprise at the grounds on
which the prefect of RhOne chose to challenge the first permission to subdivide at Le
Soleil levant.
7.23	 The Use of Power In French Development Control
These are the real powers that are exercised in French development control
system, and the analysis above gives some indication of those who are able to exercise
them. We need now to look at the actors to see how they use the powers available.
First of all mayors of communes are powerful to the extent to which they are
knowledgeable of the technical process and understand how they can use their real
freedom to best advantage. In once sense the mayor of Lyon and the mayor of
Vernaison are equally powerless given the limitations we have already observed on
the attainable powers conveyed in the statutes. The mayor of Lyon and his assistants
are obviously very considerably niore powerful in practical terms, however. The
power stems from the resources at their command and the connections they have
which ensures that in the relatively trivial process of development control they are
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also deferred to. But the assistant mayor, Moulinier, would appear to have
strengthened his position by firstly taking a detailed interest and secondly by using
all the various technical sources available to him such that he does not have to be
dependent on any one. This must have the effect of maintaining a tension between
them, in spite of the reportedly harmonious working relationships. A reluctance to
move too far too fast is only one of the factors that assured that administrative
arrangements remained substantially unaltered after 1984. One suggestion is that by
the next local government elections in 1989, a greater confidence in the use of power
and a change of personnel may result in streamlining of the system (Testut, personal
communication).
The power wielded in Lyon is hardly surprising given the city's size and
national importance. Much more instructive is the degree of leverage that the
relatively powerless mayors of smaller communes exert. At Décines-Charpieu in the
ZAC de Bonneveau it is clear that the mayor had accepted the advice offered by the
Agence d'urbanisme reluctantly and against his better judgement. His attitude was
of someone who felt trapped by circumstance. His commune so he believed is
relatively unattractive and is being bypassed in favour of places further east; as a
result it is picking up the racial problems of the whole conurbation. He had accepted
the proposals of the Agence, perhaps because he had no alternative source of advice,
perhaps because the 'urban identity' that they urged him to accept was a way of
bolstering the commune's image.
The cases of Les Longs des feuillus at St.-Priest and Le Soleil levant and
Transports Onset at Vernaison put a very different complexion on the question of
mayoral control. Here the surprise was how much power the mayors were able to
exert. At St.-Priest, it was a straightforward case of the bargaining power that being
able to control the release of developable land gives: the mayor achieved the
important benefit of land for HLM scheme as well as private development on a
suitable site. The power may have been constrained by the regulations, but the
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technical services supported the mayor in wanting to find a way round the constraint.
At Vernaison, the mayor managed to get what he wanted in more surprising
circumstances, in that policy might have dictated a different response. But the
attitude appears to have been that these were matters for the mayor to decide and not
for the technical services, since their effect was specifically on the commune: The
Agence d'urbanisme's credibility was better maintained by not interfering too deeply
in such cases which did not strike at the heart of the expertise they had to offer.
Perhaps the knowledge that the mayor could now look elsewhere for technical advice
has sharpened this attitude.
In each case, however, the discretionary power that the mayors were able to
exercise by virtue of the willingness of the other technical services to allow them to,
was checked by the prefect's conirôle de lëgalilë. The effect of this control does not
really seem to have been to increase accountability. There is rather more the feeling
in the cases described that the mayors, with the collusion of the technical services,
were prepared to try things on, in the knowledge that they might get away with the
infringements of the regulations. This may result in an intriguing game of power
relationships, but is hardly satisfactory as a means of providing responsible decision-
making.
The conclusion that begins to emerge from this analysis of mayoral power in
development control decision-making is that the pattern of cross-cutting regulation
has developed deeply entrenched dependencies between actors which are hard to
shake off. Mayors are quick to seize tactical advantages when they arise and there
appears to be much scope for them to do so. They are far more reluctant, as the
evidence of Lyon would suggest, to take on the full responsibility for their actions
in determining planning applications. Given Lyon's and its suburbs' longstanding
tradition of local autonomy and action and its considerable financial and human
resources, the conclusion is not a very encouraging one for the future of
decentralised development control. If the mayors of COURLY are fearful of new
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responsibilities, one wonders what hope there can be for the rest of France.
An analysis of the power of the technical services can do little more than
repeat some of the suggestions made earlier. The DDE, COURLY and the Agence
all continue to maintain their independence of each other by asserting their particular
specialisms. The legal competence of the DDE and the ability to handle the
paperwork is, we noted, perceived as an advantage, though the effect of this
advantage is scarcely evident from the case studies. There is a suggestion that since
decentralisation, the DDE have tended to take a harder line on the regulations for
fear of falling foul of the prefect, and by so doing become less helpful to the other
actors (Pelletier, personal communication). The case studies suggest rather the
reverse, however: there was no DDE opposition to Le Soleil levant or Les Longs des
feuillus, even though both entailed infringement of the regulations. It also has to be
recognised that the DDE's power to interpret regulations remains a source of power
and we have seen how at Le Soleil levant, they were actually able to offer helpful
solutions to the problem of the regulations.
The power of the services of COURLY does not come from any of the
decision-making powers available from the statutes. Yet they are in a position to
bargain over service provision; their unwillingness to widen the chemin des
Ferratières at Vernaison was an important lever in securing additional gain from the
developer. This kind of power is, however, tactical rather than strategic in the same
way that power of the mayors is tactical. Their greater claim to power in the system
comes from their role as honest broker, coordinating the activities of development
control. The creation of the Département Développement as part of a more rigorous
structuring of the whole of COURLY's management is an important step to
consolidating that power.
The Agence d'urbanisme is apparently in the weakest position of the three
technical services. In one sense it is judged entirely upon the quality of its services,
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and is at the mercy of the communes, for whom it acts as agent, and the council of
COURLY, which provides its major source of funding. Yet that underplays the
influence that the Agence carries over the control of development through its
preparation of plans and of special studies. The case studies reveal some weaknesses
in the process, as for example at Vénissieux or Décines. The POS for Lyon, however,
is a good example of how the reserving of discretionary powers ensures that the
Agence retains control over applications for development because they have to
interpret the plan in its specific application. The deployment of an expertise in plan
preparation is in itself a source of power.
The power wielded by the prefect through the contrôle de legalite is clearly
considerable, and we have noted the extent to which it is discretionary. They danger
of this power being used in an arbitrary way is great for there is no access to the way
in which a decision to challenge a permission to build is actually reached. The case
studies confirm that neither the spirit of decentralisation nor a change in title or
responsibilities have in fact changed the impact the prefect has on the development
control process. Indeed his discretionary power of control appears to have added a
new uncertainty to the process.
We have thus identified the ways in which the various participants gain power
through the use of discretionary powers available, and how the exercise of discretion
may serve to bolster the power of the organisation as in the case of both the Agence
and the DDE. Significant authority may thus be derived by using discretion in
individual cases. But with the mayors this appears to be less true. They may find
they have unimpeded discretion to gain a tactical advantage for the commune, but
are still short of strategic power. The strategic power that the technical services
wield as do some mayors, comes from their technical competence, their location in
the system and their connections with other important authorities. Under these
circumstances, and given the tactical control over development control decision-
making, the new responsibilities are not going to look particularly attractive to
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mayors, and the old order will remain convenient.
7.24	 Decentralisation and Power in COURLY
The question must now be answered whether decentralisation has made any
difference to the powers of the various participants. We have argued above that the
new power to sign permissions or refusals to build in the name of the commune was
niuch less significant than the ability to command the technical expertise to process
applications. The ability to choose one's own agency is thus a potentially more
important freedom, if the chances were not heavily weighted in favour of the
existing agencies. But even if the choice was unconstrained, one can argue that it
represents real power only insofar as the mayor is technically competent, because an
outside agent is unlikely to be committed to the future of the commune. The
possibilities of negotiating for development have always existed and were not
modified by decentralisation. The power to initiate the POS or its modification is
new and we have suggested potentially important to the extent that technical services
can be persuaded to do the work.
If we add to this the lack of structural change and the continuity of existing
organisations the claims for decentralisation as a major revolution in local
government looks false at lease in respect of development control and plan
preparation. Local autonomy was thus no more a reality in 1986 than it was in 1980.
On the other hand, it has not been totally without effect. The new powers have led
to shifts in the equilibrium of forces that sustain French adminstration and there is
some suggestion that the shift has been in favour of communes and particularly the
non-traditional organisations like COURLY. Decentralisation is thus an important
staging post on the evolution of local government and of planning. The LOF of 1967
introduced the concept of partnership between the state and local authorities; the act
of 1983 permits a greater degree of equality between partners. Indeed in Lyon it is
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likely to be COURLY that is the major beneficiary of the change. For the truth is
that the communes of the Lyon conurbation would always find it difficult to go it
alone; Bron's independence is symbolic rather than real. None could hope to
command technical expertise of the order of COURLY, the DDE and the Agence
combined. And even in the exceedingly unlikely event of 55 separate agencies
advising each of the communes separately someone would have to coordinate their
activities.
The central role of COURLY in the future is evidenced by the slow but
steady accretion of competence. Before decentralisation, COURLY was already
processing Lyon's applications. It was the one organisation that underwent a major
management change to coincide with decentralisation. It has taken on staff with the
expertise necessary to cope with the new tasks. Sooner or later someone will observe
that the DDE is unnecessary, indeed that the process would be more effective
without it. Two possibilities will then exist: either that COURLY undertakes all the
processing itself or that the technical vetting of applications is undertaken in the
larger communes and the planning advice, coordination and the processing of
applications for the small communes will be retained by the services of COURLY.
That will leave the role of the Agence much as it has been since 1978, more
deferential to mayors perhaps, but still the sole repository of a particular kind of
expert knowledge.
In one sense this will result in a greater concentration of power at the local
level; in another it will not. It does not represent a greater degree of democratic
control, because COURLY's technical services are accountable to a delegated, not a
directly elected, body. The inequalities between small and large communes will
remain, and the same elites will dominate. COURLY as the main development
control authority would be a more effective provider of a service, but it would not
ensure a greater degree of control by the electorate. The evidence then supports the
view of those who see decentralisation as strengthening the hand of the 'habitual
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users' of power while doing nothing for participatory democracy.
7.3	 Conclusions and Future Work
The conclusions of this thesis about the impact of a regulatory system on the
control of development in a major conurbation have suggested certain inherent
weaknesses which represent obstacles for the users of the system to overcome. In the
end, however, the rules are less of an obstacle than the spirit that they appear to
engender. Moreover, the code de l'urbanisnie will not simply disappear; it is
dependent on a whole system of law that requires town planning to be treated in this
way. The tendency to say that rules are a stumbling block to be circumvented either
by the adoption of practices of doubtful legality or by ever more refined rule writing
does not advance the cause of the proper control of development. The real problem
is to discover what the degrees of freedom for the action ought to be for a given
location and to draft the POS accordingly. The concern for the minutiae of the
regulations must give way to a concern for an overall strategy to be implemented by
the accretion of individual decisions to develop. In some places, it will still be
appropriate for there to be detailed controls over the form, bulk and density of
buildings; in others strategic objectives will permit the possibility of a wide range of
alternatives. There is enough evidence from examples in COURLY to suggest that
with sufficient ingenuity, all this is possible within the current framework.
If discretionary power to act is increased in this way, it becomes essential that
the decisions taken are properly aired, because accountability before the courts will
not be enough to ensure that decisions are taken reasonably and responsibly. The
practice of the consultation ptéalable for Lyon suggests one way forward and maybe
all major proposals should be exposed to this kind of examination. The drawback
would be that the public would gain nothing from the use of these informal meetings,
which do not even confer procedural rights on them. A more radical proposal which
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would ensure the public both procedural and substantive rights would be the
extension of the enquêle publique to deal with contentious development control cases,
particularly where the case hinged upon discretionary action and where matters of
policy rather than law were at stake. In a case like that of Transports Griset, the use
of an enquêle would have ensured that the facts of the case were properly examined
and the dispute did not remain at the level of wild allegation and personal
vituperation. It would get round the problem identified by Chabanol (1986) that
courts ire increasingly having to make judgements on matters that go beyond their
traditional competence.
The task for the Future does not lie in further tampering with the code or
clamouring for deregulation. The code has been modified enough in the past five
years. The administrators and politicians of the Lyon conurbation need now to
harness the administrative and professional expertise at their disposal to create
structures which are effective as providers of a service, responsive to local need and
accountable to the local electorate for the decisions taken. The time to act is now,
before the momentum of decentralisation is lost and the old inertia reasserts itself.
The conclusions of this thesis about decentralisation have of necessity to be
more tentative because Lyon is untypical of the country as a whole and because, as
we suggested at the outset, the full impact of the new powers may still have to be
realised. There remains an important doubt, however, about whether decentralisation
can ever be effective without the amalgamation of communes into larger
administrative units. At Lyon we could foresee a locally constructed organisation,
COURLY, taking control because it had the resources to coordinate servcies for the
whole conurbation. It can act on an equal footing with the services of the state. For
the vast majority of communes the same is not true, whatever tactical advantages
mayors may be able to secure for themselves in negotiations with the DDE. There
may indeed have been a shift in the balance of power as a result of decentralisation,
but effective policy making and implementation must always be difficult in units as
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small as French communes. The hypothesis that decentralisation has helped those
urban areas which were already on the road to cooperation and local control, but has
left small rural communes in their old position of dependency looks correct.
As yet,however, there has been no comprehensive research to examine what
has been happening in predominantly rural dëparlernenls where many communes still
lack POS, or if they have a plan, rely entirely on the DDE for technical assistance.
In particular, there needs to be a detailed examination of the way in which agree-
ments between communes and the DDE on how the national regulations should apply
(nzoda/ilë dapplication de Ia églcnieniaiion nationale urbaine: MARNU). This
would reveal the extent to which the rule of limited constructability has affected
communes and whether MARNU have effectively increased the communes' role in
decision-making even if they cannot exercise the full powers available under the
decentralisation acts. Such a study would complement the current work on Lyon
and could draw on a growing body of published examples of the effects of
decentralisation in various parts of France.
This thesis started with a reflection on the value and difficulties of studying
planning in other cultures, and in the dangers of making facile comparisons. The real
worth of such studies, we argued, came from understanding the relationship between
the planning system and the context within which it operates. We also pointed to the
problem of approaching a foreign planning system armed with the prejudices and
expectations bred from close involvement with the British system. Against this was set
the major advantage of being an outsider: the ability to observe the system
dispassionately. The lessons then to be learn from a study of this kind relate
essentially to method of doing research that emphasises the participants in the system
and the use they make of the planning instruments at their disposal. Regulations,
plans and discretionary powers are all part of the armoury that define the rules of the
game these participants play out, but (he use of the rules depends on the roles these
participants are assigned by the culture in which they operate. The French planning
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system has certain inherent constraints which affect the ability to plan for, and
control, development. At least as much of what we observe in Lyon depends on a
process that goes well beyond the formal possibilities of the planning machinery.
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Appendix 1	 List of Persons Interviewed
Agence d'urbanisme de Ia Communauté urbaine de Lyon
Jean DELLUS	 Directeur-adjoint
Patrice BERGER	 Responsable du Secteur Centre-Villeurbanne
Pierre BUISSON	 Responsable du Secteur Centre-Lyon
Giuseppe I3ONACORSI
Bogdan MILENKOVIC
Philippe ROUX
Dominique PRUD'IION
Bernard GUINET
Jean-Claude VERT
Responsable du Secteur Est
Responsable des Secteurs Nord/Nord-Ouest
Responsable du Secteur Sud-Ouest
Chargé d'Etudes Architecte-Urbaniste
Ad joint technique
Adjoint technique
Jean PELLETIER
	
Professeur d'urbanisme Université Lumière -
Lyon 2
Charles DELFANTE
	
Architecte-urbaniste
Communauté urbainde Lyon
Michel IDE
	
Service de l'amenagement urbain
Direction de partementale de l'Eciui pement du RhOne
M. HUGON	 Directeur du Service de l'aplication du Droit des
sols
M. TESTUT
	
Service de l'application du Droit des sols
chef de Ia zone I (ville de Lyon)
A gence intercommunale d'Urbanisnie de l'A gg loniération di ionnaise
M. BURDIN	 Directeur du Service du Droit des sols
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Direction déDartementale de l'Eg uirement de Ia COte-d'Or
M. BRIAND	 Urbanisme opérationnel et Construction
M. DESPIERRES	 Directeur du Service de l'urbanisme
opérationnel et Construction
Tribunal administratif de Lyon
Daniel CHABANOL
	
Vice - président
Commune de Bron
Laurent DESCHAMPS
	
Maire-adjoint
Mile. POISSON
	
Services techniques
Commune de Décines-Charpieu
Pierre MOUTIN
	
Maire
Commune de St.-Priest
Mme COUTURIER
	
Services techniques
Commune de Vénissieux
Guy FISCHER
	
Maire-ad joint
Christiane KOBIALKA
	
Direction de l'économie et de l'urbanisme
M. TEYSSANDIER
	
Direction de i'économie et de l'urbanisme
Commune de Vernaison
M. DUPRE-LATOUR
	
Maire-adjoint
Commune de Villeurbanne
M. SELIGNAC
	
Directeur general des services techniques
Odile PELLAS
	 Services techniques
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Grou pe Maison Familiale
M. SEGUY
STOK- France
Henri PAYET-MORICE
Décines-Immobilier
M. BRIGNAIS
Trans ports Griset
M. GRISET
Association pour le Res pect de l'environnenient et des Residents du Pellet
M. et Mme MAGNAN	 Président et adherent
Mme DESBOS	 Sécretaire
M. BALLANDRAS	 Architecte
Dudier MANHES	 Architecte
103195
1015
41931
898
2056
7062
3544
1257
8982
709
31799
779
4113
1050
5,027.:
17,617.1
-2,587.:
3,587.1
12,607J
12,52
50,237.:
30,807.1
23,297.:
23,097.1
2,907.:
I ,96X
17,597.1
55,567.1
77434
751
37603
79?
1306
5313
1825
742
5413
366
18292
723
3798
505
98263
963
43041
867
1826
6276
2359
961
5663
576
30894
784
3498
475
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A ppendix 2	 Population of COURLY b y commune 1968-1982
SECTEUR	 COrIrIUNE	 POPULATION II)	 VARIATION
I	 1968	 1975	 1982	 7. 75 82
I	 COURt V ......................... 1 	 1049080	 1119013	 1106055	 -1,167.1
I	 I
I	 CENTRE ............................ 7679573251529055-7,717.1
	LY NI	 5270('O	 458718	 413095	 -9,55/1
I	 VILLEUUL,ANFJE:	 119079	 116535	 115960	 -0,497.
	
EST .......................... 106973 	 273022	 288953	 5,8471
	
CHASOICU	 2867	 3599	 6882	 91 ,227.
	
DECINES	 15297	 20031	 22932	 13,997.1
	
JoNrGE:	 1445	 2206	 2939	 33,187.:
	
IIEVZIEIfl	 10012	 19435	 26776	 37,777.:
	
VAULX EN VELIN:
	 20726	 37868	 44160	 16,627.1
	
DaRN:	 41619	 44563	 40639	 -8,917J
	
CORDAS:	 2208	 3225	 6375	 97,477.1
I	 rEYZINI	 5604	 7346	 7753	 5,54/.1
I	 MIONS	 2848	 5081	 604	 18,957.1
I	 SAINT FONS	 15098	 17144	 15291	 -10,817.1
	
SAINT FRIEST:	 20419	 36734	 42877	 18,187.1
	
SOLAIZE	 1119	 1445	 1793	 23,397J
	
vrNIssIEux:	 47L13	 74347	 84804 -12,847.:
	
SUDDUEST .......................... 96502 	 121107	 126109	 4,127.1
	
c)-1AF,L y :	 1643	 2392	 2864	 19,737.:
	
CRAPONNE	 3423	 4592	 5536	 20,567.1
I	 FRRNCHEV1LLE:	 4932	 8099	 9500	 17,3071
I	 1RZGNY	 3679	 5226	 6820	 30,6571
	
1IULATIEPE LA:	 8073	 7886	 7716	 -2,187.:
	
OULLIIJSI	 28604	 27772	 27189	 -2,177.1
	
rIEE ENv6;	 ?O0	 t&01'	 7468	 -5.787.1
1	 SAINTE FOVI	 18583	 21899	 21521	 -0,0271
	
SAINT GENIS LAVALI 	 7128	 13162	 14353	 9,OSYJ
I	 SAINI GENIS LES OLLIERES:	 1429	 2125	 2791	 30,O7YJ
	
TASS)N1	 12983	 14896	 15001	 0,9171
	
VEr4IJAISON:	 1995	 3250	 3373	 3,78/.:
1	 NORD OUEST ......................... 1 	 40392	 53340	 58743	 10,137.:I	 AL9IGNY	 2508	 2405	 2853	 10,317.:
I	 CHAIIPAGNE	 3932	 4518	 4783	 5,4771
I	 cIIARDoNN1ErES:	 2448	 3086	 0973	 28,747.1
	
COILONGES	 2462	 2786	 2824	 1,367J
	
COLJZON	 1928	 2434	 2421	 -0,537.1
	
CURIS	 581	 75	 622	 8,177.1
	
DARDILLY:	 2010	 2740	 4888	 70,187.:1	 ECULLY1	 10077	 17944	 17965	 -0,447.1I	 LINONESTI	 1751	 14j	 2131	 9,797.1
	
MARCY LETOIE	 484	 683	 1033	 51,247.1I	 SAINI CYR	 4075	 4763	 4800	 0,7971
	
SAINT DIDIERI	 3872	 5115
	
SAINT GERMAIN	 1971	 2170	 2129	 -1,8971
	
SAIN1 ROMAINI	 729	 742	 919	 23,8571
	
TOUR RE SALVAGNY LA: 	 1367	 1904	 2827	 49,487.1
IN000 .........................
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Appendix 3
	
Decisions on applications for Permis de Construire in
COURLY b y commune in 1986
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Annendix 4	 Deicsioiis on applications for Permis de construire b y category
of deveIppjp. nt in COURLY b y commune in 1986
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